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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988 South Carolina substantially amended its enactment of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code by adopting, with minor
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variations, the 1972 Official Text of the Code.' Although the adoption
of the 1972 Official Text effects many changes in the law of secured
transactions in South Carolina, the 1972 Official Text does not re-
present a radical restructuring of the 1962 Official Text,2 which South
Carolina enacted in 1966.1 In large part, the revisions to Article 9 ef-
fected in the 1972 Official Text were designed to clarify issues not re-
solved under the 1962 Official Text.4 One of the most significant sets of
clarifying amendments involves the priority rules applicable to con-
flicts between competing security interests in inventory and proceeds.5
This article surveys the resolution of these priority conflicts under the
revised Article 9. From this survey the article draws conclusions con-
cerning the appropriate relationship between the various forms of Arti-
1. See 1988 S.C. Acts 494 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-101 to -607 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989)).
Throughout this article the author compares South Carolina's former version of Ar-
ticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (i.e., the 1962 Official Text adopted by the
General Assembly in 1966 as modified) with the newly enacted version (i.e., the 1972
Official Text, as amended by the drafters in 1977, adopted by the General Assembly in
1988 as modified). Parallel citations to the Official Text and the South Carolina Code are
given in almost every instance in which a U.C.C. section is cited. When the former ver-
sion of the Official Text of Article 9 is cited, the year 1962 will be indicated parentheti-
cally, as will the year 1977 to indicate that Article 9 as a whole was last substantially
amended in that year (e.g., U.C.C. § 9-XXX(X) (1962) (amended 1977)). Likewise, when
the former South Carolina version is cited, the year of the South Carolina Code, 1976,
will be indicated parenthetically, as will the year of amendment, 1988, showing that the
former state version of Article 9 was substantially amended in that year (e.g., S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-XXX(X) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988)). When the current version of
the Official Text of Article 9 is cited, the year 1972 will be indicated parenthetically.
Again, an additional parenthetical will be provided showing that the Official Text of
Article 9 as a whole was last substantially amended in 1977 (e.g., U.C.C. § 9-XXX(X)
(1972) (amended 1977)). In the rare case in which the Article 9 section cited was actually
created in 1977, that year alone will be indicated parenthetically (e.g., U.C.C. § 9-
XXX(X) (1977)). Citations to the new South Carolina version of Article 9 will be cited to
the 1989 supplement to the South Carolina Code (e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-XXX(X)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)).
When a quotation is identical in both the Official Text of Article 9 and the South
Carolina Code, parallel citations are given. When the South Carolina Code varies in any
way from the Official Text of a quoted section, the South Carolina version is quoted and
thus the citation is only to the South Carolina Code.
2. See REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT, app.,
195 (1971) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 477, 483 (1973).
3. See 1966 S.C. Acts 1065 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-101 to -507 (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988)).
4. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., at 195-96.
5. See id. paras. E-29 to -38, at 221-26; see also Coogan, supra note 2, at 516-17
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cle 9 financing available to debtors in the business of selling inventory.
This article envisions a debtor who sells inventory to buyers in the
ordinary course of business under either secured or unsecured credit
terms. The debtor contemplated requires financing both to acquire the
inventory it holds for sale, and to provide working capital. This article
further assumes that the debtor's inventory and the receivables gener-
ated by sales of inventory constitute the principal collateral that the
debtor can provide to secure the necessary financing.
The priority rules of Article 9 suggest that several forms of secured
financing may be available to this debtor. The debtor can finance its
inventory acquisition by granting either its supplier or an inventory
"floor planner" a purchase money security interest6 in items of inven-
tory that they finance to secure the debtor's obligation to pay the
purchase price or the enabling loan. The debtor also can grant a lender
a floating lien upon its current and after-acquired receivables. Addi-
tionally, the Code contemplates financing through the sale of the
debtor's accounts and chattel paper for new value.7 Perhaps the most
basic form of Article 9 financing available to the debtor, however, is to
secure all advances a lender makes by granting the lender a floating
lien on current and after-acquired inventory and proceeds.8
Article 9 does much to facilitate financing through a floating lien
on inventory. The Code expressly validates both after-acquired prop-
erty9 and future advance clauses.10 The Code system of notice filing
also permits a secured party to perfect a security interest in the
debtor's current and after-acquired inventory through a single fling."
Moreover, under the revised Article 9, the filing with respect to the
inventory generally will continue the perfected status of the security
6. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). An inventory floor planner is a secured party who makes loans to a
debtor to enable the debtor to acquire inventory, and retains a purchase money security
interest.
7. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972) (amended 1987), §§ 9-102(1)(b), -308(b) (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-201(37), -9-102(1)(b), -308(b) (Law. Co-op.
Supp, 1989).
8. See generally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 10.01, at 10-2 (2d ed. 1988) (since loan is ongoing line of
credit, security interest must "float"); Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. REv.
838 (1959) (discussing the controversial floating lien permitted by Article 9).
9. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-204(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
10. See U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-204(3)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
11. See U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
402 comment 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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interest in the proceeds realized on the sale of the inventory.12 Most
significantly, the priority rules of revised Article 9 afford substantial,
but far from complete, protection to floating lienors if they are the first
to file a financing statement covering the debtor's inventory.1
The significance of the floating lien can be appreciated only in the
context of the Article 9 priority rules governing conflicting security in-
terests in inventory and proceeds. An analysis of these priority rules,
however, must commence with a consideration of the essential di-
lemma confronting an inventory financer. Under section 9-307(l)14 a
buyer in ordinary course who purchases collateral from a debtor takes
free of a security interest created by the debtor, even if the security
interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence. The effect of
section 9-307(1) upon an inventory financer is pronounced. The normal
operation of the debtor's business results in the erosion of the inven-
tory financer's original collateral. Accordingly, the inventory financer
must adopt a strategy to protect its secured position.
The most straightforward method of protection is to insist that
the debtor repay the secured debt as the items of collateral are sold.
This strategy is particularly effective if the inventory financer is a sup-
plier or floor planner to whom the debtor must turn for additional fi-
nancing. If the inventory financer holds a floating lien that secures an
advance of working capital, however, the repayment strategy may not
be practical. The floating lienor must then seek protection through its
security interest in the proceeds realized on the sale of the collateral
and the dealer's after-acquired inventory. As a result, the floating lie-
nor's priority in both after-acquired property and proceeds is critical to
maintaining its secured position.
Under the revised Article 9, however, the floating lienor is not as-
sured of priority with respect to either after-acquired property or pro-
ceeds. Much of this article is devoted to analyzing the situations in
which a conflicting claim can prime the security interest asserted by a
floating lienor who was the first to file a financing statement covering
the debtor's inventory. For example, a subsequent purchase money fi-
12. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) to (b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(3)(a) to (b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
13. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), (6) to (7) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §
36-9-312(5)(a), (6) to (7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
14. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 36-1-201)
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1990]
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nancer can prime the floating lienor with respect to after-acquired in-
ventory."' Moreover, a variety of secured parties who claim the pro-
ceeds of the inventory as original collateral can prime the floating
lienor's proceeds claim.16
The vulnerability of the floating lienor's security interest in after-
acquired property and proceeds does not negate the utility of the float-
ing lien on inventory. Rather, the priority rules of revised Article 9
effectively control the relationship between floating lien financing,
purchase money financing, and receivables financing. Through an anal-
ysis of these priority rules, this article will define the respective roles of
the various forms of financing available to a debtor in the business of
selling inventory. 17 Ultimately, the article will venture some conclu-
sions concerning the relationship between these forms of financing."8
II. CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVENTORY
In most priority disputes involving conflicting security interests in
inventory, at least one of the secured parties holds a floating lien on
the debtor's current and after-acquired inventory. For the most part,
this article surveys the range of priority disputes over inventory from
the perspective of a floating lienor who perfected its security interest
by filing. The article typically assumes that the floating lienor was the
first secured party to file with respect to the debtor's inventory. The
initial focus will be on the floating lienor's priority against conflicting
security interests in inventory under the basic priority rule of revised
section 9-312(5)(a). 19 The focus will then turn to the extent to which a
subsequent purchase money inventory financer can prime an earlier-
filed floating lienor under the "super priority" rules of revised section
9-312(3).2 0
15. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra text accompanying notes 126-30.
16. A secured party who filed with respect to a debtor's accounts before the inven-
tory financer filed with respect to the inventory is entitled to priority over the inventory
financer with respect to the accounts as proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), (6) (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a), (6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra
text accompanying notes 908, 934-44. Moreover, a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper
who gives new value and takes possession in the ordinary course of business is entitled to
priority over a financer who claims the chattel paper merely as proceeds of inventory.
U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(b) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989); see infra text accompanying notes 710-43.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 1029-36.
18. See id.
19. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
20. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
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A. The Floating Lienor Versus Prior Secured Parties Who Perfect
Automatically
Revised section 9-312(5)(a)2' sets forth the basic priority rule gov-
erning conflicts between secured parties asserting perfected security in-
terests in the same collateral. Under this provision the first secured
party to file or perfect with respect to the collateral is entitled to prior-
ity. Moreover, for purposes of determining priority under this rule, a
secured party can rely on the date of its filing or perfection, whichever
is earlier. While revised section 9-312(5)(a) states a residual priority
rule applicable only when no special priority rule governs the conflict,22
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
21. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral must be determined accord-
ing to the following rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of
filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made
covering the collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected,
whichever is earlier, provided that there is no period thereafter when
there is neither filing nor perfection.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
22. Revised section 9-312(5) applies in cases not governed by other rules stated in
revised section 9-312. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
9-312(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Revised section 9-312(1) provides that the priority
rules set forth in sections 4-208, 9-103, and 9-114 govern when applicable. U.C.C. § 9-
312(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
This article considers revised section 9-114, which controls disputes between a floating
lienor and a subsequent consignor of inventory, the most significant of these three prior-
ity provisions. See infra notes 322-442 and accompanying text. Revised section 9-312(1)
further provides that the priority rules stated in other sections of Part 3 of Article 9
govern when applicable. From this article's perspective, the most significant special pri-
ority rules in Part 3 are the following: section 9-306(5), governing conflicts in returned
and repossessed inventory, U.C.C. § 9-306(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §
36-9-306(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 744-907, 988-1014 and accompany-
ing text; revised section 9-307(1), governing the rights of buyers in the ordinary course,
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989); see supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 876-80 and
accompanying text; revised section 9-308, governing the rights of purchasers of chattel
paper and instruments, U.C.C. § 9-308 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
308 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 697-742 and accompanying text; revised
section 9-309, protecting purchasers of instruments and documents, U.C.C. § 9-309
(1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text; and section 9-315, governing conflicts over commin-
gled or processed goods, U.C.C. § 9-315 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
315 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 313-21 and accompanying text.
1990]
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the provision will control many priority disputes over a debtor's
inventory.
Since revised section 9-312(5)(a) awards priority to the first se-
cured party to file or perfect, a lender contemplating a loan secured by
a debtor's existing inventory must determine whether another party
has filed against or perfected a security interest in that inventory. In
South Carolina the lender usually can determine whether a financing
statement has been filed against a debtor's inventory located in the
state by searching the records in the office of the Secretary of State.23
Nevertheless, since security interests in inventory can be perfected by
taking possession,2' either through a pledge2 5 or, more commonly,
through a field warehouse arrangement,26 the prospective lender must
Subsections (2) through (4) of revised section 9-312 also set forth special priority
rules. See U.C.C. § 9-312 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). From this article's perspective, the most significant special priority rule of
revised section 9-312 is set forth in subsection (3), which provides for a super priority for
purchase money inventory financers. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 114-321, 669-80, 961-63,
988-1000 and accompanying text.
23. See U.C.C. § 9-401(1)(c) (1972) (amended 1977) (Second Alternative); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-401(1)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). An exception to this rule arises if
the goods constitute inventory because they are held by the debtor for lease, see U.C.C. §
9-109(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989),
and the goods are of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction. See U.C.C. § 9-
103(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-103(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
In such cases security interests are perfected by filing in the jurisdiction in which the
debtor is located. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
103(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). "A debtor is considered located at his place of busi-
ness if he has one, at his chief executive office if he has more than one place of business,
otherwise at his residence." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-103(3)(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
Therefore, if the goods at issue are inventory because they are held for lease, are mobile,
and are of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction, the potential lender must
search the filings in the Secretary of State's office in the jurisdiction in which the debtor
is located.
A search of the filings in the South Carolina Secretary of State's office is normally
effected by submitting a request for information pursuant to South Carolina Code sec-
tion 36-9-407(2). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-407(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
24. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 36-9-305 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
25. The pledge may be of the goods themselves or of a negotiable document of title
covering the inventory. A secured party can perfect a security interest in a negotiable
document by taking possession of the document. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Moreover, while goods are in the
possession of the issuer of a negotiable document, a security interest in the goods is
perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document. U.C.C. § 9-304(2) (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Therefore, by
taking possession of a negotiable document, a secured party perfects a security interest
in the underlying goods.
26. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
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also determine whether the debtor has possession of the inventory. A
critical issue arises when the lender's inquiry establishes that no fi-
nancing statements have been filed against the existing inventory and
the debtor has possession of the inventory. The question presented is
whether the lender is assured of priority with respect to the debtor's
existing inventory when filing the first financing statement covering
that inventory. The answer to this question is no.
A secured party who files first with respect to inventory in a
debtor's possession is not assured of priority because in certain situa-
tions Article 9 provides for the automatic perfection of security inter-
ests in inventory. To illustrate this problem, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 1-On June 1 Buyer, a farm equipment dealer lo-
cated in Barnwell, South Carolina, entered into a contract with Seller,
located in Seattle, Washington, to purchase ten tractors, which Buyer
intended to hold as inventory. The contract provided for a documen-
tary'sale.2 7 On June 5 Seller delivered the tractors to a rail carrier in
Seattle and procured a negotiable bill of lading covering the tractors.
Also on June 5, Seller drew a sight draft on Buyer, which Seller at-
tached to the negotiable bill of lading. Finally on June 5, Seller for-
warded the sight draft and negotiable bill to Barnwell through bank-
ing channels.
On June 6 Buyer and Bank entered into a written security agree-
ment under which Bank extended new value to Buyer to enable him
to honor the sight draft. The security agreement granted Bank a se-
curity interest in the negotiable document and the underlying goods.
On June 10 Buyer, using the funds provided by Bank, honored the
sight draft and obtained possession of the negotiable bill of lading.
Buyer, however, immediately surrendered the bill of lading to Bank.
On June 20 the tractors arrived in Barnwell and Bank released the
negotiable bill of lading to Buyer to enable Buyer to accept delivery of
the tractors. Also on June 20, Buyer surrendered the negotiable bill of
lading to the rail carrier and took possession of the tractors.
On July 1 Buyer and Finance Company entered into a written
security agreement that granted Finance Company a security interest
in Buyer's current and after-acquired inventory to secure a contempo-
raneous loan and any future advances. Also on July 1, Finance Com-
pany filed a properly executed financing statement in the Secretary of
State's office that identified the collateral as Buyer's inventory of
tractors.
On July 5 Bank filed a financing statement in the Secretary of
State's office that described the collateral as the ten tractors.
27. See generally Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts Under the Uniform Commer-
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Both Bank and Finance Company have perfected security inter-
ests in the ten tractors. Although Finance Company filed first, Bank is
entitled to priority under revised section 9-312(5)(a), since Bank per-
fected its security interest before Finance Company filed. Section 9-
304(2)28 provides that while goods are in the possession of the issuer of
a negotiable document, a security interest in the goods is perfected by
perfecting as to the document. Under section 9-304(4)29 a security in-
terest in negotiable documents is perfected for twenty-one days with-
out filing or possession if the security interest arises for new value
given under a written security agreement. Therefore, Bank's security
interest in the tractors was perfected on June 6 when it made the loan
under its security agreement.
Moreover, Bank's security interest remained continuously per-
fected. On June 10 Bank perfected its security interest in the negotia-
ble bill of lading and the underlying goods by taking possession of the
document.3 0 Additionally, under revised section 9-304(5)(a), 1 Bank's
security interest remained automatically perfected for twenty-one days
after June 20 when Bank made the negotiable bill of lading available to
Buyer for acceptance of delivery of the tractors. Finally, Bank's filing
on July 5, prior to the expiration of the twenty-one day period of auto-
matic perfection under revised section 9-304(5)(a), was effective to con-
tinue the perfected status of its security interest.32 Therefore, Bank
can rely upon June 6, the date of its initial perfection, for purposes of
determining priority under revised section 9-312(5) (a). Since Bank per-
fected before Finance Company filed or perfected, Bank is entitled to
28. U.C.C. § 9-304(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
29. U.C.C. § 9-304(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(4) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
30. See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(2), -305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-
304(2), -305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
31. U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides:
A security interest remains perfected for a period of twenty-one days with-
out filing where a secured party having a perfected security interest in an in-
strument, a negotiable document, or goods in possession of a bailee other than
one who has issued a negotiable document for the goods:
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing
the goods for the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose
of loading, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing,
processing, or otherwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to
their sale or exchange, but priority between conflicting security interest
in the goods is subject to subsection (3) of Section 36-9-312 ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
32. See. U.C.C. § 9-304(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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The lesson to be drawn from Illustration 1 is clear. Even if no
prior financing statements covering a debtor's inventory have been
filed, a prospective lender cannot rely on existing inventory in the
debtor's possession as collateral. Before a lender makes a loan secured
by inventory in the debtor's possession, the lender must do more than
determine that it is the first to file a financing statement covering the
inventory. The lender also must verify that the existing inventory is
not subject to a prior automatically perfected security interest. As a
practical matter, the secured party can protect itself from an automati-
cally perfected security interest in existing inventory by refusing to
lend against that inventory for twenty-one days after filing, and then
making the loan only if no conflicting financing statements have been
filed within that twenty-one day period.3 3 Even if the inventory was
subject to an automatically perfected security interest when the lender
filed, the failure of the secured party holding that security interest to
file within the twenty-one day period would break the continuity of the
secured party's perfection. Therefore, that secured party could not rely
upon the date of that party's original perfection for the purpose of de-
termining priority under revised section 9-312(5)(a).
B. The Floating Lienor Versus Subsequent Nonpurchase Money
Security Interests
1. Basic Application of Revised Section 9-312(5)(a)
In adopting the 1972 Official Text, the South Carolina General As-
sembly increased the protection afforded to secured parties who file
first against subsequently perfected nonpurchase money security inter-
ests. Under revised section 9-312(5)(a), a secured party who files with
respect to a debtor's inventory before the holder of a conflicting non-
purchase money security interest files or perfects is assured of priority
over the conflicting security interest. Under the 1962 Official Text, a
secured party who filed first was not assured of priority over a subse-
quent nonpurchase money security interest that was originally per-
fected in a manner other than by filing a financing statement.3 4 To
understand this aspect of the revised statute, the residual priority pro-
33. See generally McLaughlin, "Seek But You May Not Find": Non-UCC Re-
corded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953 (1985) (discussing various types of unre-
corded security interests and ways to minimize their impact on subsequent creditors).
34. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
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visions of the 1962 Official Text must be considered.
The "first to file or perfect" rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a) re-
places the two residual priority rules of the 1962 Official Text. 5 Under
the prior law, if all conflicting security interests were originally per-
fected by filing, former section 9-312(5) (a) applied and determined pri-
ority by the order of filing.36 In contrast, if one or more of the conflict-
ing security interests were originally perfected in a manner other than
filing, former section 9-312(5)(b) applied and determined priority by
the order of perfection. 37 The substitution of the first to file or perfect
rule for the two residual priority rules under the 1962 Official Text will
change the outcome in only a few situations. The amendment, how-
ever, does change the resolution of some priority conflicts in which the
subsequent party perfects by possession or automatically. Moreover,
the amendment evidences the increased importance of notice filing in
the resolution of priority disputes between secured parties under the
revised Code.
To illustrate the effect of the amendments to section 9-312(5),
consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 2-On June 1 Bank entered into negotiations with
Debtor which envisioned a loan secured by Debtor's current and after-
acquired inventory. Also on June 1, Bank filed a financing statement
that identified the collateral as Debtor's inventory. On July 1 Debtor
entered into a security agreement with Finance Company, which
granted Finance Company a possessory security interest in Debtor's
inventory to secure a contemporaneous loan. On August 1 Bank and
Debtor concluded their negotiations and executed a security agree-
ment, which granted Bank a nonpossessory security interest in
Debtor's inventory to secure a contemporaneous loan. Subsequently,
Debtor defaulted on both loans and a priority dispute arose over the
inventory in which Finance Company held a possessory security
interest.
Since Finance Company perfected its security interest by taking
possession of the collateral, the first to perfect rule of former section 9-
312(5)(b) controls the resolution of this dispute under the 1962 Official
Text. Application of former section 9-312(5)(b) required a determina-
tion of when both Bank and Finance Company perfected. Section 9-
303(1) provides that a security interest is perfected when it has at-
35. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312 reporter's note 5 (Law, Co-op. Supp. 1989).
36. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), (6) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-
312(5)(a), (6) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
37. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) to (6) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(b) to (6) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
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tached and all applicable steps for perfection have been taken."' Under
former section 9-204(1), a security interest could not attach until there
was an agreement that it would attach, the secured party had given
value, and the debtor had obtained rights in the collateral.3 9 Applying
these standards to Illustration 2, Finance Company perfected on July 1
and Bank did not perfect until August 1. Although Bank took the steps
necessary to perfect its security interest on June 1, its security interest
did not attach until August 1, since Bank did not give value or obtain
an agreement that its security attach until August 1. Thus, under the
1962 Official Text, Finance Company is entitled to priority despite
Bank's earlier filing.
The resolution of Illustration 2 under the 1962 Official Text raises
serious policy issues. By filing on June 1 Bank gave public notice of its
claim to Debtor's inventory. The Code's basic concept of notice filing
rests upon the premise that the date of filing normally fixes a secured
party's priority against conflicting security interests that arise after the
filing. Although Article 9 provides exceptions to this general rule when
strong policy reasons exist to prefer the subsequently secured party,40
there is no apparent reason to award Finance Company priority be-
cause it perfected by possession. Significantly, had Finance Company
perfected by filing on July 1, Bank would have primed Finance Com-
pany under the first to file rule of former section 9-312(5)(a).
The application of former section 9-312(5)(b) to resolve the dis-
pute depicted in Illustration 2 also affects the costs incurred by a pro-
spective lender in investigating the proposed collateral. When a pro-
spective debtor approaches a lender seeking a loan secured by existing
inventory, the lender should immediately file a financing statement
covering the proposed collateral.4 1 Before agreeing to make the loan,
the lender also should investigate both the credit worthiness of the
debtor and the status of the collateral. With respect to the collateral,
the lender should determine whether any conflicting financing state-
ments were filed against the inventory before it filed, whether the
debtor has possession of the inventory, and whether the inventory in
the debtor's possession is subject to an automatically perfected secur-
ity interest.
38. U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-303(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
39, U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-204(1) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
40. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (purchase money super priority in inventory).
41. The Code expressly permits a prospective secured lender to file "before a secur-
ity agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches." U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN, § 36-9-402(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1990]
13
Lacy: Conflicting Security Interests in nventory and Proceeds under th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Illustration 2, however, establishes that these inquiries were not
sufficient under the 1962 Official Text. Under former section 9-
312(5)(b), Bank, who filed first and did so when Debtor had possession
of the unencumbered inventory, was primed by Finance Company, a
subsequent-secured party who took a possessory security interest in
the inventory after Bank filed but before Bank executed a security
agreement and made a loan. Therefore, to be assured of priority over
subsequent security interests, the lender had to reinvestigate the col-
lateral immediately prior to making a loan in order to ascertain
whether the debtor had retained possession.
The first to file or perfect rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a)
reverses the outcome in Illustration 2. Under the revised statute, a se-
cured party's "[p]riority dates from the time a filing is first made cov-
ering the collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected,
whichever is earlier .... "14 Therefore, under revised section 9-
312(5)(a), Bank can base its claim upon its date of filing, even though
Finance Company originally perfected through possession. Because
Bank filed before Finance Company perfected, Bank prevails under the
revised statute. Moreover, since the date of filing fixes the Bank's pri-
ority under revised section 9-312(5)(a), Bank would not need to deter-
mine whether the debtor retained possession of the inventory when-it
made the loan to be assured of priority over subsequent secured
parties.
Even under the revised statute, however, such an investigation is
prudent. A secured party's priority over judicial lien creditors depends
on the secured party's perfecting its security interest before the credi-
tor acquires its lien.43 Therefore, if a judgment creditor levies on collat-
eral in the interval between filing and attachment, the secured party's
security interest will be subordinate to the claim of the lien creditor.
44
42. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
43. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-301(1)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides that "an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected ... ." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-9-301(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
44. The distinction between revised section 9-312(5)(a), under which filing without
perfection affords priority over a subsequent-secured party, and revised section 9-
301(1)(b), under which a filing without perfection does not afford priority over a subse-
quent lien creditor, appears to turn on the fact that a "judicial lien creditor" is not
directly part of the Code system of priorities. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-
44, at 227-28. The drafters appear to have concluded that a secured party and a debtor
should not be able to "squeeze out" a judgment creditor who has successfully levied on
the debtor's equity by entering into a security agreement covered by an earlier financing
statement after the judgment creditor has levied. Id.
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In any event, if, prior to the consummation of the loan, the debtor has
disposed of the collateral for whatever reason, business concerns would
suggest that the loan transaction is ill advised.
The adoption of the first to file or perfect rule also changes the
outcome of some priority disputes in which a secured party claims an
automatically perfected security interest in inventory. To illustrate this
aspect of revised section 9-312(5)(a), vary the facts of Illustration 1 by
assuming that Finance Company filed on May 1 rather than July 1.
Under the 1962 Official Text the resolution of this dispute appears to
be controlled by the first to perfect rule of former section 9-312(5)(b),
since Bank originally perfected automatically under section 9-304(4).
Bank's date of perfection was June 6, when its security interest at-
tached. Finance Company, despite its May 1 filing, was not perfected
until July 1, when it entered into a security agreement and gave value.
Therefore, under the 1962 Official Text, Bank would have been enti-
tled to priority. In contrast, under the first to file or perfect rule of
revised section 9-312(5)(a), Finance Company can base its claim for
priority upon its May 1 filing. Therefore, under the residual priority
rule of the 1972 Official Text, Finance Company primes Bank. Note,
however, that since Bank had a purchase money security interest in
the ten tractors under our variation of Illustration 1, Bank could have
primed Finance Company under revised section 9-312(3) if Bank had
met the notification requirements under that provision.45
2. The Application of Revised Section 9-312(5)(a) to After-
Acquired Property
The most significant component of a floating lien upon inventory
is an after-acquired property clause. Such clauses are validated by re-
vised section 9-204(1). 46 A valid after-acquired property clause, how-
ever, is of little value to the floating lienor unless the lienor can estab-
lish priority in the after-acquired inventory. Therefore, it is significant
that the provisions of revised section 9-312(5)(a) apply to after-ac-
quired property and enable the floating lienor to base its claim for pri-
ority in after-acquired inventory on the date of the lienor's original fil-
ing. As a result, the floating lienor has substantial protection against
subsequent security interests in after-acquired inventory. This protec-
tion, however, is less than complete because a subsequent purchase
money financer of new inventory can prime a floating lienor with re-
45. See infra notes 126-28, 168-87 and accompanying text.
46. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-204(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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spect to the new inventory.4 7
The effect of the first to file or perfect rule on after-acquired prop-
erty can be illustrated as follows:
ILLUSTRATION 3-On June 1 Bank entered into a written security
agreement with Debtor covering Debtor's existing and after-acquired
inventory. Also on June 1, Bank properly filed a financing statement
identifying the type of collateral as inventory. On July 1 Finance
Company entered into a written security agreement with Debtor cov-
ering the same existing and after-acquired inventory. Also on July 1,
Finance Company properly filed a financing statement covering inven-
tory. On August 1 Debtor acquired a new item of inventory. This new
inventory was not acquired with funds advanced by either Bank or
Finance Company.
Although the security interests of Bank and Finance Company at-
tached to the new item of inventory simultaneously when Debtor ac-
quired rights in the collateral, 48 and hence became perfected at the
same time,4 Bank is entitled to priority based on its earlier filing.50
That revised section 9-312(5)(a) controls priorities with respect to
after-acquired property has a pronounced impact on the traditional use
of field warehousing in inventory financing.5 1 In a variety of contexts,
but especially in financing the inventory of grain dealers, secured par-
ties have relied on possessory security interests effected through field
warehousing arrangements. 52 Reliance on a field warehousing arrange-
ment to establish and perfect a security interest in a debtor's inventory
presents a number of legal problems.5 3 The most critical problem, how-
47. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 114-291 and accompanying text.
48. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
203(1)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
49. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-303(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
50. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
51. See generally McGuire, The Impact of the UCC on Field Warehousing, 6
U.C.C. L.J. 267, 278-79 (1974) (examining policy reasons for encouraging lenders to per-
fect by filing).
52. See, e.g., South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Republic Nat'l Bank (In re R.V. Segars
Co,), 54 Bankr. 170 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985); Hodges v. Anderson (In re George B. Kerr,
Inc.), 25 Bankr. 2 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Hodges v. First Nat'l Bank, 696
F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1982).
53. For example, if the debtor has control over the warehouseman and free access
to the inventory after delivery to the warehouse, the transfer of the goods will not consti-
tute a valid bailment. As a result, the warehouse's purported possession of the inventory
will not be sufficient to establish a security agreement under revised section 9-203(1)(a)
or to perfect a security interest under revised sections 9-304(3) and 9-305. See, e.g., In re
Colonial Distrib. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1235 (D.S.C. 1968), appeal dismissed sub nom. Har-
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ever, is the risk of losing priority in after-acquired property to a subse-
quent floating lienor who perfects by filing. The risk was present under
the first to perfect rule of former section 9-312(5)(b);", it continues
under the first to file or perfect rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a).
5 5
In a traditional field warehousing arrangement the secured party
acquires a possessory security interest in a debtor's inventory.5 The
debtor is required to set aside a portion of the debtor's business prem-
ises as a field warehouse and grant an independent bailee control over
the field warehouse. The debtor then delivers inventory to the field
warehouse. In exchange for the inventory, the bailee issues nonnegoti-
able warehouse receipts in the name of the secured party and delivers
these receipts to the secured party.57 The secured party then makes
advances to the debtor against the inventory covered by the warehouse
receipts. Under section 9-304(3) these advances are secured by a per-
fected security interest on the inventory in the field warehouse.5 s
To illustrate the potential problems in a field warehousing ar-
rangement under revised section 312(5)(a), consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 4-On June 1 Bank and Debtor entered into a writ-
ten security agreement that provided for inventory financing under a
field warehouse arrangement. On July 1 Finance Company entered
into a written security agreement with Debtor, which granted Finance
Company a security interest in Debtor's current and after-acquired
inventory to secure a contemporaneous loan and any future advances.
Also on July 1, Finance Company filed a financing statement that
relson v. Lewis, 418 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1969).
54. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(b)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988); see supra note 37.
55. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
56. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 7.13, at 7-44 to -45 (discussing field
warehousing as a form of inventory financing); 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.3, at 441-42 (1965) (overview of perfection and field warehous-
ing under Article 9).
57. The practice of field warehousing agricultural products in South Carolina devi-
ates from the traditional pattern in that a state warehouse issues receipts which, accord-
ing to the bankruptcy court, are negotiable. These warehouse receipts are issued to the
debtor. The debtor then endorses the receipts and delivers them to a secured party to
secure a loan. See, e.g., South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Republic Nat'l Bank (In re R.V.
Segars Co.), 54 Bankr. 170 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985); Hodges v. Anderson (In re George B.
Kerr, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 2 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), af'd sub noma. Hodges v. First Nat'l Bank,
696 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1982); see also infra note 62 (parenthetically discussing the "state
warehouse system"). The use of negotiable warehouse receipts in a field warehousing
operation gives rise to priority issues in addition to those arising under revised section 9-
312(5)(a). See infra notes 61-84 and accompanying text for an analysis of these issues.
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identified Debtor's inventory as the collateral. On August 1 Debtor
transferred the inventory it manufactured in July to the field ware-
house in exchange for which the field warehouseman issued a non-
negotiable warehouse receipt in the name of the Bank. The field ware-
houseman then delivered the receipt to Bank and Bank made an
advance to Debtor. On September 1 Debtor defaulted on its obliga-
tions to both Bank and Finance Company. A priority dispute subse-
quently arose over the inventory manufactured in July, which was in
the possession of the field warehouse.
Both Bank and Finance Company have perfected security inter-
ests in the July 1 inventory. Bank perfected its security interest under
section 9-304(3) through the issuance of the nonnegotiable warehouse
receipt. Finance Company perfected its security interest by filing a fi-
nancing statement. Since Bank did not file a financing statement cov-
ering Debtor's inventory, under revised section 9-312(5)(a), Bank's
date for priority in the July inventory is the date on which its security
interest became perfected. Under section 9-303(1)59 Bank's security in-
terest became perfected on August 1, when the warehouse as bailee
obtained possession of the inventory and issued the nonnegotiable re-
ceipt in Bank's name. On the other hand, since Finance Company filed
with respect to Debtor's inventory, Finance Company's date for prior-
ity with respect to the July inventory is July 1, the date on which it
filed. Therefore, under the first to file or perfect rule of revised section
9-312(5)(a), Finance Company is entitled to priority over Bank with
respect to the August 1 inventory. 0
A more complex situation arises if a field warehouseman issues ne-
gotiable warehouse receipts covering goods placed in its possession. Be-
cause warehouse receipts issued by state warehouses6 covering agricul-
59. U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-303(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
60. Finance Company also would have prevailed over Bank under the first to per-
fect rule of former section 9-312(5)(b). Bank's security interest was perfected when the
warehouse issued the nonnegotiable receipt in Bank's name. Therefore, the critical issue
under former section 9-312(5)(b) was determining when Finance Company perfected.
Under former section 9-303(1), Finance Company's security interest became perfected
when it attached and when all applicable steps for perfection had been taken. Finance
Company took the steps necessary for perfection on July 1. Moreover, two of the three
requirements for attachment under former section 9-204(1) occurred on July 1. Finance
Company obtained a security agreement providing for its security interest and it gave
value on July 1. Therefore, the critical focus in determining the time of attachment and
perfection is on when Debtor acquired rights in the collateral. This question does not
have to be resolved with precision, since it is certain that Debtor had rights in the July
inventory before it delivered the inventory to the warehouse on August 1. Thus, Finance
Company's security interest in the July inventory was perfected prior to August 1. As a
result, Finance Company primes Bank under former section 9-312(5)(b).
61. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-21-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (establishing and
[Vol. 41
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss2/4
CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
tural products have been held to be negotiable, 2 the issues raised by
the use of such documents merit discussion. To analyze these issues,
consider the following illustration inspired by the facts of South Caro-
lina National Bank v. Republic National Bank (In re R.V. Segars,
Co.):13
mandating a state warehouse system for storage of nonperishable agricultural products).
62. "A warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other document of title is negotiable...
if by its terms the goods are to be delivered to bearer or to the order of a named person
.... " U.C.C. § 7-104(1)(a) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-104(1)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Many of the warehouse receipts issued by the South Carolina Department of Agriculture
do not include "bearer" or "order" language. See Hodges v. Anderson (In re George B.
Kerr, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 2, 26-27 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), af'd sub nom. Hodges v. First Nat'l
Bank, 696 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1982); see also South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Republic Nat'l
Bank (In re R.V. Segars Co.) 54 Bankr. 170, 173 n.1 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981) (dealing with
same type warehouse receipts as in Kerr, which do not include "bearer" or "order" lan-
guage). These receipts, however, do bear a legend stating: "Under the statute laws of
South Carolina, this receipt carries absolute title to the products herein described which
will be delivered only upon presentation of this receipt and payment of all warehouse
charges and expenses." Id. (quoting the precise language of the warehouse receipts).
In Kerr the bankruptcy court held that these receipts were negotiable, despite the
absence of bearer or order language. See Kerr, 25 Bankr. at 7. The court found "no
support" in the Code or case law for the assertion that warehouse receipts were nonnego-
tiable unless they contained bearer or order language. Id. Moreover, the court reasoned
that because the "absolute title" language on the receipts required that the goods be
delivered only upon presentation and surrender of the receipts, the state warehouse re-
ceipts had the essential attribute of negotiable documents of title. Id. Finally, the court
found that the usage of trade was to treat the receipts as negotiable documents of title.
Id. at 6. In Segars the bankruptcy court reaffirmed its determination that such ware-
house receipts are negotiable. Segars, 54 Bankr. at 173.
The conclusion of the bankruptcy court that the warehouse receipts in Kerr and
Segars were negotiable can be challenged on several grounds. First, consideration of
trade usage to establish negotiability appears proper only in cases of documents used in
overseas trade. See U.C.C. § 7-104(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-104(1)(b) (Law.
Co-op. 1976). Therefore, the court's apparent reliance on trade usage to establish negoti-
ability appears improper. Second, and more significantly, the Code expressly provides
that a domestic warehouse receipt that contains neither bearer nor order language is
nonnegotiable. See U.C.C. § 7-104(2) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-104(2) (Law. Co-op.
1976). Finally, the comment to section 7-104 substantially undercuts the court's reliance
on the "absolute title" legend to support its conclusion that the receipts were negotiable.
The comment states:
A document of title is negotiable only if it satisfies this section. "Delivera-
ble on proper indorsement and surrender of this receipt" will not render a doc-
ument negotiable. Bailees often include such provisions as a means of insuring
return of nonnegotiable receipts for record purposes. Such language may be
regarded as insistence by the balee upon a particular kind of receipt in con-
nection with delivery of the goods.
U.C.C. § 7-104 comment (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-104 comment (Law. Co-op. 1976).
63. 54 Bankr. 170 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985). Segars, however, involved a nonpossessory
security interest in farm products rather than inventory. For a decision involving a prior-
ity dispute over inventory covered by warehouse receipts issued by the South Carolina
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ILLUSTRATION 5-On June 1 Bank entered into a written security
agreement with Dealer, which granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory of peanuts to secure a
contemporaneous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank
filed a financing statement covering Dealer's inventory of peanuts in
the Secretary of State's office. When Bank entered into the security
agreement it knew that Dealer, as an ongoing practice, stored some of
its inventory of peanuts in state warehouses and that negotiable ware-
house receipts were being issued to the Dealer for those peanuts. Dur-
ing the month of June Dealer took possession of ten tons of peanuts it
had purchased from farmers on unsecured credit. On July 1 Dealer
placed the ten tons of peanuts in a state warehouse and the South
Carolina Department of Agriculture issued a negotiable warehouse re-
ceipt to Dealer covering the peanuts. On August 1 Dealer endorsed
the negotiable warehouse receipt and delivered it to Finance Company
as security for a contemporaneous loan. On September 1 Dealer de-
faulted on both loans from Bank and Finance Company. A priority
dispute subsequently arose over the ten tons of peanuts, which re-
mained in the possession of the state warehouse.
Both Bank and Finance Company hold perfected security interests
in the ten tons of peanuts. Bank's security interest was perfected by
the June 1 filing; Finance Company's security interest was perfected
when it took possession of the negotiable warehouse receipt on August
1.64 Therefore, unless a special priority rule controls the conflict, Bank
will prime Finance Company under the first to file or perfect rule of
revised section 9-312(5) (a). Finance Company, however, can argue that
a special priority rule applies. Finance Company can assert not only
that it holds a perfected security interest in the peanuts, but also that
it qualifies as a good faith holder to whom a negotiable document of
title has been duly negotiated. 5
Department of Agriculture, see Kerr, 25 Bankr. 2.
64. See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(2), -305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-
304(2), -305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
65. See U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
This section provides:
A negotiable document of title is "duly negotiated" when it is negotiated in the
manner stated in this section to a holder who purchases it in good faith with-
out notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person and
for value, unless it is established that the negotiation is not in the regular
course of business or financing or involves receiving the document in settle-
ment or payment of a money obligation.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Subsection (1) of section 7-501 provides that "[a] negotiable document of title run-
ning to the order of a named person is negotiated by his indorsement and delivery."
U.C.C. § 7-501(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Subsection
(2)(a) of section 7-501 provides that "[a] negotiable document of title is also negotiated
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Two Code provisions afford protection to persons who acquire ne-
gotiable documents by due negotiation. First, under revised section 9-
309 such holders "take priority over an earlier security interest even
though perfected." 66 Although this provision is somewhat ambiguous,
when properly interpreted it applies to earlier perfected security inter-
ests in a negotiable document and not to security interests in the un-
derlying goods perfected before the document was issued.17 Therefore,
revised section 9-309 does not assist Finance Company in its dispute
with Bank. Finance Company, however, may be able to invoke its sta-
tus as a holder to whom a negotiable document has been duly negoti-
ated to claim priority under section 7-503(1)(b) 68
The foundation for Finance Company's argument under section 7-
503(1)(b) is intricate. Section 7-503(1)(b) is an exception to an excep-
tion. The general rule is stated in section 7-502(1)(b), which provides
that subject to section 7-503, "a holder to whom a negotiable document
of title has been duly negotiated acquires . . . title to the goods [cov-
ered by the document] . "..."69 The exception to this general rule is
set forth in section 7-503(1), which provides that "[a] document of title
confers no right in goods against a person who before issuance of the
document had. . . a perfected security interest in them .... "o70 Para-
graph (b) of section 7-503(1) then provides the exception to the excep-
tion. Under paragraph (b), if a secured party who perfected a security
interest in the goods before the document of title was issued acqui-
esced in the debtor's procurement of that document, the secured party
is precluded from arguing that the document does not confer title to
the goods.7 1
Since section 7-503(1)(b) is an exception to an exception to the
by delivery alone when by its original terms it runs to bearer." U.C.C. § 7-501(2)(a)
(1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
66. U.C.C. § 9-309 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
67. See Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the
Interplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17-21 (1978). Cf. Se-
gars, 54 Bankr. 170 (applying both section 9-309 and section 7-503(1)(b) to a conflict
involving a security interest in goods which was perfected before issuance of a negotiable
document).
68. See U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976). This section provides that "[a] document of title confers no right in goods against
a person who before issuance of the document had a legal interest or a perfected security
interest in them and who [has not] . . . acquiesced in the procurement by the bailor or
his nominee of and document of title." U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
7-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
69. U.C.C. § 7-502(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-502(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
70. U.C.C. § 7-503(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
71. See Dolan, supra note 67, at 7-8.
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rule that a holder to whom a negotiable document has been duly nego-
tiated acquires title to the goods, to claim priority under this section
Finance Company apparently must establish both that the warehouse
receipt was negotiable7 2 and that it acquired the receipt by due negoti-
ation.73 Under the facts of Illustration 5, Finance Company should
qualify as a holder of a negotiable document" who took by due negotia-
tion, unless Bank's filing constituted notice to Finance Company of an
adverse claim to the document. Although not directly applicable to the
dispute in Illustration 5, revised section 9-309 strongly suggests that
Bank's filing does not constitute notice of the security interest.74
Therefore, Finance Company apparently qualifies as a holder to whom
a negotiable document was duly negotiated.
Assuming that Finance Company does qualify as a holder to whom
a negotiable document was duly negotiated, in order to prevail under
section 7-503(1)(b), Finance Company also must establish that Bank
"acquiesced" in Dealer's procurement of the warehouse receipt. Al-
though the Code does not define acquiesence, the comments provide
that acquiescence "does not require active consent . . .[but instead,]
knowledge of the likelihood of storage or shipment with no objection or
effort to control it is sufficient . . . . 5 Moreover, in analyzing facts
comparable to those in Illustration 5, the court in In re R. V. Segars Co.
relied on this comment to hold that the secured party had acquiesced
for purposes of section 7-503(1)(b). 76 Therefore, under the reasoning in
Segars, Finance Company in Illustration 5 apparently is entitled to
priority over Bank.
The only issue remaining in Illustration 5 is whether Finance
Company can rely upon the special priority rule in section 7-503(1)(b),
even though that provision was omitted from the list of special priority
rules in revised section 9-312(1). 7 7 Some case authority precludes a se-
cured party in the position of Finance Company from relying on 7-
72, See supra note 62.
73. See supra note 65. Whether a holder who fails to qualify as a holder to whom a
negotiable document has been duly negotiated can assert priority over a perfected secur-
ity interest under section 7-503(1)(b) is debatable. Compare Dolan, supra note 67, at 6-9
(no) with B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 7.12, at 7-42 to -44 (yes). For the reasons outlined in
the text, the author agrees with Dolan's conclusion.
74. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. COD. ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides in part that "[fliling under this chapter does
not constitute notice of the security interest to the holders or purchasers." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
75. U.C.C. § 7-503 comment 1 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503 comment 1 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
76. 54 Bankr. 170, 173-74 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985).
77. See U.C.C. § 9-312(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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503(1)(b) on the grounds that Article 9 provides the exclusive rules
governing priority disputes between two secured parties.78 Neverthe-
less, since section 7-503(1)(b) expressly addresses the conflict
presented, that provision should apply. Moreover, the court in Segars
relied on 7-503(1)(b) in awarding priority to a secured party in the po-
sition of Finance Company.
79
The lesson to be drawn from Illustrations 5 and 6 is clear. A lender
entering into a long-term inventory financing transaction should not
rely on possessory perfection under a traditional field warehouse ar-
rangement for priority over subsequently secured parties with respect
to after-acquired property. Under revised section 9-312(5)(a), a subse-
quently secured party who perfects by filing may claim priority with
respect to after-acquired inventory unless the lender can establish all
of the elements necessary under section 7-503(1)(b). This possible loss
of priority does not mean, however, that field warehousing arrange-
ments should be abandoned. Field warehousing is an effective, though
often expensive, device to police collateral.8 0 Once inventory has been
placed in a field warehouse, the debtor cannot gain access to it without
the consent of the secured party.8"
By controlling a debtor's access to the collateral, the secured party
reduces the possibility of debtor misconduct. Moreover, if the ware-
house releases the collateral to the debtor without authorization, the
secured party can hold the warehouseman liable for the ensuing loss.8 2
Therefore, in some transactions an inventory financer may be well ad-
vised to establish a field warehousing arrangement to police its collat-
eral. In such cases, however, the secured party should not rely on the
possession of the collateral by the warehouseman to evidence and per-
fect its security interest. To protect its security interest in after-ac-
quired property, an inventory financer utilizing a field warehouse ar-
rangement should insist on the execution of a written security
agreement that includes an after-acquired property clause. 3 Moreover,
to perfect its security interest, the inventory financer should, at the
outset of the transaction, iromptly file a financing statement that cov-
78. See Scallop Petroleum Co. v. Banque Trad-Credit Lyonnais S.A., 690 F. Supp.
184, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
79. See Segars, 54 Bankr. at 173-74; see also B. CLARK, supra note 8, % 7.12, at 7-43
(courts should not fail to consider impact of section 7-503).
80. See McGuire, supra note 51, at 280.
81. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 6.2, at 152-53.
82. See McGuire, supra note 51, at 282.
83. See e.g., Hodges v. Anderson (In re George B. Kerr, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 2 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Hodges v. First Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1982)
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ers the debtor's current and after-acquired inventory. 4
In summary, the application of the first to file or perfect rule to
after-acquired property facilitates long-term inventory financing. To
the extent that revised section 9-312(5)(a) applies to resolve disputes
over after-acquired property, a floating lienor who files the first financ-
ing statement covering a debtor's inventory can rely on all inventory
subsequently acquired by the debtor as collateral for the loan. The
Code, however, provides a significant exception to the first to file or
perfect rule. Although a floating lienor is the first to file with respect to
a debtor's inventory, its security interest in after-acquired inventory
can be primed by a subsequent-secured party holding a purchase
money security interest in that inventory if the purchase money fi-
nancer meets the requirements of revised section 9-312(3).85 The Code
recognizes the purchase money exception to the first to file or perfect
rule in order to preclude the floating lienor from acquiring a situational
monopoly over the extension of secured credit to the debtor.8 8 Such a
monopoly could enable the floating lienor to thwart the expansion of
the debtor's business.8 7 As discussed below, however, revised section 9-
312(3) attempts to balance the floating lienor's need to rely on after-
acquired property with the debtor's need for access to additional in-
ventory financing 8
3. The Application of Revised Section 9-312(5)(a) to Future
Advances
Many long-term inventory financing arrangements contemplate
that the floating lienor will make future advances secured by the
debtor's after-acquired inventory8 9 To facilitate such financing the
floating lienor's priority necessarily must extend to future advances.
More precisely, the floating lienor needs assurance that it will prime a
conflicting security interest with respect to secured advances it makes
to the debtor after the conflicting secured party files or perfects. Al-
though the 1962 Official Text generally afforded an earlier-filed float-
84. See McGuire, supra note 51, at 280.
85. See infra notes 114-291 and accompanying text.
86. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors,
88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167 (1979).
87. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODES § 24-5, at 1138 (3d
ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
88. See infra notes 114-291 and accompanying text.
89. The Code expressly validates future advance clauses in security agreements.
U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. 36-9-204(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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ing lienor priority with respect to subsequent secured advances, 90 two
situations gave rise to uncertainty under former section 9-312(5).
The first troublesome situation arose when the security agreement
between the debtor and the first secured party to file did not include a
future advance clause. Because a secured party with a floating lien on
inventory typically will include a future advance clause in the security
agreement, this problem rarely will arise in the context of inventory
financing. Nevertheless, to illustrate the problem, consider the
following:
ILLUSTRATION 6-On June 1 Bank and Debtor executed a written
security agreement that granted Bank a security interest in Debtor's
current and after-acquired inventory to secure a contemporaneous
loan. This security agreement did not include a future advance clause.
Also on June 1, Bank filed a financing statement that identified its
collateral as Debtor's inventory. On July 1 Debtor repaid the loan ob-
tained from Bank. Debtor did not, however, request Bank to provide a
termination statement and no termination statement was filed. On
August 1 Finance Company and Debtor executed a written security
agreement which granted Finance Company a security interest in the
same inventory claimed by Bank to secure a contemporaneous loan by
Finance Company. Also on August 1, Finance Company filed a financ-
ing statement covering Debtor's inventory. On September 1, to secure
an additional loan to Debtor, Bank and Debtor entered into a second
security agreement, which granted Bank a security interest in the in-
ventory described in Bank's June 1 financing statement.
The issue presented is whether Bank is entitled to priority over
Finance Company with respect to the September 1 loan. Former sec-
tion 9-312(5)(a) appears to award priority to Bank because it was the
first party to file. On comparable facts, however, the court in Coin-O-
Matic Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co."' reached the
opposite result.92 The holding in Coin-O-Matic, however, is a minority
interpretation of the 1962 Official Text.9 3 Although the drafters of the
1972 Official Text expressed concern over and specifically disapproved
90. If both secured parties originally perfected by filing, the first to file rule of
former section 9-312(5)(a) governed priorities. Moreover, under this rule the priority
given to the first secured party to file extended to future advances. See FINAL REPORT,
supra note 2, app., para. E-42, at 227; 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 35.7, at 939-40.
91. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966).
92. Id. at 1120.
93. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-4, at 1133-35; see, e.g., In re Rivet, 299
F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Household Fin. Corp. v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 233, 235
A.2d 732 (1967); see also Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Cheney Inv., Inc., 227 Kan. 4,
605 P.2d 525 (1980) (if security agreement is executed, value is given, and financing
statement describing collateral is filed, later advances made pursuant to subsequent se-
curity agreements are perfected as of date of original filing).
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of the holding in Coin-O-Matic,94 the drafters concluded that a statu-
tory amendment was not necessary to overrule the decision." Rather,
the drafters included an illustration in the Official Comments to re-
vised section 9-312 rejecting the result in Coin-O-Matic.26 Therefore,
although the resolution of Illustration 6 may have been unclear under
prior law, under revised section 9-312(5)(a), Bank should prime Fi-
nance Company as to the September 1 loan.
The resolution of Illustration 6 under the revised Code graphically
illustrates the Code's policy of notice filing and provides a warning to
potential lenders in the position of Finance Company. Even though
there may have been equity in Debtor's collateral on July 1, and even
though Bank's June 1 security agreement did not provide for future
advances, based on its earlier filing Bank can establish a prior claim to
the equity on which Finance Company relied in making its secured
loan. The lesson is clear: if a secured party has filed a financing state-
ment covering collateral of a debtor, a subsequent lender should not
lend against that collateral unless the debtor obtains and files a termi-
nation statement, 7 or the lender enters into a subordination agree-
ment with the secured party.98
The second troubling situation under the 1962 Official Text arose
when a secured party who perfected by filing made a future advance
pursuant to a future advance clause in a security agreement after a
subsequent-secured party had perfected by possession. To illustrate
this problem, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 7-On June 1 Bank and Debtor executed a security
agreement that granted Bank a security interest in all of Debtor's cur-
rent and after-acquired inventory to secure a contemporaneous loan
and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank filed a financing state-
ment covering Debtor's inventory. On July 1 Finance Company and
Debtor entered into a security agreement that granted Finance Com-
pany a security interest in Debtor's current inventory. Also on July 1,
in order to perfect the security interest, Finance Company had Debtor
transfer possession of the inventory to an independent bailee with no-
tice of Finance Company's security interest.109 On August 1 Bank
94. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-39, at 226-27.
95. Id. para. E-40, at 227.
96. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 7, example 5 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §
36.9-312 comment 7, example 5 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
97. See U.C.C. § 9-404 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-404 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
98. See U.C.C. § 9-316 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-316 (Law.
Co-op, Supp. 1989).
99. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 35.7, at 940-42.
100. See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(3), -305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-
304(3), -305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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made a future advance to Debtor under the terms of the June 1 secur-
ity agreement.
The issue presented is whether Bank has a prior claim to the inventory
in the bailee's possession so that the inventory effectively secures the
August 1 advance.
Under the 1962 Official Text, former section 9-312(5)(b) governed
the resolution of this issue because Finance Company originally per-
fected in a manner other than by filing. 10' Therefore, one had to deter-
mine which of the two claimants was the first to perfect. Recall that a
security interest is not perfected until it attaches'02 and that a security
interest does not attach until the secured party gives value.10 3 With
respect to the future advance, Bank arguably did not give value until
August 1.10 If this argument is accepted, Bank did not perfect with
respect to the future advance until August 1. Since Finance Company
perfected on July 1, the 1962 Official Text could be interpreted to
subordinate Bank's security interest to that of Finance Company to
the extent that Bank's security interest secured the August I ad-
vance. 1 1 Bank could have protected itself by determining whether
Debtor had granted a possessory security interest before Bank made
the August 1 advance. Imposing such a burden on Bank, however, ap-
pears inconsistent with the Code's concept of notice filing.
The 1972 Official Text clarifies the resolution of priority disputes
between secured parties with respect to future advances. 0 6 Under re-
vised section 9-312(7), if a secured party makes a future advance while
its security interest is perfected by filing or possession, for purposes of
101. See supra text accompanying note 37.
102. U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-303(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
103. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-203(1)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
104. See Coogan, supra note 8, at 866-68. But see 2 G. GLmroRE, supra note 56, §
35.7, at 941-42 (discussing priority of holder of security interest in future advances over
an intervening security interest).
105. See Coogan, supra note 8, at 866-68.
106. See U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1972) (amended 1977). This section provides:
If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected by filing,
[or] the taking of possession, . . the security interest has the same priority for
the purposes of subsection (5) with respect to the future advances as it does
with respect to the first advance. If a commitment is made before or while the
security interest is so perfected, the security interest has the same priority with
respect to advances made pursuant thereto. In other cases a perfected security
interest has priority from the date the advance is made.
Id.
South Carolina enacted the subsection quoted above, but inadvertently deleted the
word "so" immediately preceding the word "perfected" in the second sentence. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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revised section 9-312(5)(a), its security interest has the same priority
with respect to the future advance as it has with respect to the first
advance. 10 7 In contrast, if the secured party has perfected automati-
cally, its security interest has priority only from the date the advance
is made. 0 '
If the dispute in Illustration 7 arose under the revised statute,
Bank would prime Finance Company with respect to the August 1 ad-
vance. Since Bank perfected by filing when it made the advance on
August 1, under revised section 312(5)(a), Bank has the same priority
with respect to that advance that it had with respect to the initial loan
on June 1. Under revised section 312(5)(a) Bank would prime Finance
Company with respect to the June 1 loan, since Bank filed on June 1
before Finance Company perfected on July 1. Thus, Bank would pre-
vail as to the August 1 advance.
Revised section 9-312(7) is an improvement over prior law. First,
the revised section provides a certain answer while the resolution of
the dispute under the 1962 Official Text was uncertain. 10 9 Second,
awarding priority with respect to future advances to the secured party
who was the first to file or take possession is consistent with the policy
of notice filing. A secured party who files a financing statement
describing the collateral or who takes possession of the collateral effec-
tively gives notice to third parties that it claims the collateral as secur-
ity for current and future loans made to the debtor. If the secured
party is the first creditor to give such notice, the concept of notice fil-
ing dictates that it should be awarded priority with respect to all
advances.
Since most inventory financers perfect either by filing or taking
possession, they will be entitled to the benefit of revised section 9-
312(7). Nevertheless, a security interest in inventory can be perfected
automatically. If an inventory financer perfects automatically, however,
its priority with respect to the future advance will not relate back to
the date of the initial loan. To illustrate such a case, consider the
following:
ILLUSTRATION 8-On June 1, to secure a contemporaneous loan
and any future advances, Bank entered into a written security agree-
ment that granted Bank a security interest in certain negotiable ware-
house receipts covering Debtor's inventory of cotton then stored in a
107. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-43, at 227; see also U.C.C. § 9-
312 comment 5 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312 comment 5 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1989) (addressing priority of secured party who is first to file as to subsequent
advances).
108. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-43, at 227.
109. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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state warehouse. Also on June 1, Bank took possession of the ware-
house receipts. On June 30 Bank made the warehouse receipts availa-
ble to Debtor to enable Debtor to obtain possession of the cotton. Also
on June 30, Debtor surrendered the receipts to the warehouse and in
exchange obtained possession of the cotton. On July 1 Debtor entered
into a written security agreement with Finance Company that granted
Finance Company a security interest in the cotton to secure a contem-
poraneous loan. Also on July 1, Finance Company fied a financing
statement to perfect its security interest. On July 10 Bank made an
advance to Debtor under the future advance clause of the June 1 se-
curity agreement. On July 20 Bank filed a financing statement cover-
ing the cotton.
On June 1 Bank perfected its security interest in the negotiable
warehouse receipts by taking possession.110 Bank's perfection in the ne-
gotiable documents thus gave it a perfected security interest in the cot-
ton."' Moreover, Bank's security interest in the warehouse receipts
and the underlying cotton remained automatically perfected for 21
days after Bank made the negotiable documents available to Debtor.
1 2
On July 20 Bank filed with respect to the cotton and thus preserved
the continuity of its perfection. 1 3 Therefore, Bank had a continuously
perfected security interest which was first perfected on June 1.
Finance Company's date for priority under revised section 9-
312(5)(a) was July 1 when it filed the financing statement covering the
cotton. Therefore, had Bank made the future advance while it was per-
fected by filing or possession, under revised section 9-312(7), Bank's
priority with respect to the advance for purposes of revised section 9-
312(5) (a) would be June 1 and Bank would have primed Finance Com-
pany. In Illustration 8, however, Bank made the advance on July 10,
when it was automatically perfected under revised section 9-304(5)(a).
Therefore, under revised section 9-312(7), Bank's priority date for the
future advance is July 10, and Bank loses to Finance Company under
revised section 9-312(5)(a).
C. The Purchase Money Priority in Inventory
The validation of after-acquired property and future advance
110. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-305 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
111. See U.C.C. § 9-304(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
112. See U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
304(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
113. See U.C.C. § 9-304(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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clauses combined with the residual priority rule of revised section 9-
312(5)(a) operates to afford a floating lienor who is the first to file sub-
stantial protection against subsequent conflicting security interests in a
debtor's inventory. The Code does not, however, afford a floating lienor
absolute priority over the claims of all subsequent-secured parties.
Under revised section 9-312(3)114 a subsequent-secured party who ex-
tends new value to enable the debtor to acquire new inventory can
prime an earlier-filed floating lienor who claims the new inventory
under an after-acquired property clause. The purchase money "super-
priority" in inventory afforded by revised section 9-312(3) reflects a
basic Code policy of favoring creditors who advance new value to en-
able debtors to acquire collateral.115 As will be discussed more fully
below, however, the conditions that a purchase money financer must
meet to establish priority under revised section 9-312(3) operate to
protect the interests of an earlier-filed floating lienor.
The Code policy of preferring purchase money"1 6 financers has
114. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides:
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority
in identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory
to a buyer if:
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the inventory;
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the
holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing
statement covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing
made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the
twenty-one day period where the purchase money security interest is tempora-
rily perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 36-9-304);
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification
within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects
to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor,
describing the inventory by item or type.
S,C. CoDE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
115. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), -312(4), -313(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-301(2), -312(4), -313(4)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also U.C.C.
§§ 9-308(b), -310, -314(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-308(b), -310,
-314(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (provisions affording priority to various categories of
financers over earlier-filed lienors); see generally Gilmore, The Purchase Money Prior-
ity, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1370-1401 (1963) (analyzing provisons for priority of purchase
money security interests in inventory, noninventory, and fixture financing); Nickles, Set-
ting Farmers Free: Righting the Unintended Anomaly of UCC Section 9-312(2), 71
MINN. L. REv. 1135, 1139-80 (1987) (discussing priority of enabling interests over floating
liens).
116. For definition of purchase money security interest, see infra note 126.
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been justified by arguments of fairness and economics.117 The fairness
argument stresses that the purchase money financer has given new'
value so that the debtor can acquire the new collateral, while the se-
cured party who claims the collateral under an after-acquired property
clause has not.'" Moreover, the argument runs that conferring priority
on the purchase money financer does not impair the position of the
floating lienor because the floating lienor retains priority in collateral
other than that financed by the purchase money lender."29 In contrast,
if the law awarded priority to the floating lienor, the floating lienor




The economic arguments in support of the purchase money prior-
ity are made on two levels. First, commentators argue that the
purchase money priority is necessary to prevent an uncooperative
floating lienor from frustrating a debtor's ability to expand the
debtor's business.' 2 For example, if a floating lienor afforded absolute
priority over a debtor's after-acquired inventory refuses to finance a
117. See Nickles, supra note 115, at 1171.
118. See, e.g., Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 925, 945, 948.
119. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 86, at 1145. The authors state:
Viewed uncritically, the purchase money priority may appear to strike a
sensible balance between the interests of prior lenders, who retain their prop-
erty with respect to their original collateral, and the interests of the new
lender, who obtains a special priority in the particular item or items of prop-
erty the acquisition of which the new lender financed.
Id.; see also Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Com-
mercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 936 (1985) (arguing that giving
priority to the holders of purchase money security interests takes nothing away from
unsecured creditors); Nickles, supra note 115, at 1172-74 (not allowing purchase money
financers to have prioity over floating liens would give the floating lienor a monopoly
over extensions of credit to the debtor).
120. See Nickles, supra note 115, at 1172 (creditors who must rely on after-acquired
collateral they did not finance are almost always to blame for the predicament and,
therefore, allowing creditors to claim such collateral amounts to unjust enrichment).
121. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-5, at 1138. The authors contend:
Finally, and most pervasive, is the argument that the debtor needs some pro-
tection from a creditor who has filed a financing statement with respect to his
goods, but who is unwilling to advance additional funds. If such a debtor can
find a lender willing to finance a new line of merchandise, the purchase money
provisions enable him to give that new lender a first claim on the new mer-
chandise notwithstanding a prior filing by another creditor. Thus, the purchase
money provisions give the debtor somewhat greater bargaining power and at
least theoretically enlarge his ability to get credit.
Id.; see also, Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1337 (when bonds have been issued to finance
old equipment, it would be impossible to procure the bond holders' consent to
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new line of inventory, the debtor may be unable to obtain financing for
the new inventory.122 By permitting the debtor to grant a purchase
money financer priority in the new inventory, the Code fosters the ex-
pansion of the debtor's business.123 Second, and on a more sophisti-
cated level, commentators argue that the purchase money priority fos-
ters competition among financers and prevents the floating lienor from
maintaining a situational monopoly over extension of credit to the




In order to establish priority under revised section 9-312(3), an in-
ventory financer must hold a purchase money security interest in the
inventory at issue.126 Moreover, the purchase money financer must
122. If a debtor were unable to grant priority to a purchase money financer of new
inventory, the purchase money financer would extend credit only if it could obtain a
subordination agreement from the earlier-filed floating lienor, or it could rationally ex-
tend credit on an unsecured basis. Significantly, the purchase money financer could not
rely on the equity created by the new inventory because the earlier-filed floating lienor
could appropriate this equity by making a subsequent advance secured by the inventory.
Under the Code's residual priority rules, the floating lienor's priority would extend to
this advance. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. Furthermore, even if the
purchase money financer were willing to extend credit because it obtained a subordina-
tion agreement or the extension of credit could be justified on an unsecured basis, the
cost to the debtor of obtaining this credit would be higher than if the purchase money
financer had priority.
First, in the case of a subordination agreement the debtor and purchase money fi-
nancer would incur transaction costs in negotiating the subordination agreement. More-
over, the floating lienor could be expected to demand compensation in exchange for sub-
ordinating its claim to the new collateral. Second, if the purchase money financer were to
extend credit in the absence of a subordination agreement, the purchase money financer
would charge a higher interest rate to compensate for the increased risk of financing the
new collateral without a right to priority. Furthermore, these increased costs of obtaining
new credit probably would exceed any savings to the debtor which would flow from af-
fording the floating lienor priority. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 86, at
1167-74 (Article 9 policy of giving priority to purchase money security interests is eco-
nomically advantageous to both floating lienor and to debtor).
123. See Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,
962 (1986).
124. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 86, at 1167; Special Project, The Priority
Rules of Article 9, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 834, 870-71 (1977).
125. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 86, at 1171-72.
126. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). This section provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent
that it is:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of
its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if
such value is in fact so used.
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meet two additional requirements. First, the purchase money security
interest must be perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the inventory.127 Second, the purchase money financer must notify cer-
tain holders of conflicting security interests who perfected by filing
that it has or expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in
the debtor's inventory.1 28 Finally, revised section 9-312(3) severely lim-
its the extent to which the purchase money priority in inventory ex-
tends to proceeds realized by the debtor on the sale of inventory.
129
Both the conditions imposed on the purchase money priority and the
limitations on the extension of the priority to proceeds operate to pro-
tect secured parties holding conflicting security interests. This section
will analyze the operation and effect of the perfection and notification
conditions on the purchase money priority in inventory. The effect of
the proceeds limitations will be analyzed in Part III.130
Revised section 9-312(3) does not represent a radical departure
from prior law. Rather, the 1972 amendments clarify uncertainties that
arose under former section 9-312(3)."3' Most significantly, the 1972
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
The case law illustrates two problems an inventory financer may encounter in estab-
lishing that it holds a purchase money security interest. First, if a purchase money fi-
nancer responds to a debtor's default by refinancing the transaction, most courts hold
that the security interest retained in the refinancing agreement is a nonpurchase money
security interest. See, e.g., Dominion Bank v. Nucholls, 780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1985);
Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984);
Rosen v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 17 Bankr. 436 (D.S.C. 1982). But see Billings v. Avco
Colo. Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1988). The courts that hold
that a refinancing transforms a purchase money security interest into a nonpurchase
money security interest reason that the refinancing involves a repayment of the original
loan and an extension of a new loan. Accordingly, they hold that the security interest
retained upon refinancing does not secure an advance made to enable the debtor to ac-
quire the collateral. See Matthews, 724 F.2d at 800.
The second and more significant problem arises when an inventory financer extends
credit to enable a debtor to acquire specific inventory pursuant to a security agreement
that includes an after-acquired property clause and a future advance clause. In South-
trust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985), the court
held a secured party that financed a debtor's acquisition of inventory could not claim a
purchase money security interest when it exercised a future advance clause and an after-
acquired property clause in its security agreement. Id. at 1243.
127. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
128. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. 36-9-
312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 162-291 and accompanying
text.
129. See infra notes 636-50, 930-58 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 651-54, 961-1000 and accompanying text.
131. Section 9-312(3) of the 1962 Official Text provided:
A purchase money security interest in inventory collateral has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if
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amendments resolve the question of whether the purchase money pri-
ority extends to proceeds. Although the 1972 Amendments do not vary
the perfection condition upon the purchase money priority, they do al-
ter the requirements of the notification condition. 32 The amendments
to the notification provisions not only clarify the process of giving no-




1. The Perfection Condition
To claim priority in inventory under revised section 9-312(3), a
purchase money financer's security interest must be perfected at the
time the debtor receives possession of the inventory.135 This require-
ment is significant because two potential classes of nonpurchase money
financers may assert conflicting security interests in the inventory sub-
ject to the purchase money security interest. First, a conflicting claim
may be asserted by a floating lienor who filed covering a debtor's in-
ventory before the debtor acquired the purchase money collateral. The
floating lienor may claim a security interest in the new inventory under
an after-acquired property clause. Recognition of a purchase money
priority would impair the floating lienor's position if the lienor relied
on the new inventory as collateral for a future advance. Although the
perfection requirement of revised section 9-312(3)(a) provides the
floating lienor some notice of most purchase money security inter-
ests,'13 the notification requirements of subsections (b) through (d)
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral; and
(b) any secured party whose security interest is known to the holder of the
purchase money security interest or who, prior to the date of the filing made
by the holder of the purchase money security interest, had filed a financing
statement covering the same items or type of inventory, has received notifica-
tion of the purchase money security interest before the debtor receives posses-
sion of the collateral covered by the purchase money security interest; and
(c) such notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects
to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor,
describing such inventory by item or type.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
132. See id.
133. See infra notes 168-78, 195-202 and accompanying text; see also FINAL REPORT,
supra note 2, app., paras. E-29 to E-31, at 221-23 (explaining the necessity of clarifying
certain notice provisions of the 1962 Official Text).
134. See infra notes 203-91 and accompanying text.
135. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
136. See id. But see U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §
36-9-304(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Section 9-304(5)(a) provides that a purchase
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provide the principal protections to earlier-filed floating lienors 31
The second potential class of secured parties holding conflicting
nonpurchase money security interests consists of those creditors who
perfect nonpurchase money security interests after the debtor has re-
ceived possession of the new inventory. When a purchase money fi-
nancer of new inventory originally perfects by filing, the requirement
of revised section 9-312(3)(a) operates to protect subsequent lenders
contemplating a loan to a debtor secured by existing inventory. If a
purchase money financer files before the debtor receives possession of
the collateral, a subsequent lender will have notice of the purchase
money security interest before relying on the new inventory by ex-
tending credit secured by that inventory.
Although the operation of revised section 9-312(3)(a)' is fairly
straightforward when applied to subsequent secured parties holding
conflicting nonpurchase money security interests, several aspects of the
provision merit further discussion. First, the perfection requirement of
revised section 9-312(3)(a) does not afford the purchase money fi-
nancer a grace period for perfection. The absence of a grace period
distinguishes revised section 9-312(3) from the purchase money provi-
sions in revised section 9-301(2),138 revised section 9-312(4),139 and re-
money security interest in inventory can be automatically perfected when the debtor
obtains possession of the collateral. In such a case the perfection requirement affords no
notice to an earlier-filed floating lienor. Id.; see generally supra notes 28-33, 45 and ac-
companying text (analysis of automatically perfected purchase money security interests
in inventory).
137. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally infra notes 162-291 and accom-
panying text (analysis of notification requirements under revised section 9-312(3)(b) to
(d)).
138. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-301(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase security interest
before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral,
he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor
which arise between the time. the security interest attaches and the time of
filing.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-301(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
The adoption of the 1988 Amendments reduced the grace period in South Carolina
Code section 36-9-301(2) from twenty days to ten days. In 1979 South Carolina adopted
a provision inconsistent with section 9-301(2) of the 1962 Official Text. This amendment
increased the grace period from ten to twenty days. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980) (repealed 1988). This inconsistent amendment was ill-advised
because purchase money financers who relied upon the twenty day grace lost the ability
to claim the purchase money exception to the trustee's power to avoid preferences in
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1988).
139. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(4) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides that "[a] purchase money security in-
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vised section 9-313(4)(a), 140 all of which afford a purchase money fi-
nancer a ten-day grace period for perfection. These grace periods
accommodate the "transaction filing" systems developed under pre-
Code law. Prior to adoption of the Code, conditional sellers and
purchase money chattel mortgagees filed executed conditional sales
contracts and chattel mortgages to perfect their liens.141 The drafters
adopted the grace periods to conform the Code to these practices.
142
Moreover, the grace periods expedite purchase money financing trans-
actions. 14 3 A supplier retaining a purchase money security interest need
not delay delivery until filing if the supplier can obtain priority by fil-
ing within a subsequent grace period. In order to evaluate the perfec-
tion rule of revised section 9-312(3)(a), one must first compare it to the
purchase money priority rule of revised section 9-312(4) and then to
the priority rules governing fixtures in revised section 9-313(4)(a) and
(b).
Revised section 9-312(4) sets forth the super priority rules gov-
erning purchase money security interests in collateral other than in-
ventory.4 Under this provision, a purchase money financer is entitled
to priority over a secured party holding a conflicting nonpurchase
money security interest in the same collateral if the purchase money
financer perfects within ten days after the debtor receives possession of
the collateral. The difference between revised sections 9-312(3)(a) and
9-312(4) is illustrated by the following:
ILLUSTRATION 9-On June 1 Seller entered into a written contract
to sell bulldozers to Debtor on credit. The contract granted Seller a
purchase money security interest in the bulldozers to secure Debtor's
terest in collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in
the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected at
the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
140. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(4)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where:
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest
of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the se-
curity interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures
or within ten days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the
real estate or is in possession of the real estate . . ..
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(4)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
141. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 15.2, at 466.
1,42, See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-5, at 1148-59.
143. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 16.2, at 498.
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obligation to pay the purchase price. On June 5 Debtor received pos-
session of the bulldozers. On June 10 Debtor and Bank entered into a
written security agreement that granted Bank a security interest in
the bulldozers and after-acquired property of the same character to
secure a contemporaneous loan. Also on June 10, Bank filed a financ-
ing statement in the Secretary of State's office, which described the
collateral so as to include the bulldozers. On June 15 Seller filed a
financing statement in the Secretary of State's office, which described
the collateral as the bulldozers.
If the bulldozers in the possession of the Debtor constituted inventory
under section 9-109(4),'145 Seller's filing on June 15, after Debtor re-
ceived possession of the collateral, was too late to enable Seller to
claim priority under revised section 9-312(3). Therefore, revised section
9-312(5)(a) would apply to resolve the priority dispute. Under that
provision, Bank would prevail because it was the first party to file or
perfect. 46 In contrast, if the bulldozers in Debtor's possession were
equipment under section 9-109(2), 4  Seller's June 15 filing was within
ten days after Debtor received possession of the collateral and thus
preserved Seller's purchase money priority under revised section 9-
312(4).
In principle, the requirement of revised section 9-312(3)(a), that a
security interest be perfected when the debtor receives possession of
the collateral, is preferable to the grace period afforded under revised
section 9-312(4). By conditioning a purchase money financer's priority
on perfection at the time the debtor receives possession of the collat-
eral, revised section 9-312(3)(a) limits the situations in which a subse-
quent inventory financer can be misled by a debtor's apparent unen-
145. U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(4) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
Goods are . . . "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them
for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or he has so
furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process, or materials used
or consumed in a business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his
equipment.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
146. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
147. U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
Goods are . . . "equipment" if they are used or brought for use primarily
in business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-
profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are
not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products, or consumer goods
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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cumbered ownership of the collateral.148 Moreover, the policy of
protecting secured parties against secret liens appears to outweigh the
need to expedite purchase money financing under Article 9. Article 9
envisions notice filing by which a secured party can perfect its security
interest by filing a financing statement prior to the execution of a se-
curity agreement.149 Given the availability of notice filing, in most
cases there is little reason for a priority rule that provides a grace pe-
riod for perfection against subsequent-secured parties.
Although the rule of revised section 9-312(3)(a) appears preferable
to the grace period of revised section 9-312(4), the General Assembly
could have protected subsequent-secured parties without depriving the
purchase money financer of noninventory collateral of a grace period
with respect to prior secured parties. For example, the purchase money
priority with respect to fixtures under revised section 9-313(4)(a) pro-
vides for a ten-day grace period, but this grace period applies only to
conflicting real estate interests that arose before the goods become fix-
tures.150 With respect to real estate interests that arise after the goods
become fixtures, the "first in time, first -in right" rule of revised section
9-313(4)(b)1 51 controls.152 For purposes of comparison, consider the fol-
lowing illustration of the operation of the revised fixture provision:
ILLUSTRATION 10-On January 10 First Bank loaned Debtor funds
to purchase an office building and recorded a real estate mortgage,
which encumbered the office building and any after-acquired fixtures
and improvements. On June 1 Debtor purchased a new furnace for the
office building from Seller under a conditional sales contract, which
granted Seller a purchase money security interest in the furnace to
secure Debtor's obligation to pay the purchase price. The furnace was
148. Note, however, that if the purchase money security interest is automatically
perfected under revised section 9-304(5)(a), the perfection affords no notice to a subse-
quent-secured party. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33, 45.
149. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-402(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
150. See U.C.C. § 9-313 comment 4(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
9-313 comment 4(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
151. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(4)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where. . . the security
interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer
or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any conflicting
interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor
has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(4)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
152. See U.C.C. § 9-313 comment 4(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
9-313 comment 4(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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installed on June 5 and upon installation became a fixture. On June
10, Debtor obtained a loan from Second Bank secured by a mortgage
upon the office building. Also on June 10 Second Bank recorded its
mortgage. On June 15 Seller made a proper fixture filing covering the
furnace.
Under revised section 9-313(4)(a) Seller's fixture filing on June 15
was effective to afford Seller priority over First Bank. The protection
of revised section 9-313(4)(a), however, does not extend to afford Seller
priority over Second Bank.5 3 By its terms, revised section 9-313(4)(a)
applies only to real estate interests that arise before the goods become
fixtures. Since Second Bank acquired its mortgage lien on June 10, af-
ter the goods were installed, the priority dispute between Seller and
Second Bank is resolved under the residual rule of revised section 9-
313(7)," which awards priority to Second Bank as the holder of an
interest in the real estate. Seller could have avoided the effect of re-
vised section 9-313(7) and established priority over Second Bank by
meeting the requirements of revised section 9-313(4)(b). Under section
9-313(4)(b) Seller would have primed Second Bank if the Seller had
made a fixture filing before Bank recorded. 55
In summary, the Code provides three distinct perfection rules for
purchase money priority. Revised section 9-312(3)(a) affords no grace
period for perfection with respect to either prior or subsequent non-
purchase money security interests. Revised section 9-312(4) provides a
grace period of ten days applicable to both prior and subsequent con-
flicting security interests. Revised section 9-313(4)(a) allows a purchase
money financer a ten-day grace period only with respect to prior con-
flicting interests. From the perspective of a subsequent creditor, the
rules of either revised section 9-312(3)(a) or revised section 9-313(4)(a)
are preferable to the grace period permitted under revised section 9-
312(4). By providing a ten-day grace period for perfection that applies
to subsequent-secured parties, the Code creates a problem of apparent
ownership. Because of the perfection rule of revised section 9-312(4), a
lender can rely on a debtor's existing, apparently unencumbered prop-
erty other than inventory only if the lender can establish that the
debtor has been in possession of the collateral for more than ten days.
A remaining question is whether a provision allowing a grace pe-
riod against prior secured parties is preferable to the no grace period
153. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
313(4)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
154. U.C.C. § 9-313(7) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(7) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
155. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
313(4)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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provision of revised section 9-312(3)(a). To resolve this question, the
position of a prior secured creditor who might make an advance
against the purchase money collateral must be analyzed. Ironically, in
the abstract, a grace period applicable against prior secured parties ap-
pears more appropriate in the context of revised section 9-312(3) than
it does under revised sections 9-312(4) and 9-313(4)(a). Under revised
section 9-312(3) a prior secured party claiming a floating lien on a
debtor's inventory cannot be primed by a subsequent purchase money
financer unless the floating lienor receives written notice of the
purchase money security interest before the debtor receives possession
of the new inventory.156 Therefore, the purchase money financer's filing
before the debtor receives possession of the collateral is not essential to
protect the floating lienor from making advances in reliance upon the
new inventory.
In contrast, under revised sections 9-312(4) and 9-313(4)(a) the
purchase money priority is not conditioned on notice to prior secured
parties holding conflicting security interests. Under these provisions,
the purchase money financer's filing is the only notice to a prior se-
cured party that warns the secured party not to rely on the after-ac-
quired collateral in making an advance. The absence of a notification
requirement, combined with the ten-day grace period for perfection
under revised section 9-312(4), precludes a prior secured party from
relying on after-acquired collateral in making a future advance unless
the collateral has been in the debtor's possession for ten days.
15 7
The comments defend the absence of a notification requirement
under revised section 9-312(4), and by implication the ten-day grace
period for perfection, on the grounds that "an arrangement for periodic
advances against incoming property is unusual outside the inventory
field."158 The purchase money priority rule of revised section 9-
313(4)(a) similarly precludes a prior mortgagee from relying on after-
acquired fixtures in making advances unless the goods have been fix-
tures for more than ten days. Significantly, however, revised section 9-
313(6)15 " precludes a fixture financer from claiming priority under re-
156. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
157. See McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 966.
158. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312
comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
159. U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to
subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a con-
struction mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods be-
come fixtures before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it
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vised section 9-313(4)(a) when the prior mortgage is a construction
mortgage.""0 Construction mortgagees typically make a series of ad-
vances to the mortgagor while the building is in construction. The pre-
clusion from asserting the purchase money priority against a prior con-
struction mortgagee affords the mortgagee substantially greater
protection when making advances in reliance on after-acquired fixtures
than a notification requirement would provide.
The final aspect of the perfection requirement of revised section 9-
312(3)(a) that merits mention is that the requirement does not elimi-
nate for subsequent secured parties the problem of apparent owner-
ship. A purchase money security interest in inventory in the possession
of the debtor can be perfected without filing under section 9-
304(5)(a)."6' As Illustration 1 demonstrates, because of this possibility
a lender cannot rely on a debtor's existing inventory simply because no
financing statements have been filed against that inventory when the
debtor received possession of the inventory or when the lender makes
the loan.
2. The Notification Condition
Revised section 9-312(3) retains the basic requirement of the for-
mer statute: to obtain the super priority, a purchase money financer of
new inventory must give notification of its purchase money security
interest to certain prior secured parties claiming conflicting security in-
terests in the new inventory.112 The notification requirement is in-
tended to protect earlier-filed floating lienors.16 3 In the absence of such
notification, a floating lienor who filed first with respect to a debtor's
inventory might assume it had a prior claim to the new inventory as
after-acquired property and thus make a future advance against the
is given to refinance a construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to
the same extent as the construction mortgage.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
160. "[A] mortgage is a 'construction mortgage' to the extent that it secures an obli-
gation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the acquisition
cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates." U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(c) (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(1)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
161. U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
162. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
163. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 36-9-312
comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-31,
at 222 ("[T]he obvious purpose of Section 9-312(3) [is] to permit a first-filed inventory
financer to rely on his priority in making advances unless he receives notice of a compet-
ing purchase money security interest before the debtor receives the inventory.").
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new collateral.164 The manner in which the revised section imposes the
notification requirement, however, differs in several aspects from the
former law.
The notification requirements of revised section 9-312(3) are set
forth in subsections (b) through (d). Each of these subsections appears
to address a distinct aspect of the notification process. Although sub-
section (b) specifies that the notification must be written, its principal
function is to define the secured parties that the purchase money fi-
nancer must notify in order claim the super priority.16 Subsection (c)
addresses the timing of the notification.1 66 Finally, subsection (d) de-
fines the content of the notification.
16 7
Subsection (b) of revised section 9-312(3) requires a purchase
money financer to give written notice to holders of conflicting security
interests who have filed their financing statements before the purchase
money financer files or before the beginning of the twenty-one day pe-
riod during which the purchase money financer claims automatic
perfection under section 9-304(5).16 8 Revised subsection (b) makes sev-
eral changes in the prior law. First, former section 9-312(3)(b) did not
clearly state whether the purchase money notification had to be in
writing.69 Second, the former statute required a purchase money fi-
nancer to give notification not only to holders of conflicting security
interests who had filed before the purchase money financers filed, but
also to any secured party whose security interest was known to the
purchase money financer.170 Under revised subsection (b), the purchase
money financer is not required to notify secured parties holding con-
flicting security interests unless those parties filed a financing state-
ment before the purchase money financer files or before the period of
automatic perfection under section 9-304(5) begins.'
7 '
The most interesting change made by the 1988 amendments to
164, See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
165, See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
166, See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
167. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
168. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
169, See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.3, at 787-88; J. WHITE & R. SUMmERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-5, at 918 (1972)
[hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK].
170. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(b)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
171. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-30, at 222.
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section 9-312(3)(b) is the enactment of subparagraph (ii) relating to
purchase money security interests automatically perfected under sec-
tion 9-304(5). Subparagraph (ii) applies when a lender finances the
debtor's acquisition of new inventory through a documentary sale
172
and initially perfects its purchase money security interest in the new
inventory by perfecting a security interest in a negotiable bill of lading
covering the goods.'" The purchase money financer may initially per-
fect its security interest either automatically under revised section 9-
304(4)174 or by taking possession of the document. 7 5 Subsequently, the
purchase money financer may release the negotiable bill of lading to
the debtor to enable the debtor to obtain possession of the new inven-
tory from the carrier. Under revised section 9-304(5)(a),' 17  the
purchase money security interest in the negotiable bill of lading and
the underlying goods continues to be perfected automatically for
twenty-one days following the release of the document to the debtor. If
the purchase money financer has not been paid prior to the expiration
of the twenty-one day period, it can continue the perfected status of its
security interest by filing before the end of that period. 7 7 In such a
transaction, subparagraph (b)(ii) apparently conditions the purchase
money financer's super-priority on giving notice to any conflicting se-
cured party who filed before the twenty-one day period of automatic
perfection under revised section 9-304(5) begins.
7 8
To illustrate a straightforward application of revised section 9-
312(3)(b)(ii), consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 11-On June 1 Bank entered into a written security
agreement with Dealer, under which Bank retained a security interest
in Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory to secure a contem-
172. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
173. See U.C.C. § 9-304(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
174. U.C.C. § 9-304(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(4) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides that "[a] security interest in instru-
ments or negotiable documents is perfected without filing or the taking of possession for
a period of twenty-one days from the time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new
value given under a written security agreement." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(4) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1989).
175. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. 36-9-305 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
176. U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
177. See U.C.C. § 9-304(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
178. But see infra text accompanying notes 240-56 (revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii)
can be read to require the purchase money financer to give notification before the com-
mencement of the twenty-one day period of automatic perfection).
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poraneous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank prop-
erly filed a financing statement covering Dealer's inventory.
On July 1 Dealer entered into a written contract to purchase new
inventory from Seller. This contract provided for a documentary sale.
On July 5 Seller delivered the new inventory to a rail carrier, which
issued a negotiable bill of lading to Seller covering the new inventory.
Also on July 5, Seller drew a sight draft on Dealer for the purchase
price of the new inventory, and forwarded the sight draft and negotia-
ble bill of lading to a bank in Dealer's city.
On July 6 Dealer entered into a written security agreement with
Finance Company, under which Finance Company advanced Dealer
the funds necessary to honor the sight draft. This security agreement
granted Finance Company a security interest in the negotiable bill of
lading and the underlying new inventory. On July 9 Dealer paid the
sight draft using the funds advanced by Finance Company and ob-
tained possession of the negotiable bill of lading. Dealer, however, im-
mediately delivered the negotiable bill of lading to Finance Company.
On August 1 the new inventory arrived in Dealer's city. On Au-
gust 2 Finance Company released the negotiable bill of lading to
Dealer to enable him to take delivery of the new inventory. On August
5 Dealer surrendered the negotiable bill of lading to the rail carrier
and obtained possession of the new inventory. On August 20 Finance
Company filed a financing statement covering the new inventory. On
September 1 Dealer defaulted on both obligations to both Bank and
Finance Company, and a priority dispute arose over the new inven-
tory which remained in Dealer's possession.
Both Bank and Finance Company have perfected security inter-
ests in the new inventory. Bank's security interest arose under the af-
ter-acquired property clause in its security agreement and was per-
fected by its June 1 filing. Finance Company obtained a security
interest in the negotiable bill of lading and the new inventory under its
July 1 security agreement. Finance Company's security interest in the
negotiable bill of lading was originally perfected automatically under
section 9-304(4) on July 1.179 Moreover, Finance Company's perfection
in the negotiable document perfected its security interest in the new
inventory.18 0 Finance Company's security interest continued perfected
through possession of the negotiable bill of lading from July 6 to Au-
gust 1.181 Following Finance Company's release of the negotiable bill of
179. See U.C.C. § 9-304(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
180. See U.C.C. § 9-304(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
181. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-305 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying note 30 (illustrating perfec-
tion of security interest in goods covered by a negotiable document through possession of
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lading to Dealer on August 1, its security interest remained automati-
cally perfected for twenty-one days."s2 Finally, Finance Company con-
tinued the perfected status of its security interest by filing on August
20.183
If revised section 9-312(5)(a) controls the resolution of this dis-
pute, Bank will prevail over Finance Company because Bank filed on
June 1 and Finance Company did not perfect until July 1. Finance
Company, however, holds a purchase money security interest in the
new inventory because it advanced value to enable Dealer to acquire
the new inventory and the value was in fact so used.8 4 Therefore, Fi-
nance Company will be entitled to priofity under revised section 9-
312(3) if it met the conditions of that provision. Under the facts stated
in Illustration 11, however, Finance Company failed to meet the condi-
tions for the purchase money priority. Because Bank had filed on June
1 and before the beginning of the period of automatic perfection,
which, under revised section 9-304(5)(a), was on August 2, revised sec-
tion 9-312(3)(b)(ii) required Finance Company to give Bank written
notice of its purchase money security interest.18 5 Since Finance Com-
pany failed to give such notification, Finance Company cannot claim
priority under revised section 9-312(3). As a result, revised section 9-
312(5)(a) applies to resolve the conflict"8 s and awards priority to
Bank.
s87
The curiosity in revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) becomes apparent if
we vary the facts of Illustration 11 by assuming that Bank filed on July
10 rather than June 1. Since Bank's July 10 filing was before the com-
mencement of Finance Company's period of automatic perfection
under revised section 9-304(5)(a), revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) condi-
the document).
182. U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying note 31 (illustration of
continued perfection under section 9-304(5)(a)).
183. See U.C.C. § 9-304(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying note 32 (illustration of
continued perfection by filing).
184. See U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. 36-9-107(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also supra note 126 (analysis of requirements for a
purchase money security interest).
185. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b)(ii) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b)(ii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
186. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Revised section 9-312(5) specifically provides that it applies to
determine priorities in "cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify
for the special priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-312(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
187. See supra note 21.
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tions Finance Company's purchase money priority on giving Bank
written notification. Since Finance Company did not give the written
notification, Finance Company cannot claim priority under revised sec-
tion 9-312(3). Denying Finance Company priority under revised section
9-312(3) is consistent with the purpose of the notification requirement
because Bank had no notice of Finance Company's claim to the new
inventory and might have relied upon the new inventory in making an
advance. 188 That Finance Company is precluded from establishing pri-
ority under revised section 9-312(3), however, is not fatal to Finance
Company's position. The effect of failing to qualify for the purchase
money priority is simply to relegate Finance Company to the priority
rules of revised section 9-312(5)(a). 89 Moreover, under the residual pri-
ority rule, Finance Company will prevail because it initially perfected
its security interest on July 1, before Bank filed on July 10.1'°
The result in the variation of Illustration 11 is not the product of a
flaw in revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii). Rather, it is a manifestation of
the problems that flow from the automatic perfection of security inter-
ests in inventory.19 1 Nevertheless, Illustration 11 and its variation indi-
cate that revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) was not artfully drafted. From
the perspective of a purchase money financer financing a debtor's ac-
quisition of new inventory through a documentary sale, revised section
9-312(3) is significant only with respect to holders of conflicting secur-
ity interests who filed before the purchase money financer initially per-
fected.109 Accordingly, if the function of revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii)
is to define the class of secured parties such a purchase money financer
must notify to establish a super priority, the provision should require
the purchase money financer to notify any secured party who filed
before the purchase money financer initially perfected in the negotia-
ble document.
This analysis at least suggests that revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii)
serves a function other than defining the class of conflicting secured
parties that a purchase money financer must notify to obtain a
purchase money priority. Specifically, this analysis suggests that sub-
paragraph (ii) defines when the purchase money financer must give no-
tice rather than whom it must notify.19 If this suggested interpretation
is correct, subparagraph (ii) contributes to a significant ambiguity in
188. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 186.
190. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
192. A purchase money financer who perfects before the holder of a conflicting se-
curity interest files will prevail under revised section 9-312(5)(a) and need not rely upon
revised section 9-312(3) for priority. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
193. See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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the notification requirements of the revised statute. 9 4
Subsection (c) of revised section 9-312(3) addresses the timing of
the purchase money notification. Subsection (c) conditions the
purchase money priority on "the holder of the conflicting security in-
terest receiv[ing] the notification within five years before the debtor
receives possession of the [new] inventory."'" 5 Subsection (c) clarifies
prior law to the extent that it defines how frequently the purchase
money financer must notify holders of conflicting security interests."'9
The provision continues prior law to the extent that it provides that
the notification is effective if the holder of a conflicting security inter-
est receives the notification before the dbbtor takes possession of the
new inventory, 9 7 possession being defined as physical possession. 98
194. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
195. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(c)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
196. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-29, at 221.
197. Compare U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) with U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1962) (amended 1977);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988) (substantially same
rule).
198. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.3, at 787 (" 'Receives possession' [in
former section 9-312(3)(b)] is evidently meant to refer to the moment when the goods
are physically delivered at the debtor's place of business .... "). Physical possession,
however, may not be sufficient unless the recipient qualifies as a debtor at the time of
taking physical possession. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-105(1)(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (providing that "'[d]ebtor' means the
person who owes payment. . . ."). Therefore, the notification is arguably timely under
revised section 9-312(3)(c) if it is received after the debtor receives possession of the new
inventory but before the debtor incurs an obligation to pay for that inventory. Cf. Na-
tional Acceptance Co. v. Community Bank (In re Ultra Precision Indus. Inc.), 503 F.2d
414 (9th Cir. 1974) (for purposes of section 9-312(4), a debtor receives possession of
goods sold on approval when it decides to buy the goods); Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v.
United States, 431 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1970) (when debtor purchased goods that he
had held under lease, debtor received possession for purposes of section 9-312(4) when it
incurred obligation to pay the purchase price).
Significantly, however, courts have found that a debtor receives possession of goods
purchased under a pure sales contract when taking physical possession even if installa-
tion is not completed, see Finance Co. of Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp. (In re Automated
Bookbinding Servs., Inc.), 471 F.2d 546, 553 (4th Cir. 1972), or not accepting the goods.
See Ever Ready Machinists, Inc., v. Relpak Corp. (In re Relpak Corp.), 25 Bankr. 148,
152 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). But see James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates Capital Co., 491
F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1974) (secured party may not retroactively bind debtor as of delivery
date and still obtain perfected security interest by filing within ten days of agreement).
In the case of inventory, a purchase money financer should effect notification before
the debtor's physical receipt of the collateral. The most common situation in which a
person obtains physical possession of new inventory without incurring an obligation to
pay for the goods is a true consignment. The Code, however, treats most true consign-
ments as "sale or return" transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §
36-2-326(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Furthermore, in most true consignment transactions, re-
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This requirement appears reasonable. The holder of the conflicting se-
curity interest is typically a floating lienor who claims the new inven-
tory under an after-acquired property clause. In most contexts, such a
lender would not rely on the new inventory by making a future ad-
vance before the debtor took possession of the goods. 1'99
Subsection (d) of revised section 9-312(3) defines the content of
the notification. Subsection (d) requires that, to be effective, the notifi-
cation state "that the person giving the notice has or expects to acquire
a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describ-
ing such inventory by item or type."2 °0 This language is a verbatim
adoption of the requirement set forth in former section 9-312(3)(c).' 01
The most significant aspect of subsection (d) is that when read in con-
junction with subsection (c) it permits the notification to be effective
for future purchase money security interests. 02
Although a variety of issues have arisen in cases applying the noti-
fication provisions of revised section 9-312(3)(b) through (d),'203 the
very language of the statute-gives rise to a significant issue of statutory
construction. This issue arises in determining the time at which the
notification must be given and involves an ambiguity in the require-
ments of section 9-312(3)(b). Specifically, the question raised is
whether the "before" provisions of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) should be
read as modifying the language "the purchase money secured party
gives notification" or the language "the holder [of a conflicting security
interest] had filed a financing statement. '20 4 If the first interpretation
vised section 9-114(1)(b) to (c) conditions a consignor's priority over an earlier-filed in-
ventory financer of the consignee upon the inventory financer's receiving written notice
of the consignor's interest before the consignee receives possession of the goods. U.C.C. §
9-114(1)(b) to (c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-114(1)(b) to (c) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
199. A lender might, however, rely upon a negotiable document of title covering the
new inventory while the inventory is in the possession of the issuer of the document. See
infra note 240 and accompanying text.
200. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
201. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
202. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312 reporter's note 3(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989);
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-29, at 221; see, e.g., Fedders Fin. Corp. v.
Chiarelli Bros., Inc., 221 Pa. Super. 224, 231, 289 A.2d 169, 173 (1972).
203. Most of these issues involve the sufficiency of the written notification. The
courts have held that broad descriptions of the purchase money collateral are effective.
See, e.g., Sunn Musical Equip. Co. v. Thomas (In re Beverage), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 369, 372 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1980); Fedders Fin. Corp., 221 Pa. Super. at 230,
289 A.2d at 172. Some courts have also sustained imprecise description of the collateral
in written notifications. See, e.g., Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'1 Bank, 626 F.
Supp. 1025, 1028-29 (D. Md. 1986).
204. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see B. CLARK, supra
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is correct, subsection (3)(b) defines when the purchase money notifica-
tion must be given.205 In contrast, if the latter interpretation is correct,
subsection (3)(b) merely defines the persons whom the purchase money
financer must notify.0 6
The ambiguity in revised section 9-312(3)(b) is further compli-
cated by the possibility that subparagraphs (i) and (ii) can be inter-
preted differently. Therefore, this section of the article will first con-
sider the problem potentially arising under subparagraph (i) if the
purchase money financer has perfected by filing when the debtor ob-
tains possession of the new inventory. Then, the discussion will focus
on the problem potentially arising under subparagraph (ii) if the
purchase money security interest is automatically perfected under re-
vised section 9-304(5)(a).
207
The ambiguity issue under revised section 9-312(3)(b)(i), when the
purchase money financer perfected by filing, is illustrated by the
following:
ILLUSTRATION 12-On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a
written security agreement under which Bank retained a security in-
terest in Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory. Also on June
1, Bank filed in the Secretary of State's office a financing statement
covering Dealer's inventory. On July 1 Dealer and Seller began negoti-
ating a contract under which Seller would sell new inventory to Dealer
on secured credit terms. Also on July 1, Seller filed in the Secretary of
State's office a financing statement that described the new inventory.
On July 10 Dealer and Seller concluded their negotiations and exe-
cuted a written agreement under which Seller contracted to sell new
inventory to Dealer on credit secured by a security interest in the
goods sold. On July 15 Seller gave Bank sufficient written notification
describing the new inventory in which it held a purchase money secur-
ity interest. Bank received the notification on July 20. On August 1
Seller delivered the new inventory to Dealer. On September 1 Dealer
defaulted on its obligations to both Bank and Seller. A priority dis-
pute arose concerning the new inventory which remained in Dealer's
possession.
Seller clearly meets several of the requirements for a purchase
note 8, 3.09[3][a], at 3-102 to -103; Baker, The Ambiguous Notification Requirement of
Revised UCC Section 9-312(3): Inventory Financers Beware!, 98 BANKING L.J. 4, 6-7
(1981).
205. See Baker, supra note 204, at 9.
206. See id. at 8-15. A third interpretation is possible under which the "before"
language of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) modify both the "purchase money secured party
gives notification" clause and the "the holder had filed a financing statement" clause. Id.
at 15-21. Under this interpretation, revised section 9-312(3)(b) would determine both to
whom and when written notification must be given. Id.
207. See infra text following note 229 and text accompanying notes 230-91.
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money priority. Seller has a purchase money security interest,208 which
was perfected when the debtor received possession of the new inven-
tory.20 Moreover, Seller gave Bank sufficient written notification
describing the inventory in which it claimed a purchase money security
interest,21 0 and Bank received this notification before Dealer took pos-
session of the new inventory.211 The critical question is whether the
written notification was timely. Although Bank received the notifica-
tion before Dealer received possession of the new inventory, Seller did
not give the notification before the date on which the Seller filed its
financing statement. Therefore, if the court interprets revised section
9-312(3)(b)(i) to confer the purchase money priority only if "the
purchase money secured party gives notification. . . before the date of
the filing made by the purchase money secured party, '212 Seller failed
to meet the conditions for the purchase money priority. As a result,
Bank would prime Seller with respect to the new inventory under re-
vised section 9-312(5)(a).
21 3
The commentators who have specifically addressed this ambiguity
have rejected the argument that revised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) condi-
tions the purchase money priority upon the purchase money financer
giving notification before it files.214 Furthermore, most courts that have
considered the issue have agreed with the commentators. 15 Under
these authorities, subparagraph (i) of revised section 9-312(5)(b) modi-
fies the phrase, "if the holder [of the conflicting security interest] ha[s]
filed a financing statement covering the same types of inventory. '218 In
208. See U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
209. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
210. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
211. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
212. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b)(i) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
213. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
214. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, % 3.09[3](a], at 3-102 to -103; Baker, supra note
204, at 21-22.
215. See, e.g., Diaconx Corp. v. ITT Corp. (In re Diaconx Corp.), 79 Bankr. 602,
604-05 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); King's Appliance & Elecs., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Bank, 157
Ga. App. 857, 278 S.E.2d 733 (1981). But cf. Scallop Petroleum Co. v. Banque Trad-
Credit Lyonnais S.A., 690 F. Supp. 184, 191-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (section 9-312(3)(b)(ii)
required notice be given prior to commencement of period of automatic perfection even
though debtor never had possession of the new inventory).
216. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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essence, these authorities interpret revised section 9-312(3)(b) as defin-
ing which secured parties are entitled to written notification, not when
the written notification must be given. 217 Under this interpretation, re-
vised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) simply requires a purchase money inven-
tory financer to give written notification to those secured parties who
filed before the purchase money financer filed.
Several arguments support the apparent majority view that re-
vised section 9-312(3)(b) defines whom the purchase money financer
must notify rather than when the financer must give the notification.
First, the timing of the purchase money notification is expressly ad-
dressed in revised section 9-312(3)(c). This section conditions the
purchase money financer's priority on the conflicting secured party's
receiving the written notification "within five years before the debtor
receives possession of the inventory. '218 Although the drafters of re-
vised section 9-312(3)(c) were concerned primarily with how frequently
the purchase money financer must give notice,219 the provision clearly
states that the notices must be received before the debtor receives pos-
session of the purchase money collateral. 20 Therefore, interpreting re-
vised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) to condition the purchase money priority
on the purchase money financer's giving notice before filing appears
inconsistent with the express requirements of revised section 9-
312(3) (c).
221
The second argument against reading revised section 9-312(3) (b) (i)
to require a purchase money inventory financer to give notice before it
files is that such a requirement is not necessary to effect the policy
underlying the notification provision. Revised section 9-312(3) condi-
tions the purchase money priority on notification to the holder of a
conflicting security interest to protect an earlier-filed secured party
claiming a floating lien from relying on the new inventory by making a
future advance.222 The risk of the floating lienor relying on the new
inventory, however, would rarely arise before the debtor obtained pos-
217. See King's Appliance & Elecs. Inc., 157 Ga. App. at 859-60, 278 S.E.2d at 736;
Baker, supra note 204, at 10.
218. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(c)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
219. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-29, at 221.
220. See Baker, supra note 204, at 9-10.
221. It is possible to argue that revised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) requires the purchase
money financer to give notice before filing, and that revised section 9-312(3)(c) requires
the secured party holding the conflicting security interest to receive the notification
before the debtor receives possession of the new inventory. There seems, however, no
reason for imposing such a dual requirement. Id. at 19-20.
222. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
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session of the new inventory.223 Therefore, the notification is effective
to accomplish its function if it is received by the conflicting secured
party before the debtor obtains possession of the purchase money
collateral.
The third argument against interpreting revised section 9-
312(3)(b)(i) to require a purchase money findncer to give written notifi-
cation before filing involves the policy of prompt filing implemented
under revised section 9-402(1).24 Under revised section 9-402(1), a se-
cured party can file before a security agreement is made or a security
interest attaches. Moreover, sound practice dictates that a secured
party file at the start of negotiations concerning the creation of a se-
curity interest.225 Therefore, a purchase money financer would be ex-
pected to file at the commencement of negotiations looking toward a
sale of inventory or an enabling loan.
If revised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) requires the purchase money fi-
nancer to give written notice before filing, two potential problems
arise. First, a purchase money financer must delay filing until it has
given notice, a requirement which appears inconsistent with the prac-
tice fostered under section 9-402(1). Second, potential purchase money
financers would give notification in cases in which the negotiations
failed and no purchase money security interest was created. In such
cases the notification might disrupt the debtor's financing arrange-
ments with a floating lienor, even though no purchase money financing
ever takes place.
The final argument against interpreting revised section 9-
312(3)(b)(i) to require notification prior to filing is that such an inter-
pretation is inconsistent with the 1962 Official Text22 and the drafters
did not express an intention to change the rule.227 Under former sec-
tion 9-312(3) a notification was timely if a conflicting secured party
received the notification before the debtor received possession of the
new inventory.228 Thus, under prior law, a purchase money financer
was not precluded from claiming the super priority if the financer filed
223. But see infra note 240 and accompanying text.
224. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-402(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) ("[a] financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is
made or a security interest otherwise attaches.").
225. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, T 2.13[1], at 2-136 to -138.
226. Under the 1962 Official Text the clear rule of section 9-312(3) was that the
notice must be received before the debtor receives possession of the collateral, and not
that the notice must be given before the purchase money financer filed. See Baker, supra
note 204, at 10.
227. Id.
228. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
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before giving notice. Had the drafters intended to change this rule,
presumably they would have done so clearly and would have docu-
mented the change in the Final Report and revised Official Comments.
The Final Report gives no indication that a change was intended.
Moreover, the revised Official Comments indicate that the date the
debtor receives possession 'of the new inventory is the reference point
for determining whether a notification is timely.221 9
Revised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) thus should not be interpreted to
condition a purchase money financer's super priority on giving written
notice before filing, but to provide that notification is timely if received
before the debtor obtains possession of the new inventory. The remain-
ing issue is whether revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) should be inter-
preted to require written notice before the beginning of the period of
automatic perfection under revised section 9-304(5)(a). This issue
arises when the purchase money financer initially perfects either
through possession of a negotiable document or automatically under
section 9-304(4), and subsequently releases the negotiable document to
the debtor to enable the debtor to take delivery of the goods. A notion
of consistency suggests that if revised section 9-312(3)(b)(i) does not
require notification prior to filing, revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) should
not be interpreted to require notification before the period of auto-
matic perfection begins under revised section 9-304(5)(a). Neverthe-
less, the policy of protecting floating lienors underlying the notification
requirements of revised section 9-312(3) arguably supports such an
interpretation.
To illustrate the problem in interpreting revised section 9-
312(3)(b)(ii), consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 13-On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a
written security agreement that granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory to secure a contempora-
neous loan and future advances. Also on June 1, Bank filed a financ-
ing statement in the Secretary of State's office convering Dealer's
inventory.
On July 1 Dealer entered into a written contract with Seller
under which Dealer purchased new inventory from Seller. This con-
tract provided for a documentary sale. Seller identified the new inven-
tory to this contract on July 1.
On July 2 Seller delivered the new inventory to a rail carrier and,
in exchange for the goods, received a negotiable bill of lading. Also on
July 2, Seller drew a sight draft on Dealer for the purchase price of
the new inventory. Seller then forwarded the negotiable bill of lading
and the sight draft to a bank in Dealer's city.
229. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
9-312 comment (3)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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On July 3 Dealer and Finance Company entered into a written
security agreement under which Finance Company advanced funds to
the Dealer to enable him to pay the sight draft. This security agree-
ment granted Finance Company a security interest in the negotiable
bill of lading and the underlying new inventory to secure the advance.
On July 5 Dealer paid the sight draft using the funds advanced
by Finance Company and obtained possession of the negotiable bill of
lading. Dealer immediately transferred possession of the bill of lading
to Finance Company.
On July 10 the new inventory arrived in Dealer's city and Finance
Company released the negotiable bill of lading to Dealer to enable
him to take possession of the new inventory.
On July 12 Finance Company sent written notification of its
purchase money security interest to Bank. Bank received the notice
on July 13.
On July 14 Dealer surrendered the negotiable bill of lading to the
rail carrier and obtained possession of the new inventory.
On July 31 Finance Company filed a financing statement in the
Secretary of State's office covering the new inventory.
Subsequently, Dealer defaulted under the terms of the security
agreements with Bank and Finance Company. A priority dispute arose
over the new inventory that remained in Dealer's possession.
Ultimately, the issue presented in Illustration 13 is whether the
written notification sent by Finance Company on July 12 and received
by Bank on July 13 was timely under revised section 9-312(3). To re-
solve this issue the other requirements for the super priority must first
be addressed. First, since Finance Company advanced funds to Dealer
to enable Dealer to acquire the new inventory and the funds were in
fact so used, Finance Company has a purchase money security inter-
est.2 30 Second, Finance Company's security interest was perfected
when Dealer received possession of the new inventory on July 14.231
Finance Company's security interest in the negotiable bill of lading
was automatically perfected on July 3 for a period of twenty-one
days.2 2 As a result, Finance Company's security interest in the new
inventory covered by the negotiable bill of lading was also perfected on
July 3 .23 The perfected status of Finance Company's security interest
230. See U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
231. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
232. See U.C.C. § 9-304(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
233. See U.C.C. § 9-304(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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continued when it took possession of the negotiable bill of lading.2 3'
Moreover, under revised section 9-304(5)(a) Finance Company's secur-
ity interest remained perfected for twenty-one days after it surren-
dered the negotiable bill of lading to Dealer on July 10.235 Finally, Fi-
nance Company gave Bank written notification, including a sufficient
description of the new inventory, and Bank received the notification
before Dealer obtained possession of the collateral.23 6 Therefore, unless
revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) is interpreted to require a purchase
money financer to give notification before the beginning of the twenty-
one-day period of automatic perfection, Finance Company has met the
conditions for the purchase money priority.
Arguably, Finance Company's notification was timely. First, unless
a clear indication to the contrary exists, it is fair to assume that sub-
paragraph (ii) serves the same purpose as subparagraph (i). Since the
authorities agree that subparagraph (i) defines the conflicting secured
parties who must be notified rather than when the notification must be
given,2 7 subparagraph (ii) arguably does not require a purchase money
financer to give notification before the period of automatic perfection
under revised section 9-304(5)(a) begins. Therefore, Finance Com-
pany's notification would seem timely under revised section 9-312(3)(c)
because Bank received the notification before Dealer obtained posses-
sion of the new inventory. Moreover, the Official Comments expressly
support this conclusion. Describing the operation of revised section 9-
312(3), the Official Comments state:
Where the purchase money inventory financing began by posses-
sion of a negotiable document of title by the secured party, he must in
order to retain priority give the notice required by subsection (3) at or
before the usual time, i.e., when the debtor gets possession of the in-
ventory, even though his security interest remains perfected for
twenty-one days under Section 9-304(5). 23
8
Additionally, commenting on revised sections 9-312(3)(b)(ii) and
9-304(5)(a), the Review Committee for Article 9 asserted that "the
Committee's proposed revision of Sections 9-304(5) and 9-312(3) re-
quires the notice to be given before the debtor receives the inventory,
234. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-305 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
235. See U.C.C. § 9-304(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
304(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
236. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
237. See sources cited supra notes 214-15.
238. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972" (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312
comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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and if this is done, the purchase money security interest obtains a pri-
ority and retains it so long as the interest remains perfected.P
239
In response to this argument, Bank can assert that the purchase
money notification cannot serve its function unless the notification oc-
curs before Dealer obtains possession of the negotiable bill of lading.
Even though Dealer did not have possession of the new inventory on
July 10, it did have possession of the negotiable document which enti-
tled him to possession of the goods. 2 40 Therefore, absent notification of
Finance Company's purchase money security interest, Bank might
have relied on the new inventory covered by the bill of lading. To avoid
this risk, Bank can assert that revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) should be
interpreted to condition the purchase money priority on Finance Com-
pany's giving notice before the period of temporary perfection begins.
Thus Bank would conclude that Finance Company's notification given
on July 12 was too late to satisfy the conditions for the purchase
money priority.
In the only decision to date interpreting revised section 9-
312(3)(b)(ii), the court in Scallop Petroleum Co. v. Banque Trad-
Credit Lyonnais S.A. 2 4 1 concluded that the provision requires a
purchase money financer to give notification before the period of tem-
porary perfection under revised section 9-304(5) begins.24 2 The court,
however, did not support its conclusion with the argument suggested
above. Moreover, the court appeared to be unaware that its conclusion
was inconsistent with the accepted interpretation of revised section 9-
312(3)(b)(i). Therefore, the authoritative effect of this aspect of the
Scallop Petroleum decision is debatable.
Although the interpretation of revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) in
Scallop Petroleum appears to protect a floating lienor who may rely on
new inventory covered by a negotiable bill of lading, two arguments
can be advanced in opposition to that interpretation. First, reading
subparagraph (ii) to require notification prior to the commencement of
the period of temporary perfection under revised section 9-304(5) is
not necessary to protect the interests of a floating lienor. If Bank in
Illustration 13 made an advance on July 11 in reliance on the new in-
ventory covered by the negotiable bill of lading, Bank could have en-
hanced its position by taking possession of the document. If Bank took
a possessory security interest in the negotiable bill of lading, Bank ap-
parently could qualify as a holder to whom a negotiable document of
239. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-31, at 222.
240. See U.C.C. § 7-403(1), (3) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-403(1), (3) (Law. Co-
op. 1976).
241. 690 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
242. Id. at 191-92.
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title has been duly negotiated.2 3 If so, Bank would prime Finance
Company under revised section 9-309 even if Finance Company's noti-
fication was sufficient under revised section 9-312(3).24 Therefore, the
Scallop Petroleum interpretation of subparagraph (ii) seems necessary
to protect only those floating lienors who fail to protect their own in-
terests by not taking possession of the negotiable bill of lading through
due negotiation. A court cannot be faulted for refusing to adopt a
strained interpretation of revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) to protect a
party who failed to protect itself.24
Second, the Scallop Petroleum interpretation of subparagraph (ii)
arguably should not be adopted because it does not fully protect a
floating lienor. If Finance Company had mailed written notice of its
purchase money security interest to Bank on July 9, this notification
apparently would be timely under the Scallop Petroleum interpreta-
tion of subparagraph (ii). If Bank did not receive the notification until
July 12, however, the notification would not provide Bank meaningful
notice of Finance Company's purchase money claim. For example, if
Bank made an advance to Dealer on July 11 in reliance on the new
inventory, even under Scallop Petroleum Finance Company would
prime Bank under revised section 9-312(3).
Even if a court refuses to interpret subparagraph (ii) to condition
the purchase money priority on giving written notice prior to the be-
ginning of the period of automatic perfection under revised section 9-
304(5), the court is not precluded from holding that Finance Company
in Illustration 13 failed to meet the requirements of revised section 9-
312(3). A court determined to hold in favor of Bank could find that the
243. See U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
244. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The revised section provides:
Nothing in this chapter limits the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument (Section 36-3-302) or a holder to whom a negotiable doc-
ument of title has been duly negotiated (Section 36-7-501) or a bona fide pur-
chaser of a security (Section 36-8-301), and the holders or purchasers take pri-
ority over an earlier security interest even though perfected. Filing under this
chapter does not constitute notice of the security interest to the holders or
purchasers.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
Revised section 9-309 rather than section 7-503(1)(b) would control this issue be-
cause Finance Company would be asserting an automatically perfected security interest
in the negotiable bill of lading and Bank would be asserting its status as a holder to
whom a negotiable document of title had been duly negotiated. See Dolan, supra note
67, at 17-21.
245. See James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933)
(Hand, J.) ("[I]n commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek
strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves.").
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written notification was untimely under revised section 9-312(3)(c). 241
Although Dealer did not receive physical possession of the inventory
until July 14, Dealer did receive the negotiable bill of lading on July
10. The negotiable bill of lading entitled Dealer to possession of the
new inventory.247 Moreover, pursuant to section 9-304(2), possession of
a negotiable document of title is the equivalent of possession of the
goods covered by the document.24 8 Therefore, a court could find that
Dealer received possession of the inventory on July 10, before Bank's
receipt of the purchase money notification on July 13.
On this basis the court could conclude that Finance Company
failed to meet the condition imposed by revised section 9-312(3)(c).
Such a conclusion is consistent with the intended function of the noti-
fication requirement. A purchase money financer should be entitled to
priority over an earlier-filed floating lienor only if the floating lienor
receives notice of the purchase money security interest before it can
rely upon the new inventory.2 41 In most cases a floating lienor would
not rely on new inventory until the debtor received possession of that
inventory. Nevertheless, when the inventory is in the possession of a
bailee who has issued a negotiable document and the debtor has pos-
session of the document, the floating lienor may rely on the new inven-
tory before the debtor surrenders the document and takes physical
possession of the goods.
Although the court in Scallop Petroleum did not adopt the sug-
gested interpretation of "receives possession" under revised section 9-
312(3)(c), it reached a result not inconsistent with that interpreta-
tion.2 50 The debtor in Scallop Petroleum was in the business of trading
oil. The debtor had granted security interests in the after-acquired in-
ventory of oil to two related banks. Subsequently, the debtor entered
into a contract to purchase 312,000 barrels of oil located in Italy for
shipment to New Jersey. The purchase money financer of this oil ini-
246. See supra note 131.
247. See U.C.C. § 7-403(1), (3) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-403(1), (3) (Law. Co-
op. 1976).
248. U.C.C. § 9-304 comment 2 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304
comment 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The comment provides in part:
Subsection (2), following prior law and consistently with the provisions of
Article 7, takes the position that, so long as a negotiable document covering
goods is outstanding, title to the goods is, so to say, locked up in the document
and the proper way of dealing with such goods is through the document.
U.C.C. § 9-304 comment 2 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304 comment 2
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
249. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
250. See Scallop Petroleum Co. v. Banque Trad-Credit Lyonnais S.A., 690 F. Supp.
184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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tially perfected by taking possession of a negotiable bill of lading that
covered the oil, which was issued by the company transporting the oil.
When the oil reached New Jersey, the purchase money financer appar-
ently released the bill of lading to the debtor, who in turn surrendered
it to the carrier.
251
The debtor in Scallop Petroleum, however, instructed the captain
of the vessel that had transported the oil to deliver a portion of the oil
to a third party, Belcher Oil Company. Belcher Oil in turn issued a
non-negotiable warehouse receipt to the purchase money financer cov-
ering this oil. Although the purchase money financer never gave writ-
ten notification to the banks holding the floating liens, the purchase
money financer asserted that it was entitled to priority under revised
section 9-312(3). The purchase money financer argued that since the
debtor never received possession of the oil, it was not required to give
notice.2 52 The court rejected this argument, asserting that the require-
ment of giving written notice was not excused by the debtor's failure to
take physical possession of the inventory.
253
The Scallop Petroleum court, however, did not base its decision
on the conclusion that a debtor has "received possession of the inven-
tory" for purposes of revised section 9-312(3)(c) when it has received
possession of a negotiable document covering the goods. Rather, the
court held that revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii) requires a purchase
money financer to give written notification before the period of auto-
matic perfection under revised section 9-304(5) commences, even in
cases in which the debtor never takes possession of the inventory.5 4
In conclusion, whether Finance Company primes Bank under re-
vised section 9-312(3) in Illustration 13 is uncertain. The critical issue
is whether Finance Company's notification was timely under subsec-
tions (b) and (c) of revised section 9-312(3). Although most authorities
conclude that subsection (b) defines the persons who must be notified
rather than when notice must be given,2 55 the court in Scallop Petro-
leum asserted that subparagraph (ii) conditions the purchase money
priority on notification before the twenty-one-day period of automatic
perfection under revised section 9-304(5) begins. Since Finance Com-
pany in Illustration 13 did not give written notification to Bank until
after Finance Company had surrendered the negotiable bill of lading to
Dealer and triggered the commencement of the period of temporary
perfection, Bank can argue that Finance Company's notification was
251. Id.
252. Id. at 192.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 191-92.
255. See supra notes 214-15.
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untimely under revised section 9-312(3)(b)(ii).
Even if a court rejects the Scallop Petroleum interpretation of
subparagraph (ii), Bank can argue that for purposes of subsection (c)
Dealer received possession of the new inventory when it obtained pos-
session of the negotiable bill of lading. Therefore, Bank can claim that
since it did not receive Finance Company's written notification before
Dealer took possession of the bill of lading, the notification was un-
timely under revised section 9-312(3)(c). If either of Bank's arguments
is accepted, Finance Company cannot establish a purchase money pri-
ority in the new inventory. Therefore, Bank would argue that it is enti-
tled to priority under the residual first to file or perfect rule of revised
section 9-312(5)(a).0 6
Finance Company has one final argument which rests upon the
provisions of Article 7 rather than Article 9. Finance Company can as-
sert that under section 7-503(1)(b) 257 it took free of Bank's perfected
security interest in the new inventory.0 9 To succeed with this argu-
ment, Finance Company must prevail on three basic issues. First, Fi-
nance Company must establish that it is a holder to whom the negotia-
ble bill of lading covering the new inventory has been duly
negotiated. 259 Second, Finance Company must establish that Bank ac-
quiesced in the procurement of the negotiable bill of lading.260 Finally,
Finance Company must establish that section 7-503(1)(b) supercedes
the priority rules of Article 9.
Section 7-503(1) is a limitation on the rights acquired by the
holder of a negotiable document who takes by due negotiation.261
Under section 7-502(1)(b) a holder who takes a negotiable document
by due negotiation acquires title to the underlying goods.262 The
holder's rights under section 7-502(1), however, are expressly subject to
256. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
257. U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976); see supra note 68.
258. Under this argument section 7-503(1)(b), rather than revised section 9-309,
would control the conflict at issue because Bank in Illustration 13 held a perfected secur-
ity interest in the new inventory before the negotiable bill of lading was issued. See
supra note 67, 243 and accompanying text; see also Dolan, supra note 67, at 8 (section 7-
503(1) applies to qualified holders of negotiable documents).
259. See U.C.C. 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976);
see also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
260. See U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976); see also supra notes 75-76.
261. See U.C.C. § 7-502(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-502(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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section 7-503(1).26" As a general rule, section 7-503(1) provides that a
document of title confers no right in the goods covered by the docu-
ment against a secured party who perfected a security interest in the
goods before the negotiable document was issued. Subsection 7-
503(1)(b), however, provides an exception to this general rule if the
secured party acquiesced in the procurement of the document of title.
Since section 7-503(1) limits the rights acquired by a holder of a nego-
tiable document who took by due negotiations, the exception to the
limitation should be available only to such holders.264 Therefore, to
prevail under the section 7-503(1)(b) argument, Finance Company
must initially establish that it acquired the negotiable bill of lading
covering the new inventory by due negotiation.
265
To be duly negotiated, a negotiable document must be negotiated
according to the terms of section 7-501.266 A negotiable document run-
ning to the order of a named person is negotiated by that person's en-
dorsement and delivery.2 7 A negotiable document, however, may be
negotiated only by delivery when, by its original terms, it runs to the
bearer.268 Assuming that the negotiable bill of lading in Illustration 13
was properly negotiated to Finance Company, Finance Company must
establish several additional facts to establish that it took by due nego-
tiation. Section 7-501(4) requires Finance Company to establish that it
purchased the negotiable bill of lading in good faith and for value and
without notice of any defense against a claim to it.26 Additionally, Fi-
nance Company must establish that the negotiation was in the regular
course of business or financing.
27 0
By extending credit to Dealer secured by the negotiable bill of lad-
ing, Finance Company purchased the document for value.2 7' Further-
more, Finance Company appears to have purchased the document in
good faith and in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the criti-
cal issue is whether Finance Company purchased the document with-
out notice of an adverse claim. Whether Bank had an adverse claim to
the document appears doubtful. Bank had a perfected security interest
263. U.C.C. § 7-502(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-502(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
264. See Dolan, supra note 67, at 17-21.
265. See Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 176, 190 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
266. U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
267. U.C.C. § 7-501(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
268. U.C.C. § 7-501(2)(a) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(2)(a) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
269. See U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
270. See U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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in the new inventory, but it did not claim a security interest directly in
the bill of lading. Moreover, even if Bank had a claim to the bill of
lading, Bank's financing statement should not constitute notice of its
security interest. 72 Therefore, unless Finance Company had notice
other than the filing of Bank's security interest, Finance Company
should qualify as a holder who took by due negotiation.
Under section 7-503(1), Finance Company's status as a holder of a
negotiable document who took by due negotiation does not alone en-
able it to claim title to the goods free of Bank's perfected security in-
terest. Finance Company must also establish that Bank acquiesced in
the procurement of the bill of lading.2 73 To establish that Bank acqui-
esced in the procurement of the negotiable bill of lading, Finance Com-
pany need not prove that Bank affirmatively consented to the docu-
mentary sale of the new inventory and the procurement of the bill of
lading.274 Rather, Finance Company can establish acquiescence if it
proves that Bank had "knowledge of the likelihood of. . .shipment
with no objection or effort to control it."2 75 Therefore, if Bank had
knowledge that Dealer regularly financed its purchases of new inven-
tory by negotiating bills of lading to financers and Bank made no effort
to control the practice, Finance Company has a reasonable claim that
Bank acquiesced within the meaning of section 7-503()(b).
2 7
1
The final and most critical issue raised by Finance Company's Ar-
ticle 7 argument is whether the provisions of section 7-503(1)(b)
supercede the priority rules of Article 9. The court addressed this issue
in Scallop Petroleum Co. v. Banque Trad-Credit Lyonnais S.A.2 7 7 and
concluded that Article 9, rather than section 7-503(1)(b), controlled a
priority conflict comparable to that presented in Illustration 13.278 The
court in Scallop Petroleum provided little analysis or authority to sup-
port its conclusion. The only decision the court cited to support its
position was Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley
Co. 270 Although the Douglas-Guardian court refused to apply section
272. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
273. See U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976); see generally supra notes 75-76 (discussing requirements of acquiescence).
274. See U.C.C. § 7-503 comment 1 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503 comment 1
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
275. U.C.C. § 7-503 comment 1 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503 comment 1 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 814 n.34 (5th Cir. 1971); South
Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Republic Nat'l Bank (In re R.V. Segars Co.), 54 Bankr. 170, 173-
74 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985).
277. 690 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
278. Id. at 190.
279. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 176 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
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7-503(1)(b) to allow a subsequent-secured party who perfected through
a document of title to prime an earlier-filed party, the decision is
distinguishable.
In Douglas-Guardian the subsequent-secured party perfected
through a non-negotiable warehouse receipt.2 80 The court held that sec-
tion 7-503(1)(b) can be asserted only by holders of negotiable docu-
ments who take by due negotiation.81 Therefore, the court held that
the subsequent-secured party was not entitled to assert section 7-
503(1)(b)2 82 As a result, Douglas-Guardian does not support the con-
clusion in Scallop Petroleum that section 7-503(1)(b) is inapplicable to
vary a determination of priority under Article 9 when the subsequent-
secured party is a purchaser who took by due negotiation. Moreover,
both commentators2' and other courts284 have asserted that section 7-
503(1)(b) enables a qualified holder to reverse the priorities dictated by
revised section 9-312(5)(a).
Although the Scallop Petroleum court's analysis of section 7-
503(1)(b) is less than satisfying, the court indirectly supported its con-
clusion in its analysis of section 9-309.285 Section 9-309 provides a spe-
cial priority rule to resolve certain conflicts over negotiable docu-
ments s.2 6 The provision applies when an initial secured party perfects a
nonpossessory security interest in a negotiable document either by fil-
ing or automatically under revised section 9-304(4) or (5)(a) and a sub-
sequent-secured party perfects a possessory security interest in the
document. Under section 9-309, the subsequent-secured party will pre-
280. Id. at 180-81.
281. Id. at 190.
282. Id.
283. See Dolan, supra note 67, at 17-21; see also B. CLARK, supra note 8, % 7.12, at
7-43. Professor Clark's analysis differs from that asserted above to the extent he consid-
ers section 7-503(1)(b) to be available to holders of nonnegotiable documents. See supra
notes 257-58 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Professor Clark advocates the follow-
ing two-step analysis under which Finance Company could invoke section 7-503(1)(b) to
overcome Bank's priority under Article 9:
(1) Does A [Bank] have priority over B [Finance Company] under the
first-to-file-or-perfect rule of § 9-312(5)?
(2) If so, is this priority taken away because A [Bank] gave the debtor
[Dealer] authority to store the goods or acquiesced in the issuance of the non-
negotiable warehouse receipt? The same analysis should apply when the battle
is between a prior filed financing statement and the pledgee of a negotiable
document issued after the filing.
B. CLARK, supra note 8, 7.12, at 7-43.
284. See, e.g., South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Republic Nat'l Bank (In re R.V. Segars
Co.), 54 Bankr. 170, 173-74 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985).
285. See Scallop Petroleum, 690 F. Supp. at 190-91.
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vail if the party qualifies as a holder to whom a negotiable document
had been duly negotiated. Although technically inapplicable to the dis-
pute in Scallop Petroleum,2 87 the court considered the purchase money
financer's rights under the provision. In essence, the court found that
while the purchase money financer had possession of the negotiable bill
of lading, the purchase money financer could assert priority under sec-
tion 9-309.288 The court, however, apparently accepted the floating lie-
nor's argument that the purchaser money financer lost its status as a
holder who took by due negotiations when it released the negotiable
bill of lading to the debtor.289 Therefore, after it released the negotia-
ble document, the purchase money financer could not rely upon section
9-309.
The analysis of section 9-309 in Scallop Petroleum can be applied
to section 7-503(1)(b). In terms of Illustration 13, Finance Company
arguably qualified as a holder of a negotiable bill of lading only while it
retained possession of the document.290 Consequently, when Finance
Company released the bill of lading to Dealer, it lost its status as a
holder to whom a negotiable document of title had been duly negoti-
ated. As a result, on release of the document Finance Company lost its
ability to prime Bank under section 7-503(1)(b). After the release, Fi-
nance Company's priority turned on compliance with the requirements
of revised section 9-312(3).
Ultimately, this analysis represents the best accommodations of
the conflicting policies of section 7-503(1)(b) and revised section 9-
312(3). The policy of encouraging commercial reliance on negotiable
documents of title supports a decision to subordinate the security in-
terest of a floating lienor who acquiesces in the procurement of a nego-
tiable document to the claim of a subsequent holder to whom the doc-
ument has been duly negotiated. When the holder releases the
negotiable document to the debtor without giving the floating lienor
notification of the holder's purchase money security interest, the poli-
cies of section 9-312(3) support a decision to subordinate the holder's
security interest in the goods. By releasing the negotiable document to
the debtor without notification to the floating lienor, the purchase
money financer has given the debtor the appearance of unencumbered
ownership of the underlying goods. Hence, the debtor's possession of
287. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
288. See Scallop Petroleum, 690 F. Supp. at 190.
289. Id.
290. See U.C.C. 1-201(20) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(20)
(Law. Co-op. 1976). This section provides that "'[holder' means a person who is in
possession of a document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn,
issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
201(20) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added).
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the negotiable document has the potential to induce reliance on the
part of the floating lienor.
291
3. Conflicting Purchase Money Security Interests
A final priority issue under xevised section 9-312(3) arises when
both secured parties hold purchase money security interests in the
same item of inventory. If only one of the purchase money financers
satisfies the conditions of revised section 9-312(3), that party should be
entitled to priority. Moreover, the residual priority rule of revised sec-
tion 9-312(5)(a) will apply if both of the purchase money financers fall
to meet the conditions of revised section 9-312(3).292 The interesting
issue arises when both purchase money financers have met the condi-
tions for priority under revised section 9-312(3). To illustrate this con-
flict consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 14-On June 1 Finance Company and Boat Dealer
entered into a security agreement under which Finance Company
agreed to advance Dealer $40,000 to enable Dealer to purchase a sail-
boat from Manufacturer. The security agreement granted Finance
Company a security interest in the sailboat to secure this loan. On
June 1 Finance Company filed a financing statement covering the sail-
boat. Also on June 1, Finance Company drew a check for $40,000 pay-
able jointly to Boat Dealer and Manufacturer.
On June 5 Manufacturer and Boat Dealer entered into a written
contract under which Boat Dealer purchased the sailboat for $50,000.
On June 5 Boat Dealer endorsed the $40,000 check over to Manufac-
turer as a down payment. On June 5 Boat Dealer and Manufacturer
also executed a security agreement under which Manufacturer re-
tained a security interest in the sailboat to secure the remaining
$10,000 of the purchase price. Finally, on June 5 Manufacturer gave
written notice of its security interest to Finance Company. On June 6
Manufacturer filed a financing statement covering the sailboat.
On June 7 Finance Company received the written notice of Man-
ufacturer's security interest. On June 10 Boat Dealer received posses-
sion of the sailboat.
Both Finance Company and Manufacturer hold purchase money
security interests in the sailboat. Finance Company's security interest
arose under section 9-107(b),2 93 and Manufacturer's arose under sec-
291. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
292. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Tri-City Motors & Sports, Inc., 171 Mich. App.
260, 279, 429 N.W.2d 871, 880 (1988).
293. See U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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tion 9-107(a).19 4 Furthermore, both secured parties met the conditions
for priority under revised section 9-312(3). Finance Company's security
interest was perfected when Boat Dealer received possession of the in-
ventory. 0 5 Moreover, since no financing statements were filed against
Boat Dealer's inventory when Finance Company filed, Finance Com-
pany's purchase money priority was not subject to the condition of giv-
ing written notification. 29 1 Manufacturer's security interest also was
perfected when Boat Dealer received possession,2 97 and Manufacturer
satisfied the applicable condition of giving timely written notifica-
tion.2 9 8 Thus, both secured parties qualify for the purchase money pri-
ority under revised section 9-312(3). Applying revised section 9-312(3),
however, produces a less than satisfying result. On one hand, because
Manufacturer has met the conditions of subsection (3), it "has priority
over [the] conflicting security interest"2 9 asserted by Finance Com-
pany. On the other hand, Finance Company "has priority over [the]
conflicting security interest" 0 0 asserted by Manufacturer because Fi-
nance Company has also met the conditions of subsection (3).
Although other solutions have been proposed, 01 most authorities
would resolve the dilemma depicted in Illustration 14 either by apply-
ing the residual rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a) and awarding prior-
ity to the first secured party to file or perfect, 0 2 or by ordering a pro
rata distribution.3 0 3 In support of applying revised section 9-312(5)(a),
294. See U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
295. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
296. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
297. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
298. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
299. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
300. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
301. See Johnson & Battersby, Article Nine Dual Purchase Money Financing:
Creditor Priority, 67 MICH. B.J. 44 (1988). Johnson and Battersby advocate awarding
priority to the seller over an institutional purchase money financer who filed first on the
grounds that the institutional lender is in a better position to discover the potential
conflict. Id. at 47.
302. See Framingham UAW Credit Union v. Dick Russell Pontiac, Inc., 41 Mass.
App. Dec. 146 (1969); John Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ass'n, 686 S.W.2d 904, 907-08
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-5, at 1149 (when
both parties comply with subsections (3) or (4) of section 9-312, priority should be deter-
mined under section 9-312(5)).
303. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, T 3.09[5], at 3-120; Legislation, Competing
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one can argue that cases involving the conflict between two purchase
money security interests that meet the conditions for a super priority
"are not governed by" the rule stated in subsection (3).304 A more com-
pelling argument in favor of applying subsection (5)(a), however, rests
upon the basic structure of revised section 9-312. Although set forth as
a residual rule, revised section 9-312(5)(a) can be viewed as a general
priority rule which controls unless a party can establish an exception.
Under this view, Finance Company is entitled to priority unless Manu-
facturer establishes that subsection (3) applies to award Manufacturer
priority. Although Manufacturer meets the literal requirements of sub-
section (3), Finance Company can argue that the conflict in Illustration
14 is not within the intended scope of that provision.
The function of subsection (3) is to enable a subsequent purchase
money financer to prime an earlier-filed secured party who claims the
new inventory as after-acquired property.30 5 This special priority rule
is often supported by an argument that the purchase money financer
has given new value to enable the debtor to acquire the new inventory
Purchase Money Security Interests, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 456 (1970); Special Project,
supra note 124, at 883-84.
304. Professors White and Summers base their argument in favor of applying re-
vised section 9-312(5) on the express language of that provision. See WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 87, § 24-5, at 1149. The focus of their analysis, however, is on the parenthetic
language, "(including cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for
the special priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section)", U.C.C. § 9-
312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989),
rather than the preceeding language, "[i]n all cases not governed by other rules stated in
this section." U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). White and Summers interpret the parenthetic language to
cover cases in which a secured party is not "entitled to the special priority" under sub-
sections (3) and (4). WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-5, at 1149 (emphasis added).
They then reason that if both secured parties satisfy the conditions for a purchase
money priority, neither is "entitled" to priority under the special priority rules of subsec-
tions (3) and (4). Id. As a result, White and Summers conclude that the parenthetic
language dictates the application of revised section 9-312(5)(a). Id.
The analysis set forth by White and Summers is not true to the language of the
statute. The parenthetic language expressly covers cases in which the purchase money
financers "do not qualify for the special priorities" in subsection (3) and (4). U.C.C. § 9-
312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)
(emphasis added). In the conflict addressed by White and Summers, both secured par-
ties "qualify" for priority under subsection (3), even though neither is "entitled" to pri-
ority under that subsection. Therefore, the argument advanced by White and Summers
does not support their conclusion. A better argument in support of their position is that
subsection (3) does not "govern" a conflict between two purchase money security inter-
ests which meet the conditions under that provision. See infra text accompanying note
305.
305. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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while the prior secured party has not.306 When the prior secured party
is a purchase money financer, neither the purpose nor the rationale of
subsection (3) is applicable. Moreover, the notification requirement is
also irrelevant. The purpose of the notification requirement is to pro-
tect the prior secured party from relying on new inventory when mak-
ing an advance.30 7 When the prior secured party is a purchase money
financer, it typically will have extended credit before it receives notifi-
cation. Therefore, Manufacturer arguably does not fall within the ex-
ception to revised section 9-312(5)(a) provided by subsection (3).
Initially, the application of revised section 9-312(5)(a) to resolve
the dispute in Illustration 14 seems at least arguably consistent with
the Code's basic policy of awarding priority based upon notice filing.
Since Finance Company filed prior to Manufacturer, Manufacturer was
on notice to inquire about Finance Company's security interest. Had
Manufacturer made appropriate inquiries, it would have discovered
that Finance Company had a purchase money security interest. Upon
making this discovery, Manufacturer could have refused to go forward
with the sale absent a subordination agreement. This argument is
flawed, however, to the extent that revised section 9-312(3) purports to
allow a purchase money financer meeting the conditions of that subsec-
tion to rely on its priority in the new inventory, even if an earlier filing
covers the debtor's inventory.308 Therefore, the Code does not envision
the purchase money financer making inquiry concerning the status of
the security interest claimed under the earlier-filed secured party.30
Because revised section 9-312(3) encourages both purchase money
financers to rely on having priority in the new inventory, subsection (3)
arguably should control to the extent possible.310 Moreover, in order to
afford both purchase money financers a benefit for complying with the
requirements of subsection (3), their security interests arguably should
rank equally and share pro rata.31 One way to justify this approach is
306. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
308. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.09[5], at 3-120.
309. As a practical matter, however, when a prospective buyer tenders a down pay-
ment in the form of a check drawn by a lender payable jointly to the prospective buyer
and seller, the seller should assume that the lender is engaged in purchase money financ-
ing. The seller should then withhold performance until it reaches a satisfactory agree-
ment with the lender over the relative priority of their purchase money security
interests.
310. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.09[5], at 3-120; Special Project, supra note 124,
at 883-84.
311. Although the Code does not expressly provide that security interests of equal
rank share pro rata, this is the position adopted by Gilmore, see 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 56, § 34.5, at 913, and accepted by other commentators. See, e.g., Special Project,
supra note 124, at 883 n.227.
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to invoke general equitable principles under section 1-103.312 Another
route to reaching a pro rata distribution is to invoke the principles of
section 9-31531s to resolve the dispute.3 1 4 This latter approach is consis-
tent with the view that the Uniform Commercial Code is a "true
Code." 315 Under this view of the Code, the resolution of problems not
specifically addressed by the statute should be based upon principles
extracted from statute.31
The strongest argument for applying the pro rata distribution
principle of section 9-315 to resolve the dispute in Illustration 14 is
that in some situations section 9-315 directly controls the resolution of
priority disputes between two inventory financers who both meet the
conditions of revised section 9-312(3). To illustrate this point, consider
the following:
ILLUSTRATION 15-Feed Company is in the business of manufac-
turing and selling animal feed consisting of a mixture of corn and soy-
beans. On June 1 Feed Company entered into a written agreement to
purchase corn on credit from Seller I. This contract granted Seller I a
security interest in the corn sold and in the manufactured animal feed
to secure Feed Company's obligation to pay the purchase price of the
corn. Also on June 1, Seller I filed a financing statement covering the
corn and the animal feed. On June 2 Seller I delivered the corn to
Feed Company.
On June 5 Feed Company entered into a written agreement to
purchase soybeans from Seller II. This agreement granted Seller II a
312. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (Law. Co-op. 1976); see B.
CLARK, supra note 8, 3.09[5], at 3-120.
313. U.C.C. § 9-315 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-315 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). This section provides:
(1) If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently the
goods or a part of the goods have become part of a product or mass, the secur-
ity interest continues in the product or mass if:
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled, or commingled
that their identity is lost in the product or mass; or
(b) a financing statement covering the original goods also covers the prod-
uct into which the goods have been manufactured, processed, or assembled.
In a case to which paragraph (b) applies, no separate security interest in
that part of the original goods which has been manufactured, processed or as-
sembled into the product may be claimed under Section 36-9-314.
(2) When under subsection (1) more than one security interest attaches to
the product or mass, they rank equally according to the ratio that the cost of
the goods to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost of the
total product or mass.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-315 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
314. See Johnson & Battersby, supra note 301, at 44.
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security interest in the soybeans and the animal feed to secure the
purchase price of the beans. Also on June 5, Seller II filed a financing
statement covering the soybeans and animal feed and gave written no-
tice of its security interest to Seller I. Seller I received this notification
on June 6. Seller II delivered the soybeans to Feed Company on June
7.
On June 10 Feed Company combined the corn and soybeans pur-
chased from Seller I and Seller II, respectively, to produce animal
feed. Subsequently Feed Company defaulted on its obligations to
Seller I and Seller II and a priority dispute arose concerning the
animal feed in Feed Company's possession.
Seller I had a purchase money security interest in the corn, and
Seller II had a purchase money security interest in the soybeans.3 17
Moreover, the purchase money security interests of both Seller I and
Seller II apparently continue in the animal feed.3 18 Finally, both Seller
I and Seller II met the conditions for a super priority under revised
section 9-312(3).310 As a result, Seller I and Seller II apparently find
themselves in the same dilemma depicted in Illustration 14. In the pre-
sent situation, however, the Code provides a special priority rule.
Under section 9-315(2), the security interests of Seller I and Seller II
rank equally.32 0 Consequently, they share pro rata based on the ratio of
the costs of the goods each financed to the total cost of the animal
feed.321 That the Code expressly provides a pro rata rule to resolve the
conflict in Illustration 15 at least suggests that the court should apply a
pro rata analysis in resolving the conflict in Illustration 14.
D. Consignments
The analysis of consignments under the Code is complicated by
the fact that a manufacturer seeking a sales outlet for its goods may
enter into any of four similar but legally distinct types of arrangements
317. U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(a) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
318. See Boatmen's Bank v. Smith (In re Smith), 29 Bankr. 690, 693 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1983).
319. Both Seller I and Seller II's security interests were perfected when the debtor
received possession of the new inventory. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended
1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Furthermore, Seller II
met the written notification requirements. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
320. U.C.C. § 9-315(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-315(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
321. Although revised section 9-312(3) or revised section 9-312(5)(a) could be inter-
preted to address the conflict in Illustration 15, under revised section 9-312(1) the spe-
cial priority rule of section 9-315 controls.
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with a dealer. First, the parties may enter into a standard sales con-
tract that obligates the dealer to accept and pay for all goods con-
forming to the contract. Under a standard sales contract the dealer as-
sumes the risk that it will be unable to sell the goods. In many
standard sales contracts the manufacturer will extend credit to the
dealer to enable the dealer to use the proceeds from the resale of the
goods to pay the purchase price. When a manufacturer sells the goods
on credit, it may retain a purchase money security interest in the goods
to secure the dealer's obligation to pay the purchase price. For the
manufacturer's security interest to prime the claims of subsequent lien
creditors and secured parties, the manufacturer must perfect its secur-
ity interest.2 2 Moreover, for the manufacturer to prime an earlier-filed
secured party claiming a floating lien upon the dealer's invettory, the
manufacturer must satisfy the requirements of revised section 9-
312(3).323
The second type of agreement the manufacturer and dealer may
enter into is a "sale or return" agreement.324 A sale or return transac-
tion is a true sale under which title passes to the dealer when the man-
ufacturer completes physical delivery.32 5 A sale or return transaction,
however, differs from a standard sales agreement in that the buyer may
return unsold goods even though they conform to the contract.3 2
Therefore, the dealer under a sale or return agreement does not as-
sume the risk that it will be unable to sell the goods.32 7 The goods in
the possession of a dealer under a sale or return are subject to the
claims of the dealer's creditors.3 28 Therefore, the manufacturer in a sale
or return situation must retain and perfect a purchase money security
interest to be protected from the dealer's creditors. 329 Moreover, since
322. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
301(1)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
323. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
324. See U.C.C. § 2-326(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976). This section provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be
returned by the buyer even though they conform to the contract, the transaction is ... a
'sale or return' if the goods are delivered primarily for resale." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-
326(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
325. See American Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 28 Colo. App. 486, 495, 476 P.2d
304, 309 (1970); Winship, The "True" Consignment Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, and Related Peccadilloes, 29 Sw. L.J. 825, 836 (1975).
326. See Winship, supra note 325, at 836.
327. See U.C.C. § 2-326 comment 1 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326 comment 1
(Law. Co-op. 1976); Winship, supra note 325, at 837-38.
328. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
329. See Winship, supra note 325, at 837, 849; see also U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1972); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-2-401(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("Any retention or reservation by the seller
of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
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the dealer in a sale or return acquires rights in the goods upon their
delivery, the manufacturer must comply with the conditions of revised
section 9-312(3) in order to prime the claim of the dealer's earlier-filed
inventory financer claiming a security interest in the goods pursuant to
an after-acquired property clause.33 o
The third potential arrangement between the manufacturer and
the dealer is a consignment intended as security.3 31 Under a "security
consignment," the consignor's interest in the goods is limited to an Ar-
ticle 9 security interest.3 2 In effect, a security consignment is a sale
under which the manufacturer retains a purchase money security inter-
est in the goods to secure the dealer's obligation to pay the purchase
price. Therefore, the consignor under a security consignment must
comply with all the requirements of Article 9 to obtain priority over
lien creditors and secured parties asserting claims to the goods in the
possession of the consignee.3 33 These requirements include not only the
perfection of the security interest, but also compliance with the re-
quirements of revised section 9-312(3) if the adverse interest is an ear-
lier-filed inventory financer of the debtor. As discussed below, the prin-
cipal problem involving security consignments is distinguishing them
from true consignments.
334
The final possible arrangement between the manufacturer and the
dealer is a true consignment. In legal theory a true consignment is dis-
tinct from a pure sale, a sale or return, and a security consignment. If
the manufacturer purports to retain title to the goods in a pure sale, a
sale or return, or a security consignment, the manufacturer's interest is
limited to an Article 9 security interest.3 35 As a result, the manufac-
turer must comply with the provisions of Article 9 to protect its secur-
reservation of a security interest.").
330. Cf. Winship, supra note 325, at 849 ("[I]f the seller [in a sale or return] gives
credit to the buyer and wishes to secure payment, he should be subject to all the provi-
sions of article 9.").
331. See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 11.2, at 337-40 (pre-Code and
Code treatment of leases and consignments as security); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
87, § 21-4, at 942-43 (determination of whether a consignment is a security consignment);
Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part 5: Consignments
and Equipment Leases, 77 CoM. L.J. 108, 108-10 (1972) (unless the parties intend other-
wise, the net effect of the Code is to regard consignments as security interests governed
by Article 9); Winship, supra note 325, at 828-58 (historical development of consign-
ments and their treatment under Articles 2 and 9).
332. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972) (amended 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37) (Law.
Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
333, Hawkland, supra note 331, at 109; Winship, supra note 325, at 839.
334. See infra notes 374-97 and accompanying text.
335. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-401(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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ity interest against the dealer's creditors. 33 6 In contrast, under a true
consignment, the manufacturer does retain title to the goods, and
merely transfers possession to the dealer.3 3 7 The dealer then acts as an
agent of the manufacturer for the purpose of selling the goods to third
parties.33 8 In the event the dealer makes a sale, title to the goods passes
directly from the manufacturer to the buyer.3 9 The dealer collects the
purchase price from the buyer, and after deducting a commission for
its services, forwards the purchase price to the manufacturer. In the
event the dealer does not sell the goods, the dealer must return them.
Under a true consignment the dealer is not liable for the price of
the goods if it is unable to sell them.3 40 The manufacturer's interest in
the goods in the dealer's possession is not limited to a security interest
under a true consignment. Rather, the manufacturer reiains the
owner of the goods.3 4 1 Therefore, Article 9 does not require the manu-
facturer to retain and perfect a security interest in the consigned goods
to be protected from the dealer's creditors.3 42 Moreover, since the
dealer in a true consignment holds the goods as an agent for the manu-
facturer, the dealer does not have sufficient rights in the goods for an
inventory financer of the dealer to assert a security interest in those
goods under an after-acquired property clause . 43 Therefore, the condi-
tions of revised section 9-312(3) do not apply to the manufacturer's
priority over an earlier-filed inventory financer of the dealer.
Although the consignor retains title to the goods in a true consign-
ment, from the perspective of a creditor of the consignee, the consign-
ment has the appearance of a sale of inventory to the consignee.3
4
Therefore, unless the consignor provides creditors of the consignee
with some notice of its claim to the goods, the problem of apparent
336. See supra notes 323, 329 and accompanying text.
337. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 3.5, at 73-74; Winship, supra note 325, at
826.
338. See Greenwood Mfg. Co. v. Worley, 222 S.C. 156, 161, 71 S.E.2d 886, 891
(1952); Rio Grande Oil Co. v. Miller Rubber Co., 31 Ariz. 84, 87, 250 P. 564, 565 (1926)
("[A] consignment of goods for sale does not pass the title at any time, nor does it con-
template that it should be passed. The very term implies an agency, and that the title is
in the consignor, the consignee being his agent."); Winship, supra note 325, at 826.
339. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 3.5, at 73-74; Winship, supra note 325, at
826.
340. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 3.5, at 73.
341. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
342. See Winship, supra note 325, at 840-41.
343. See id. Cf. A. Lassberg & Co. v. Atlantic Cotton Co., 291 S.C. 161, 252 S.E.2d
50 (Ct. App. 1987) (security interest does not attach to goods held by an agent unless
agent has rights in the collateral such as ownership or contract rights).
344. See Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40
J. NAT'L CONF. REF. BANKR. 37, 38 (1966).
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ownership will arise. The Code addresses this problem in section 2-
326(3) 3'5 and in new section 9-114. 34 Although the Code does not sub-
ject true consignments to Article 9, these provisions, in effect, impose
the priority requirements of Article 9 on consignors in most, but not
all, true consignments.
Section 2-326(3) grants the basic protection afforded to creditors
of a true consignee. The provision, however, operates in a somewhat
345. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This
subsection provides:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains
a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a
name other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to
claims of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed
to be on sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even
though an agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery
until payment or resale or uses such words as "on consignment" or "on memo-
randum." However, this subsection is not applicable if the person making
delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or
the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known
by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the chapter on secured transac-
tions (Title 36, Chapter 9).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
346. U.C.C. § 9-114 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-114 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). This section provides:
(1) A person who delivers goods under a consignment which is not a secur-
ity interest and who would be required to file under this chapter by paragraph
(3)(c) of Section 36-2-326 has priority over a secured party who is or becomes a
creditor of the consignee and who would have a perfected security interest in
the goods if they were the property of the consignee, and also has priority with
respect to identifiable cash proceeds received on or before delivery of the goods
to a buyer, if
(a) the consignor complies with the filing provision of the chapter on Sales
with respect to consignments (paragraph (3)(c) of Section 36-2-326) before the
consignee receives possession of the goods;
(b) the consignor gives notification in writing to the holder of the security
interest if the holder has filed a financing statement covering the same types of
goods before the date of the filing made by the consignor;
(c) the holder of the security interest receives the notification within five
years before the consignee receives possession of the goods;
(d) the notification states that the consignor expects to deliver goods on
consignment to the consignee, describing the goods by item or type.
(2) In the case of a consignment which is not a security interest and in
which the requirements of the preceding subsection have not been met, a per-
son who delivers goods to another is subordinate to a person who would have a
perfected security interest in the goods if they were the property of the debtor.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-114 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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indirect manner. Under section 2-326(3) certain true consignments are
deemed to be sale or return transactions unless the consignor satisfies
at least one of three statutory requirements. These requirements are
designed to insure that the consignee's creditors have notice that con-
signed goods in the consignee's possession are the property of the con-
signor. The effect of deeming a true consignment to be a sale or return
is to subject the goods in the consignee's possession to the claims of the
consignee's creditors.
3 47
For section 2-326(3) to apply to a true consignment, three circum-
stances must be present.3 48 First, the goods must be delivered to the
consignee for sale.3 49 Second, the consignee must maintain a place of
business at which the consignee deals in goods of that kind.3 5' Third,
the consignee must do business under a name other than the name of
the consignor.3 51 If these three circumstances are present, the true con-
signment will be deemed a sale or return unless the consignor meets at
least one of the requirements set forth in section 2-326(3)(a) through
(c).
Under subsection (a) of section 2-326(3), a consignor can prevent
the recharacterization of a true consignment by complying with an ap-
plicable sign-posting statute. 52 Since South Carolina does not have
such a statute,353 this alternative is not available to a true consignor in
a transaction subject to the law of South Carolina. Under subsection
(b), a true consignment will not be deemed a sale or return if the con-
signor can establish that the consignee is "generally known by his cred-
itors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others."'3 54 The
protection available under subsection (b) is subject to a difficult bur-
den of proof.35 5 Therefore, a consignor should not rely on subsection
347. See U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
348. See, e.g., FinanceAmerica Corp. v. Morris (In re KLP, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 256, 257
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
349. See, e.g., Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast v. Riviana Foods, Inc., 648 F.2d
1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981); Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga.
App. 368, 369, 323 S.E.2d 259, 260 (1984).
350. See, e.g., Newhall v. Haines, 10 Bankr. 1019, 1022 (D. Mont. 1981); Manger v.
Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1980).
351. See, e.g., Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Gang (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49
Bankr. 340, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1985); Mann v. Clark Oil &
Ref. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mo. 1969), afl'd, 425 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1970).
352. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3)(a) (Law. Co-op.
1976). For the text of section 36-2-326(3), see supra note 345.
353. See generally 1 G. GmmoRE, supra note 56, § 3.5, at 74 n.3 (listing states that
have enacted sign-posting statutes).
354. U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
355. See, e.g., In re BRI Corp., 88 Bankr. 71, 74-75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Mul-
tibank Nat'l v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc., (In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc.), 81 Bankr.
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(b) at the planning stage of a transaction. The basic method by which
A consignor can protect its interest in the goods from the claims of the
consignee's creditors is provided by subsection (c). Under section 2-
326(3)(c), a true consignment will not be deemed a sale or return if the
consignor "complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured
Transactions (Article 9)."'351 Therefore, the prudent true consignor will
file a financing statement covering the consigned goods.
57
Although section 2-326(3) reduces the problems of a consignor's
apparent ownership in a true consignment, the provision does not fully
protect creditors of such consignees. The shortcomings of section 2-
326(3) flow from two aspects of the provision. First, section 2-326(3)
does not apply to all true consignments. In those true consignments
that are outside the scope of the provision, a consignor's right to the
goods is not conditioned upon providing notice of its interest under
subsections (a) through (c).311 Second, if a consignor meets the public
notice requirements of subsections (a) through (c) of section 2-326(3),
the consignor's ownership interest is apparently preserved against all
creditors of the consignee, including an earlier-filed inventory financer
holding a floating lien upon the consignee's inventory. 59 The notice
afforded under subsections (a) through (c), however, appears inade-
quate to protect an earlier-filed inventory financer of the consignee
who may make a future advance in reliance on the consigned goods as
after-acquired property subject to the financer's security interest.36
Although the drafters of the 1972 Official Text did little to remedy
the first shortcoming of section 2-326(3),3e1 they did address the second
shortcoming in new section 9-114. Under section 9-114, in order to pre-
serve an ownership interest in consigned goods against an inventory
215, 218 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
356. U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(c) (1972). For the substantially same provision as adopted in
South Carolina, see supra note 345.
357. See U.C.C. § 9-408 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-408 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The provision, enacted in 1988 in South Carolina, provides for a
filing by a consignor under a true consignment. Moreover, if the consignment is subse-
quently determined to be a security consignment subject to Article 9, the consignor filing
will be effective to perfect the consignor's security interest in the consigned goods.
358. See, e.g., Allsop v. Ernst (In re Roudebush), 20 Bankr. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980).
359. See generally Hawkland, supra note 315, at 314-18 (principles of section 9-
312(3) should apply by analogy to true consignments). But see Emerson Quiet Kool
Corp. v. Marta Group, Inc. (In re Marta Group, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 634, 641 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1983); Gerber Indus. Inc. v. Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 7 Bankr. 225, 228-29 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 11 Bankr. 1019 (D.N.J. 1981), afl'd, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).
360. See generally supra text accompanying notes 163-291 (section 9-312(3) re-
quires purchase money financers to give actual notice to certain prior secured parties).
361. By enacting section 9-408 the drafters may have encouraged consignors not
subject to section 2-326(3) to file a protective financing statement.
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financer who filed before the consignment, most true consignors must
satisfy filing and notification requirements essentially identical to
those imposed upon purchase money inventory financers under revised
section 9-312(3). Section 9-114, however, does not fully protect prior
inventory financers of consignees who acquire goods pursuant to a true
consignment. Section 9-114 applies only to true consignors "who would
be required to file under this Article by paragraph (3)(c) of Section 2-
326.362
The courts have interpreted this language to mean that if a true
consignor has or could have met the conditions of section 2-326(3)(a)
or (b), the true consignor is not required-to meet the filing and notifi-
cation requirements of section 9-114 in order to prime an earlier-filed
inventory financer of the consignee. 3 3 Therefore, if a true consignor
can establish that the consignee "is generally known by his creditors to
be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others,"384 the con-
signor is entitled to priority over the consignee's inventory financer de-
spite the consignor's failure to meet the requirements of section 9-
114.365
Thus even after the enactment of the 1972 Official Text, two gaps
remain in the protection afforded inventory financers of a true con-
signee. First, as discussed above, if a consignor in a true consignment
subject to section 2-326(3) has or could have satisfied the requirements
of that provision without filing, it is not subject to the filing and notifi-
cation requirements of section 9-114.6' The second and more basic gap
in the protection afforded inventory financers arises because some true
consignments are not within the scope of section 2-326(3). In those
cases the consignor's interest is valid against a consignee's inventory
financer despite the consignor's failure to meet any of the public notice
requirements of section 2-326(3)(a) through (c).
36 7
Although most commercially significant true consignments are
covered by section 2-326(3), some of the case law interpreting the
362. U.C.C. § 9-114(1) (1972) (amended 1977). For the substantially same provision
as adopted in South Carolina, see supra note 346.
363. BFC Chems., Inc. v. Smith-Douglass, Inc., 46 Bankr. 1009, 1019-20 (E.D.N.C.
1985); Multibank Nat'l v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc.), 81
Bankr. 215, 218-19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); see 2 R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE
TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 7.43, at 1033 (2d ed. 1983).
364. U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
365. See BFC Chems., Inc., 46 Bankr. at 1019-20 (section 9-114 inapplicable when
consignor satisfied sign-posting requirement of section 2-326(3)(a) or can establish gen-
eral knowledge of creditors under section 2-326(3)(b)).
366. See supra notes 362-65 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., Allsop v. Ernst (In re Roudebush), 20 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 691-92 (Utah 1980).
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scope of the provision is alarming. Some courts, although a minority,
have held that a consignment is not "for sale" within the meaning of
section 2-326(3) when the consignee's authority is limited to soliciting
offers subject to the consignor's approval.3 6 8 Moreover, courts have ex-
cluded consignments from the scope of section 2-326(3) when the con-
signee does not maintain "a place of business," even if the consignee
deals in goods of the kind consigned. 6 9 Finally, courts have held that
section 2-326(3) does not apply when the consignee is not in physical
possession of the goods.3 7 0 This limitation on the scope of section 2-
326(3) can adversely affect a consignee's inventory financer when the
consignee appears to have rights in the goods without taking physical
possession of them.
Thus, two sets of rules are potentially applicable to resolve a prior-
ity dispute between a consignor who retained title to the consigned
goods and the creditors of the consignee. If the consignment is a secur-
ity consignment, the consignor's interest in the goods is limited to a
purchase money security interest.3 7 1 Therefore, Article 9 controls the
resolution of conflicts between the consignor and creditors of the con-
signee.3 72 In contrast, if the consignment is a true consignment, priority
disputes between the consignor and creditors of the consignee are gov-
erned by sections 2-326(3) and 9-114. 33 Because the priority rules
under sections 2-326(3) and 9-114 are not identical to the Article 9 pri-
ority rules applicable to purchase money inventory financers, it may be
essential to determine whether a consignment is a true consignment or
a security consignment. Unfortunately, the distinction between the two
is not always clear.
3 7 4
368. See, e.g., Allgeier v. Campisi, 117 Ga. App. 105, 105, 159 S.E.2d 458, 459 (1968);
Founders Inv. Corp. v. Fegett, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 903, 904-06 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978). But see Escrow Connection v. Haas, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1640, 1646, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 200, 203 (1987) (lack of express authority to sell does not preclude finding that
delivery was for sale); Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga. App.
368, 369-70, 323 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661,
663-64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
369. See, e.g., Roudebush, 20 Bankr. at 631; Manger, 619 P.2d at 692-93; see also
Cantor v. Anderson, 639 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y.) (section 2-326 not applicable even
though consignee maintained a place of business at which the consignee dealt in goods of
the kind involved because creditor never saw goods at the business, but only at the con-
signee's home), afl'd, 833 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1986).
370. See, e.g., In re Mincow Bag Co., 29 A.D.2d 400, 288 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1968), af'd,
24 N.Y.2d 776, 248 N.E.2d 26, 300 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1969).
371. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972) (amended 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989); U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-107(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
372. See Hawkland, supra note 331, at 109; Winship, supra note 325, at 839.
373. See Hawkland, supra note 331, at 109; Winship, supra note 325, at 840-42.
374. See Duesenberg, Consignments Under the UCC: A Comment on Emerging
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Under revised section 1-201(37),'37 the issue turns upon the intent
of the parties at the time they entered into the consignment arrange-
ment. 76 The difficult aspect of this issue is identifying the objective
criteria for determining the parties' intent. Commentators have advo-
cated a variety of tests that focus upon the function served by the con-
signment.3 77 Under the leading test, articulated by Dean Hawkland, a
consignment is a security consignment unless it is imposed by the con-
signor to control retail prices.
378
Other tests have focused on the relationship between the consignor
and consignee as one of principal and agent,3 7 9 or whether the consign-
ment is the functional equivalent of a floor plan.380 Perhaps the most
straightforward test has been advocated by Professor Winship. 381
Under Winship's analysis, the critical consideration is when the con-
signee incurs an obligation to pay for the consigned goods. 2 If the
consignee incurs the obligation upon receipt of delivery, but could sat-
isfy the obligation by returning the unsold goods for a credit, the trans-
action is a security consignment subject to Article 9.183 In contrast, if
the consignee is not obligated to pay for the goods until they are sold
and can return the unsold goods, the transaction is a true
consignment.
3 8 4
Winship's test conforms to the common law notions of consign-
ment3 15 and provides a relatively high degree of certainty. Moreover,
although Winship's definition of a security consignment could include
a sale or return, it does not result in an inconsistency between sections
9-201 -36 and 2-326(2).117 If the seller in a sale or return retains title to
Principles, 26 Bus. LAw. 565, 572-77 (1970); Winship, supra note 325, at 846-49.
375. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972) (amended 1987); S.C. COD ANN. § 36-1-201(37) (Law.
Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
376. See Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 Bankr. 969,
977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Duesenberg, supra note 374, at 575.
377. See Winship, supra note 325, at 846-49.
378. Hawkland, supra note 331, at 109; Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CoM. L.J. 146, 148 (1962) [hereinafter Hawkland, Con-
signment Selling]; see Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 559-60, 175
N.W.2d 465, 469 (1970).
379. See Duesenberg, supra note 374, at 575.
380. See WHTE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 21-4, at 943.




385. See supra text accompanying note 340.
386. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-201 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this title a security agreement is effective
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
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the goods in the possession of the buyer, the transaction is a security
consignment subject to Article 9.38s In such a case, the seller has an
Article 9 security interest,389 which is valid against unsecured creditors
under section 9-201 even if it is unperfected. In contrast, if the seller in
a sale or return does not retain title to the goods, the goods in posses-
sion of the buyer are subject to the claims of any unsecured creditors
under section 2-326(2).
Although the courts have addressed the issue of whether a con-
signment was intended as security in only a small number of reported
decisions,39" one recent decision indicates that a court may consider a
broad range of factors in determining the parties' intent.3 91 In Under-
writers at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.)3 92 the court listed
the following factors as evidence that the consignment was intended as
security: (1) the consignee set the price at which the goods were sold;
(2) the consignee was billed upon shipment; (3) the consignee commin-
gled the proceeds and failed to keep proper accounts; (4) the consignee
mixed the consigned good with its own goods; and (5) the consignor
purported to retain title until it was paid. 9 3 The court in Ide Jewelry
also listed the following factors as evidencing an intent to create a true
consignment: (1) the consignor retaining control over the price at
which the consignee sells the goods; (2) the consignee being given pos-
session with the authority to sell only upon the consignor's express as-
sent to the sales price; (3) the consignor being able to recall the goods;
and against creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates any charge or practice
illegal under any statute or regulation under the statute governing usury, small
loans, retail installment sales, or the like, or extends the application of any
statute or regulation to any transaction not otherwise subject to the statute or
regulation.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
387. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This
section provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (3), goods held on approval are
not subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance; goods held on sale or
return are subject to such claims while in the buyer's possession." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-
326(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
388. See Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 Bankr. 969,
973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
389. See U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-401(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
390. See, e.g., Mann v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mo. 1969),
aff'd, 425 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1970); Ide Jewelry, 75 Bankr. at 976-79; Allsop v. Ernst (In
re Roudebush), 20 Bankr. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Koenig Inc. v. Ateco Equip.,
Inc. (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 17 Bankr. 230, 234-35 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); General
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 1240, 1244-45 (Ala.
1983).
391. Ide Jewelry, 75 Bankr. at 976-79.
392. 75 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
393. Id. at 978.
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(4) the consignee receiving a commission for services and not a profit
on the sale; (5) the consigned goods being separated from other prop-
erty of the consignee; (6) the consignor being entitled to inspect the
sales records and physical inventory of the consignee; and (7) the con-
signee having no obligation to pay for the goods unless they are sold.
3 9 4
Although some of the factors listed in Ide Jewelry appear to be
less than compelling evidefice of the character of a consignment, the
court's analysis incorporates the positions taken by the leading com-
mentators. Under the Ide Jewelry opinion, whether the consignment
was used to enable the consignor to control retail prices is relevant.3 9 5
Moreover, the extent of the control asserted by the consignor over the
consignee's business is relevant, and thus consistent with the position
that the existence of a principal-agent relationship should control the
character of the consignment.3 6 Finally, whether the consignee incurs
an obligation to pay for the goods upon delivery or upon resale is
relevant.
3 97
Fortunately, given the uncertainty over the distinction between
true consignments and security consignments, the resolution of the is-
sue is critical in only a limited number of cases. If the consignor files a
financing statement pursuant to section 2-326(3)(c) in order to protect
its interest in the goods from the claims of the consignee's creditors,
the consignor will have a perfected security interest in the goods in the
event the consignment is found to be a security consignment.398 More-
over, if a consignor complies with the filing and notification require-
ments of new section 9-114 in order to protect its interest from the
claim of the consignee's inventory financer, the consignor will be enti-
tled to priority over the inventory financer under revised section 9-
312(3) in the event the consignment is a security consignment.
The characterization of the consignment is critical, however, in
three significant situations. The first situation arises when the consign-
ment, if a true consignment, is not within the scope of section 2-326(3),
and the consignor has failed to comply with either the requirements of
section 2-326(3)(a) through (c) and section 9-114, or the requirements
of Article 9.399 If the consignment is a true consignment outside the
scope of section 2-326(3), the consignor's interest in the goods is valid
394. Id.
395. See Hawkland, supra note 331, at 109-10, Hawkland, Consignment Selling,
supra note 378, at 148.
396. See Duesenberg, supra note 374, at 575.
397. See Winship, supra note 325, at 849.
398. See U.C.C. § 9-408 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-408 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
399. See, e.g., Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 Bankr.
969 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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against creditors of the consignee, even though the consignor failed to
comply with the requirements of sections 2-326(3)(a) through (c).
4 0 0
Furthermore, since section 9-114 applies only to a consignor required
to file under section 2-326(3)(c), the consignor's failure to meet the fil-
ing and notification requirements of section 9-114 will not subordinate
its interest in the goods to the consignee's inventory financer. In con-
trast, if the consignment is a security consignment, the consignor's in-
terest is limited to an unperfected security interest subordinate to the
claims of some of the consignee's creditors, including the inventory
financer.' °'
The second situation in which the classification of a consignment
is critical arises when the consignment, if a true consignment, is within
the scope of section 2-326(3) and the consignor satisfies the require-
ments of that provision in a manner other than filing. If the consign-
ment is a true consignment, the consignor's interest in the goods is
protected from the claims of the consignee's creditors because the con-
signor satisfied the conditions of section 2-326(3)(a) or (b). In contrast,
if the consignment is a security consignment, the consignor's interest is
limited to an unperfected security interest.0 2
The final situation in which the classification of a consignment is
critical is a variation of the second. In this final situation, however, the
consignor has filed but has not met the notification requirements of
section 9-114, and the adverse interest is asserted by an inventory fi-
nancer claiming a perfected security interest in the consignee's after-
acquired inventory. To illustrate this situation, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 16-Dealer maintains a place of business at which
the Dealer sells furniture. In addition, Dealer is generally known by
Dealer's creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the furniture
of others. On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a security agree-
ment that granted Bank a security interest in Dealer's current and
after-acquired inventory of furniture to secure a contemporaneous
loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank properly filed a
financing statement covering dealer's inventory of furniture.
On July 1 Dealer entered into a consignment agreement with
Manufacturer under which Mandfacturer agreed to consign a ship-
ment of new furniture to Dealer. Also on July 1, Manufacturer prop-
erly filed a financing statement that listed Dealer as consignee and
Manufacturer as consignor, and described the new furniture as con-
signed goods. Manufacturer, however, did not give written notification
400. See, e.g., Cantor v. Anderson, 639 F. Supp. 364, 368-69 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 833
F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1986); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 691-92 (Utah 1980).
401. See, e.g., Ide Jewelry, 75 Bankr. at 969..
402. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co.,
437 So. 2d 1240, 1244-45 (Ala. 1983).
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of the consignment to Bank. On July 5 Dealer received possession of
the shipment of new furniture.
On August 1 Dealer defaulted under the terms of the security
agreement with Bank, and Bank sought to enforce its security interest
against the new furniture.
If the consignment between Manufacturer and Dealer was a true
consignment, Manufacturer is entitled to priority over Bank. Although
Manufacturer failed to meet the written notification requirements of
section 9-114(1)(b) through (d), the courts have held that section 9-114
applies only to true consignments under which filing is the exclusive
manner in which the consignor can satisfy the requirements of section
2-326(3)(a) through (c). 40 3 In Illustration 16 Manufacturer could have
satisfied the conditions of section 2-326(3) without filing by establish-
ing that Dealer was generally known by Dealer's creditors to be sub-
stantially engaged in selling the goods of others.0 4 Therefore, Manu-
facturer is not subject to the special notification requirement of section
9-114. As a result, Manufacturer will prevail over Bank pursuant to
section 2-326(3)(b).
In contrast, if the consignment between Manufacturer and Dealer
is a security consignment, Bank is entitled to priority. Under a security
consignment Manufacturer's interest in the new furniture is limited to
a purchase money security interest in inventory. Therefore, in order to
prime Bank, Manufacturer had to meet all applicable requirements
under Article 9.405 Although Manufacturer met the perfection require-
ment of revised section 9-312(3)(a), 40 1 it failed to meet the notification
requirement set forth in subsections (b) through (d) of that provi-
sion.40 1 As a result, Manufacturer cannot claim a super priority under
revised section 9-312(3). The residual priority rule of revised section 9-
312(5)(a) will govern the conflict between Bank and Manufacturer.
Under that provision, Bank is entitled to priority on the basis of its
earlier filing.
40 8
403. See, e.g., BFC Chems., Inc. v. Smith-Douglass, Inc., 46 Bankr. 1009, 1020
(E.D.N.C. 1985); Multibank Nat'l v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State St. Auto
Sales, Inc.), 81 Bankr. 215, 217-18 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
404. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
405. See General Elec. Credit Corp., 437 So. 2d at 1245.
406. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
407. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
408. Illustration 16 suggests an additional issue that can arise in a priority dispute
between a true consignor and an earlier-filed inventory financer of the consignee. This
issue will arise when the following situation exists: (1) the true consignor has filed pursu-
ant to section 2-326(3)(c) and cannot meet the requirements of either subsection (a) or
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In summary, although the analysis above indicates that in some
cases a consignor can prevail over creditors of the consignee without
meeting the requirements of sections 2-326(3)(c) and 9-114(1), the only
prudent course of conduct for a consignor is to file in the manner pre-
scribed in those sections and to comply with the notification require-
ments of sections 9-114(1)(b) through (d). If the consignment is a true
consignment, the consignor's satisfaction of these requirements will
protect its interest in the consigned goods against the claims of the
consignee's creditors, including the consignee's inventory financer.
Moreover, if the consignment is found to be a security consignment,
compliance with these requirements will assure the consignor of a
purchase money priority in the consigned goods.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in A. Lassberg & Co. v. At-
lantic Cotton Co.409 recently considered a priority conflict between an
(b) of that provision; (2) the true consignor has failed to meet the notification require-
ment of section 9-114(1)(b) through (d); and (3) despite an inability to establish that the
consignee was generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the
goods of others, the true consignor can establish that the inventory financer knew that
the consignee was selling goods delivered by the consignor pursuant to the true consign-
ment. The issue -presented in this situation is whether the inventory financer's actual
knowledge excuses the consignor's failure to comply with section 9-114(1). Some courts
have excused a true consignor's failure to satisfy the conditions of section 2-326(3)(a)
through (c) when an inventory financer has actual knowledge that the consignor is selling
goods consigned by the consignor. See GBS Meat Indus. PTY Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co.,
474 F. Supp. 1357, 1362-63 (W.D. Pa. 1979), af'd, 622 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1980); First Nat'l
Bank v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). These courts stressed that
the objective of protecting creditors of a consignee from problems of apparent ownership
is realized when the creditor has actual knowledge that the goods are held on
consignment.
In contrast, the court in Multibank National v. State Street Auto Sales, Inc. (In re
State Street Auto Sales, Inc.), 81 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), held that an inven-
tory financer's actual knowledge did not excuse a true consignor's failure to comply with
section 9-114(1). In essence, the court held that under the system of notification imposed
under section 9-114(1), an inventory financer was entitled to rely upon goods consigned
to the consignee unless the inventory financer received the written notification mandated
by the statute. The court's insistence upon formal notification in State St. Auto Sales is
consistent with case law interpreting the notification requirements of section 9-312(3).
See Elhard v. Prairie Distribs., Inc., 366 N.W.2d 465, 468 (N.D. 1985); Manufacturers
Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 501, 508-09, 487 P.2d 1053, 1058
(1971). Nevertheless, the court's refusal to excuse noncompliance with the notification
requirements of section 9-114(1) in the face of the inventory financer's actual knowledge
appears unreasonable in light of the court's conclusion that the requirements of section
9.114(1) would not apply at all if the consignor had met the general knowledge require-
ment of section 2-326(3)(b). See cases cited supra note 403. The decision appears even
more questionable considering the fact that the consignor might have satisfied the gen-
eral knowledge requirement without establishing that the inventory financer had actual
knowledge.
409. 291 S.C. 161, 352 S.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1986).
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owner who transferred cotton to a cotton broker for sale and an inven-
tory financer of the broker. The court, however, failed to consider the
effect of section 2-326 on the rights of the parties. Moreover, new sec-
tion 9-114 was not in effect at the time of the transfer. Nevertheless,
the facts in Lassberg suggest a number of significant issues under sec-
tions 2-326 and 9-114.
In Lassberg a cotton broker, Mahaffey, entered into a security
agreement with A. Lassberg & Co. that granted Lassberg a security
interest in Mahaffey's inventory of cotton. The court assumed that
Lassberg properly perfected its security interest. After granting the se-
curity interest, Mahaffey entered into an arrangement with Pecot,
Ltd., a Texas cotton firm, under which Mahaffey found buyers for Pe-
cot's cotton. When Mahaffey found a buyer, he would contact Pecot,
who would then ship the cotton necessary to fill the order to a ware-
house in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The buyer would get the cotton
from the warehouse and make payment to Mahaffey. Mahaffey, in
turn, would deduct a sales commission from the purchase price and
remit the balance to Pecot.
4 10
The conflict in Lassberg involved a shipment of cotton that a
buyer refused to accept. Following the rejection of the cotton, Mahaf-
fey, apparently without Pecot's authorization, had the Spartanburg
warehouse issue negotiable warehouse receipts to him covering the re-
jected cotton. Mahaffey held these warehouse receipts for four or five
days while attempting to resell the rejected cotton. When Mahaffey
was unable to resell the cotton, he sent the negotiable warehouse re-
ceipts to Pecot.
41
The court ruled against Lassberg, Mahaffey's inventory financer,
and in favor of Pecot on the grounds that Mahaffey did not acquire
sufficient rights in the cotton delivered by Pecot for Lassberg's security
interest to attach.412 The court asserted that for a debtor to have rights
in collateral sufficient for a security interest to attach, the debtor must
have an ownership interest or contract right in the collateral.413 The
court found that Mahaffey had neither. Rather, the court found on un-
contradicted evidence that Mahaffey simply served as Pecot's
broker.
414
The Lassberg court's conclusion that Mahaffey did not have rights
in the cotton sufficient for Lassberg's security interest to attach is con-
sistent with the general rule that an unauthorized agent cannot grant a
410. Id. at 162-63, 352 S.E.2d at 501.
411. Id. at 163-64, 352 S.E.2d at 502.
412. Id., 352 S.E.2d at 502-03.
413. Id. at 164, 352 S.E.2d at 502-03.
414. Id., 352 S.E.2d at 503.
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security interest in the principal's property." 5 This general rule, how-
ever, is subject to an exception when the agent has possession of the
principal's property under a consignment which is deemed to be a sale
or return under section 2-326(3).416 A significant weakness in the Lass-
berg decision results from the parties' failure to raise, and hence the
court's failure to consider, the effect of sectibn 2-326 on the dispute in
issue.417 If the transaction between Pecot and Mahaffey constituted a
"sale or return," the cotton in Mahaffey's possession was subject to the
claims of his creditor's. 418 Therefore, if the transaction was a sale or
return, Pecot's interest in the cotton was subject to Lassberg's security
interest.
419
The transaction between Pecot and Mahaffey was not a true sale
or return. A true sale or return is an actual sale under which the buyer
may return the goods even if they conform to the contract.420 In Lass-
berg the court found on uncontradicted evidence that Pecot never sold
cotton to Mahaffey.42 1 That the transaction was not a true sale or re-
turn, however, does not preclude the application of section 2-326(2).
Even if the parties intend to create a limited bailment or a sales
agency rather than a true sale or return, the transaction may be
deemed a sale or return under section 2-326(3).42
12
Had the parties raised section 2-326(3),423 the court in Lassberg
would have confronted two issues. First, the court would have been
required to determine whether the transaction between Pecot and Ma-
haffey fell within the scope of subsection (3).424 Second, if the court
415. See, e.g., Jensen-McLean Co. v. Crouthamel Potato Chip Co. (In re Crouthamel
Potato Chip Co.), 6 Bankr. 501, 508-09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); First Nat'l Bank v.
Toppo (In re Toppo), 474 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1979); see also Walter E. Heller & Co.
Southeast v. Riviana Foods, Inc., 648 F.2d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1981) (bailee without
independent authority to sell bailor's goods cannot grant a security interest in the
goods).
416. See supra notes 347-57 and accompanying text.
417. See generally Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162, 181, 325 S.E.2d 550, 561 (Ct.
App. 1984) ("(A]ppellate courts in this state, like well-behaved children, do not speak
unless spoken to and do not answer questions they are not asked."), rev'd per curiam on
other grounds, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985).
418. See U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
419. See, e.g., Bischoff v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359, 368 (Ala. 1981); Simmons
First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 279 Ark. 204, 209-10, 650 S.W.2d 236, 239 (1983); American
Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 477, 482-83, 476 P.2d 573, 576
(1970).
420. See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
421. A. Lassberg, 291 S.C. at 164-65, 352 S.E.2d at 503.
422. See Bischoff, 400 So. 2d at 364-67; First Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661,
663-64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
423. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
424. See supra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
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concluded that the transaction was covered by subsection (3), it would
have had to decide whether Pecot met the requirements that exempt a
covered transaction from being deemed a sale or return.425
To fall within the scope of section 2-326(3) a transaction must
have three characteristics.42 First, the owner of the goods must deliver
them to a transferee for the purpose of sale. Second, the transferee
must maintain a place of business at which it deals in goods of the
kind involved. Third, the transferee must operate the business under a
name other than the name of the owner. If a transaction has these
characteristics, it will be deemed a sale or return unless the owner
meets one of the requirements set forth in subsections (a) through (c)
of section 2-326(3).427
Whether the transaction between Pecot and Mahaffey fell within
the scope of section 2-326(3) raises a number of issues. First, at the
outset of the transaction, Mahaffey's role seems to have been limited to
performing a sales contract that Pecot and the initial buyer entered
into before the cotton was delivered to Mahaffey. If Mahaffey's role
was so limited, some authority supports a conclusion that the transac-
tion was not covered by section 2-326(3).428 Nevertheless, when the ini-
tial buyer rejected the cotton, Mahaffey's role was no longer so limited.
Following the initial buyer's rejection Mahaffey was authorized to sell
or at least solicit offers to buy the rejected cotton. Most courts have
held that when a transferee is authorized to solicit offers to buy the
goods, the goods have been delivered to the transferee "for sale" within
the meaning of subsection (3), even though any sale is subject to the
transferor's approval.429 Therefore,' unless Pecot's purpose at the time
it initially delivered the cotton to Mahaffey is controlling, the transac-
tion apparently met the first requirement for the application of section
2-326(3).
The second issue in determining the applicability of section 2-
326(3) is whether Mahaffey maintained a place of business at which he
dealt in cotton. Although Mahaffey was in the business of dealing in
425. See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text.
426. See FinanceAmerica Corp. v. Morris (In re KLP, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 256, 257
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
427. See supra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
428. See Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast v. Riviana Foods, Inc., 648 F.2d 1059
(5th Cir. 1981).
429. See, e.g., Escrow Connection v. Haas, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1640, 1646, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 200, 203 (1987); Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga. App.
368, 369-70, 323 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661,
663-64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). But see Allgeier v. Campisi, 117 Ga. App. 105, 105, 159
S.E.2d 458, 459 (1968); Founders Inv. Corp -.. Fegett, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
903, 905-06 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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cotton and it can be fairly inferred that he did so at a place of busi-
ness, the court did not expressly so find. Some courts have held that a
true consignment is not within section 2-326 if the consignee does not
maintain a place of business. 430 In these decisions, however, the courts
adopted a rigid interpretation of the statute to avoid the perceived in-
equities of finding a sale or return.431 Certainly it is arguable that a
transaction in which goods are delivered to a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind should be within the scope of section 2-
326(3), since the purpose of the provision is to protect creditors of the
transferee from relying upon the transferee's apparent ownership. 432 In
some cases the problem of apparent ownership may arise even if the
transferee does not technically maintain a place of business. In these
situations the language of subsection (3) should be interpreted liberally
to effect the purpose of the statute.
A third issue concerning the application of section 2-326(3) to the
facts in Lassberg arises because Mahaffey never took physical posses-
sion of the cotton in issue. In In re Mincow Bag Co.433 a divided court
refused to apply section 2-326(3) when a "transferee" did not take pos-
session of the goods in issue, but simply arranged sales and had the
goods shipped directly from the manufacturer to the buyer. The court
reasoned that since the "transferee" never had possession of the goods,
no problems of ostensible ownership arose.434 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the policy behind section 2-326(3) did not support its ap-
plication to the facts presented.
Even if Mincow Bag is a sound decision, however, it should not
control the application of section 2-326(3) to the facts in Lassberg. Al-
though Mahaffey never had physical possession of the cotton, he ob-
tained possession of negotiable warehouse receipts covering the cotton.
Mahaffey's possession of the negotiable warehouse receipts was the le-
gal and commercial equivalent of possession of the underlying cotton 3 5
and created a problem of apparent ownership. Thus there is a princi-
430. See, e.g., Allsop v. Ernst (In re Roudebush), 20 Bankr. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982); Manger v. Davis, 619 P;2d 687 (Utah 1980); see also Cantor v. Anderson, 639
F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y.) (although consignee maintained a place of business at which the
consignee dealt in goods of the kind involved, section 2-326(3) was held inapplicable
because creditor never saw the goods at the business), alf'd, 833 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1986).
431. See, e.g., Manger, 619 P.2d at 692-93 (property consigned was a valuable ring
owned by an 80 year old widow in need of money).
432. See Bischoff v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359, 367 (Ala. 1981); Columbia Int'l
Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 559, 175 N.W.2d 465, 469 (1970).
433. 29 A.D.2d 400, 288 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1968), a/I'd, 24 N.Y.2d 776, 248 N.E.2d 26,
300 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1969).
434. Id. at 401, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
435. See U.C.C. § 9-304 comment 2 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
304 comment 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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pled basis for applying section 2-326(3), despite Mahaffey's failure to
take physical possession of the cotton.
If the court in Lassberg had concluded that the transfer from Pe-
cot to Mahaffey was within the scope of section 2-326(3), the court
would have been required to determine whether Pecot met the condi-
tions set forth in subsections (a) through (c) of section 2-326(3). If Pe-
cot meet any one of these conditions, the transfer could not be deemed
a sale or return. Since South Carolina does not have a sign-posting
statute, subsection (a) was unavailable to Pecot. Furthermore, since
Pecot failed to file a financing statement covering the cotton, Pecot
was not protected by subsection (c). Pecot's only hope would have been
to establish that Mahaffey was "generally known by his creditors to be
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others."4 3 That Mahaffey
was a broker would have assisted Pecot in this endeavor, but that fact
alone probably would not have been sufficient to enable Pecot to
prevail.
437
Even if the court in Lassberg had applied section 2-326 and con-
cluded that the transaction between Pecot and Mahaffey was a sale or
return, Pecot might have prevailed under section 7-503(1)(b). 43 8 Recall
that after he failed in his attempt to resell the cotton, Mahaffey sent
the negotiable warehouse receipts to Pecot. If Pecot qualified as a
holder to whom a negotiable document had been duly negotiated,
439
and Lassberg acquiesced in Mahaffey's procuring the negotiable ware-
house receipts,4 4 0 Pecot could have claimed title to the cotton free of
Lassberg's security interest.441 To establish that it took by due negotia-
tion, however, Pecot would have had to show that it took for value.442
The facts in Lassberg do not establish that Pecot gave value for the
warehouse receipts. Therefore, without reaching the issue of Lassberg's
436. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-326(3)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
437. See, e.g., Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49
Bankr. 340, 343-44 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (consignor must prove that most of consignee's credi-
tors knew of consignee's consignment practice to satisfy section 2-326(3)(b)), aff'd, 770
F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1985); Multibank Nat'l v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State St.
Auto Sales, Inc.), 81 Bankr. 215, 218 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) ("Section 2-326(3)(b), how-
ever, speaks of 'creditors,' which implies that a majority of creditors in number must
have knowledge, not a majority of creditors by amount of claims.").
438. See U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976). For the text of section 36-7-503(1)(b), see supra note 68.
439. See U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
440. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
441. See U.C.C. §§ 7-502(1)(b), -503(1)(b) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-7-502(1)(b),
-503(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
442. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44), 7-501(4) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-201(44), 7-
501(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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acquiescence, Pecot apparently could not have prevailed under a sec-
tion 7-503(1)(b) argument.
In summary, although the consignment issues were not raised in
Lassberg, the analysis above indicates that in any transaction in which
an owner delivers goods to a transferee for the purpose of sale, the
owner should file a financing statement to protect the owner's interest
from creditors of the transferee. Moreover, with the enactment of new
section 9-114, the owner also should satisfy the filing and notification
requirements of that provision. This will require the owner to search
for financing statements covering the transferee's inventory and to give
written notification to any party who filed before the owner filed.
III. CONFLICTING CLAIMS TO PROCEEDS OF COLLATERAL
An inventory financer seeking to enforce a security interest may
find that prior to default the debtor sold substantially all the collateral
to buyers in the ordinary course. 443 In such cases the inventory financer
must look to the proceeds realized by the debtor upon the sales of col-
lateral as the primary source of security.
Determining the extent and priority of an inventory financer's se-
curity interest in proceeds raises a broad range of issues. Two factors
contribute to the scope of inquiry. First, the sale of inventory can gen-
erate proceeds in a variety of forms, including trade-ins, cash,444 chat-
tel paper,44" and accounts.44 6 Each of these forms of proceeds presents
443. Buyers in the ordinary course take free of security interests created by their
sellers. U.C.C. § 9-307 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). Therefore, when a debtor sells encumbered inventory to a buyer in the
ordinary course, the sale extinguishes the inventory financer's security interest in the
goods. For analysis of the inventory financer's rights against buyers of the collateral, see
infra notes 876-80 and accompanying text.
444. "'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection,
or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. . . . Money, checks, deposit accounts, and
the like are 'cash proceeds'. All other proceeds are 'noncash proceeds'." S.C. CODE ANN. §
36-9-306(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
445. "Chattel paper" is defined under the U.C.C. to mean
a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security
interest in or a lease of specific goods, but a charter or other contract involving
the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced
both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series
of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-105(1)(b) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1989).
446. "'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has
been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §
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special issues. Second, an inventory financer's security interest in pro-
ceeds may conflict with two distinct types of claims. One class of con-
flicting claims includes those of creditors who make a claim to the pro-
ceeds as proceeds. For example, if the debtor has granted conflicting
security interests in inventory, the conflicting interests will transfer to
proceeds when the inventory is sold. The second and more significant
class of conflicting claims includes those claims asserted directly
against the proceeds. For example, an inventory financer's security in-
terest in accounts as proceeds of the encumbered inventory may con-
flict with a security interest of an accounts receivable financer who
loaned directly against the accounts. This section of the article will fo-
cus on the most significant forms of proceeds-cash proceeds, chattel
paper and accounts, and will consider an inventory financer's priority
over both conflicting security interests of other inventory financers and
conflicting claims asserted directly against the proceeds.
A. Attachment and Perfection of Security Interests in Proceeds
The 1988 enactment of the 1972 Amendments to the Official Text
of Article 9 clarified the requirements for creation of a security interest
in proceeds.447 Under the former statute it was unclear whether a se-
cured party had to include the word "proceeds" in the description of
the collateral in the security agreement for a security interest to extend
to proceeds. Under the revised statute a secured party acquires a se-
curity interest in proceeds as a matter of law under section 9-306(2)
and without a reference to proceeds in the security agreement.448 Re-
vised section 9-203(3) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secur-
ity agreement gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided
by Section 9-306."
449
The 1988 Amendments also addressed the requirements for
perfection of security interests in proceeds. Under both the former and
36-9-106 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The 1962 Official Text drew a distinction between
accounts and contract rights. Under the former law a contract right was an unearned
right to payment under a contract. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-106 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988). The 1972 Amendments eliminated
contract rights as a separate form of collateral and included such rights within the defi-
nition of accounts. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-10, at 215.
447. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-19, at 218; see generally 1 G.
GILMORE, supra note 56, § 11.4, at 351 (pre-amendment commentary discussing confu-
sion surrounding section 9-306).
448. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-203 reporter's note 3, -306 reporter's note 6 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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revised version of section 9-306(3)," ° a security interest in proceeds is
perfected automatically for ten days if the security interest in the col-
lateral was perfected.45 1 Moreover, both the former and the revised
statutes provide that one way a secured party can continue the per-
fected status in proceeds beyond the ten-day period is to perfect with
respect to the proceeds before the expiration of that period.45 2 The
change effected by the 1988 Amendments concerns the steps a secured
party may take prior to the sale of collateral to extend the perfection
of the party's security interest in proceeds.
Under former section 9-306(3)(a) a security interest in proceeds
remained perfected following the expiration of the ten-day period of
automatic perfection if a filed financing statement covering the original
collateral also covered proceeds. In practice secured parties complied
450. Former South Carolina Code section 36-9-306(3) provided:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security in-
terest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a
perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of
the proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral also covers
proceeds; or
(b) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration
of the ten day period.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
Amended South Carolina Code section 36-9-306(3) provides:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security in-
terest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a
perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of
the proceeds by the debtor unless:
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the pro-
ceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in
the office or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the
proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the
financing statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds;
or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the pro-
ceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration
of the ten-day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds can be per-
fected only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted in this chap-
ter for original collateral of the same type.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
451. See id. § 36-9-306 reporter's note 7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also B.
CLARK, supra note 8, 1 2.07(3), at 2-54 (discussing changes from 1962 version of section
9-306 to 1972 version).
452. Compare U.C.C. § 9-306 (3)(b) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988) with U.C.C. § 9-306(c) (1972) (amended
1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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with former section 9-306(3)(a) simply by checking the proceeds box
on the standard form financing statement.4 5 '
Although compliance with the former statute imposed a minimal
burden on a secured party, the provision gave rise to two problems.
First, a secured party who inadvertently failed to check the proceeds
box lost the perfected status of its security interest in proceeds, even
though third parties could reasonably infer from the filing with respect
to the collateral that the secured party had a security interest in pro-
ceeds.4 54 Second, in some situations checking the proceeds box on a
financing statement did not provide notice that the secured party had
a security interest in assets that the secured party could claim as
proceeds.
4 55
For example, assume that a secured party filed a financing state-
ment in the office of the Register of Mesne Conveyances (RMC) of a
debtor's residence covering farm equipment and proceeds, and that the
debtor exchanged a combine for a bulldozer which he used as construc-
tion equipment. Under former section 9-306(3)(a) the secured party's
security interest in the bulldozer would be perfected even though no
financing statement indicating that the debtor's construction equip-
ment was encumbered would be on file in the Secretary of State's
office.
Merely checking the proceeds box also could have failed to give
notice when a debtor used cash proceeds to purchase goods.45 1 For ex-
ample, assume that a secured party filed a financing statement cover-
ing a debtor's inventory and proceeds, that the debtor sold an item of
inventory for cash, and that the debtor used the cash to purchase a
piece of equipment. Under former section 9-306(1) the equipment
qualified as proceeds. Moreover, under former section 9-306(3)(a) the
secured party's security interest in the equipment was perfected even
though the filed financing statement did not indicate that equipment
was encumbered.
The application of former section 9-306(3) in these examples illus-
trates a significant problem with the former statute. By affording a se-
cured party perfected status in equipment as proceeds even though the
filed financing statements did not indicate that equipment was encum-
bered, the former statute effectively afforded priority status to a secret
lien. As a result, the former statute subjected subsequent lenders who
took a security interest in the apparently unencumbered equipment to
the risk of being primed by a secret lien. This risk, in turn, tended to
453. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-20, at 218-19.
454. Id. para. E-21, at 219; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 22-12, at 1008-09.
455. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306 reporter's note 7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
456. See id.; FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-24, at 219-20.
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reduce the availability and increase the cost of credit secured by the
equipment.
Revised section 9-306(3) addresses some of the problems that
arose under the former statute. Under the revised statute a secured
party is not required to include a claim to proceeds in the financing
statement covering the original collateral. 457 As a general rule, filing as
to the original collateral continues perfection of the security interest in
proceeds beyond expiration of the ten-day period of automatic perfec-
tion if the proceeds are either collateral in which a security interest
may be perfected by filing in the same office458 or identifiable cash pro-
ceeds. 4' 9 This rule, however, does not apply if the proceeds at issue are
acquired with cash proceeds. In such a case, for the financing state-
ment covering the original collateral to extend the perfection of the
security interest in proceeds, the description of the collateral in the
original financing statement must indicate the types of property consti-
tuting the proceeds.4
60
Revised section 9-306(3) generally simplifies an inventory fi-
nancer's task by extending the perfection of its security interest to
most forms of proceeds. Under revised section 9-306(3)(b) the inven-
tory financer's filing in the Secretary of State's office with respect to
the inventory continues the perfection of its security interest in identi-
fiable cash proceeds. Moreover, if the debtor does business only in
South Carolina or its chief executive office is located in South Carolina,
under revised section 9-306(3)(a) the inventory financer's filing in the
457. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-21, at 219.
458. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977) S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
459. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
460. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306 reporter's note 7 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
Although the 1988 Amendments improve the notice requirements for perfection of
security interests in proceeds, problems of secret liens still exist. For example, assume
that an inventory financer has filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State's
office covering only inventory, and the debtor exchanges an item of inventory for a piece
of equipment. Under revised section 9-306(3)(a) the filing is effective to continue the
perfection of the inventory financer's security interest in the equipment as proceeds,
even though the financing statement does not disclose that the equipment may be sub-
ject to a security interest. The distinction between equipment acquired as a direct trade-
in on the sale of inventory and equipment acquired with cash proceeds generated by a
sale of inventory was not an inadvertent oversight. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app.,
para. E-24, at 219-20. Presumably, the drafters of the 1972 Official Text of Article 9
viewed the problem of equipment received as direct proceeds of inventory as sufficiently
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Secretary of State's office covering inventory is effective to continue its
perfected status in proceeds in the form of accounts and chattel paper.
Revised section 9-306(3) does create two potential pitfalls, how-
ever. First, as noted, for an inventory financer's financing statement to
continue the perfection of its security interest in equipment acquired
with cash proceeds, the financing statement must indicate that equip-
ment is covered.46 ' Second, if the debtor's chief executive office is lo-
cated in another jurisdiction, a financing statement covering inventory
located in South Carolina which is filed in the South Carolina Secre-
tary of State's office will not extend the perfection of a security interest
to accounts or chattel paper.462 When a debtor is engaged in business
in more than one state, revised section 9-103 provides that to perfect a
security interest by filing in accounts and chattel paper the financing
statement must be filed in the state in which the debtor's chief execu-
tive office is located.463 Since a security interest in the debtor's ac-
counts or chattel paper could not be perfected by filing with the South
Carolina Secretary of State, the South Carolina inventory filing is not
sufficient to extend perfection in such proceeds under revised section
9-306(3) (a). Therefore, if a multi-state debtor is involved, to extend the
perfection of a security interest to proceeds in the form of accounts or
chattel paper, the inventory financer must file in the appropriate office
in the state in which the debtor's chief executive office is located.
B. Cash Proceeds
1. Identification of Commingled Cash Proceeds
From the perspective of an inventory financer, cash proceeds in-
clude both cash that the debtor has received upon the sale of inventory
and cash that the debtor has received upon the sale or collection of
accounts and chattel paper generated by the sale of inventory.464 Al-
though significant priority issues can arise with respect to cash pro-
ceeds, an inventory financer claiming cash proceeds as security must
first be able to identify the cash at issue as proceeds. If the debtor has
deposited cash proceeds in a deposit account containing only cash pro-
ceeds or is holding the cash proceeds without depositing them, identifi-
461. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
462. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3) to (4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
103(3) to (4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
463. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3) to (4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
103(3) to (4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
464. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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cation of the cash as proceeds does not present a problem. In contrast,
if the debtor has commingled the cash proceeds with other funds by
depositing them in a general bank account, substantial problems of
identification arise.
The Code does not define the term "identifiable cash proceeds."
The Code also does not provide that cash proceeds remain identifiable
after the cash proceeds have been commingled with other funds in a
general bank account. Even revised section 9-306(4)(d), which applies
in the event insolvency proceedings have been instituted by or against
a debtor to grant a secured party a limited security interest in a gen-
eral bank account in which cash proceeds have been commingled with
other funds, does not do so on the basis that the cash proceeds are
identifiable. 65 Moreover, Professor Gilmore asserted that a secured
party loses a security interest in cash proceeds if that secured party
permits the debtor to commingle the proceeds by depositing them in a
general bank account.46 Nevertheless, when the debtor is not subject
to an insolvency proceeding the courts have permitted secured parties
to identify cash proceeds in a general bank account through tracing
principles incorporated under section 1-103,47 and commentators gen-
erally have approved of this approach.468
Assuming that a secured party may identify cash proceeds that
have been commingled with other funds in a debtor's bank account,
the manner in which a secured party identifies proceeds depends on
whether insolvency proceedings have been instituted by or against the
debtor when the secured party asserts its security interest in the ac-
count. In cases in which no insolvency proceedings have been insti-
tuted, Article 9 does not specify how cash proceeds are identified. In
such cases, the courts have applied the "lowest intermediate balance"
method of tracing to identify cash proceeds commingled into a general
465. See Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S. ILL. L.J. 120, 128-29.
466. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.4, at 735-36.
467. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317
(E.D. Mo. 1973); Bank of Kan. v. Hutchinson Health Servs., Inc., 12 Kan. App. 2d 87,
735 P.2d 256 (1987) (cases are virtually unanimous in holding that cash proceeds are
identifiable if they can be traced to a debtor's bank account); General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Norstar Bank, N.A., 141 Misc. 2d 349, -, 532 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Sup. Ct.
1988) (citing 13 states permitting identification of cash proceeds by tracing); Michigan
Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d 108 (1975);
Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Sooner Coop., 766 P.2d 325 (Okla. 1988); see gener-
ally, B. CLARK, supra note 8, 10.03, at 10-32 to -33 (noting that case law under Article 9
generally rejects Professor Gilmore's proposition that cash proceeds lose their identity
once they are commingled in a general bank account).
468, See, e.g., Henning, Article Nine's Treatment of Commingled Cash Proceeds in
Non-Insolvency Cases, 35 ARK. L. REv. 191 (1981); Skilton, supra note 465, at 126-44.
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account." 9 In contrast, when insolvency proceedings have been insti-
tuted by or against a debtor, revised section 9-306(4)(d) defines and
limits the extent to which a secured party may claim a security interest
in a deposit account into which cash proceeds have been commin-
gled.4"' Although the revised statute is less than generous to secured
parties, the 1988 Amendments have clarified the operation of the pro-
vision and to some extent enhanced the rights of secured parties.
a. Noninsolvency Situations
Article 9 is silent on the appropriate manner of identifying cash
proceeds which have been commingled with other funds in a debtor's
general bank account when insolvency proceedings have not been insti-
tuted by or against the debtor. Nevertheless, the courts have permitted
secured parties to assert a security interest in a bank account to the
extent the secured party can establish that the account represents cash
proceeds under the "lowest intermediate balance" method of tracing.
471
Basically, this method of tracing involves two rules. First, commin-
gled account withdrawals not used to pay the secured party are
deemed withdrawals from nonproceeds funds; only when the non-
proceeds component of the account is exhausted are proceeds in-
vaded.411 Second, a deposit of nonproceeds funds after an invasion of
proceeds does not restore the invaded proceeds unless the debtor de-
posits the funds with an intent to make restitution to the secured
party.4
73
469. See, e.g., Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Millard Aviation, Inc. (In re Turner), 13 Bankr.
15 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 325-27; C.O.
Funk & Son, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 659, 415 N.E.2d 1308 (1981),
aff'd, 89 Ill. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982).
470. See, e.g., Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1986) (sec-
tion 9-306(4)(d) displaces non-Code tracing rules in insolvency situations); Campbell v.
Small Business Admin. (In re Jameson's Foods, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 433 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1983) (in cases of insolvency non-Code tracing rules are displaced by section 9-
306(4)(d)).
471. See cases cited supra note 467.
472. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 comment i (1957); RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION § 211 (1936). This rule is commonly referred to as the Rule of
Jessel's Bag, after Jessel, Master of the Rolls, who developed the rule in Knatchbull v.
Hallett (In re Hallet's Estate), 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879); see Oesterle, Deficiencies of the
Restitution Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and Under U.C.C. § 9-
306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172, 207 n.66 (1983). For application of this rule to tracing
proceeds under Article 9, see Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 325-26; C.O.
Funk & Son, Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d at 659, 415 N.E.2d at 1312-13. See generally, Henning,
supra note 468, at 228 (detailing the "lowest intermediate balance" method of tracing).
473. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 comment j (1957); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 212 (1936); see generally, Oesterle, supra note 472, at 208 n.66 (brief
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To illustrate the application of the lowest intermediate balance
method of tracing, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 17-Finance Company holds a perfected security
interest in Debtor's inventory. On May 31 the balance in Debtor's
general deposit account with Bank is $5,000, no portion of which rep-
resents proceeds from the sale of inventory subject to Finance Com-
pany's security interest. On June I Debtor deposits $10,000 which
constitute cash proceeds from the sale of encumbered inventory, rais-
ing the balance in the account to $15,000. On June 2 and June 3
Debtor makes withdrawals of $5,000 to pay unsecured creditors, re-
ducing the balance to $5,000. On June 4 Debtor deposits $5,000 of
nonproceeds funds, raising the balance to $10,000.
The issue posed by this illustration is to what extent may Finance
Company claim a perfected security interest in Debtor's bank account.
On June 1 the balance in debtor's account consisted of $5,000 in non-
proceeds funds and $10,000 in proceeds. Under the first rule of the
lowest intermediate balance method of tracing, the June 2 withdrawal
to pay general creditors is deemed to have been from nonproceeds
funds, with the result that the remaining $10,000 in the account con-
sisted solely of proceeds. The June 3 withdrawal of $5,000 represented
an invasion of proceeds. Finally, under the second rule of the lowest
intermediate balance method, the June 4 deposit of $5,000 in non-
proceeds funds did not restore the invaded proceeds unless the funds
were deposited with the intent of making restitution. If Debtor did not
act with this intent, Finance Company is limited to a claim of $5,000
on the $10,000 balance in Debtor's account.
As Illustration 17 demonstrates, the first rule of the lowest inter-
mediate balance method protects a secured party asserting a security
interest in a bank account into which a debtor has commingled cash
proceeds with other funds. By treating withdrawals as first depleting
nonproceeds funds, the first rule preserves the proceeds component of
the bank account. The courts, however, also have applied the lowest
intermediate balance method of tracing to determine whether goods
purchased with funds withdrawn from the account are proceeds.474 Al-
though the secured party is forced to invoke tracing to establish a se-
history of judicial methods employed to determine whose funds remain after commingled
funds are depleted). For application of this rule to tracing proceeds under Article 9, see
Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 325-27; C.O. Funk & Son, Inc., 92 Ill.
App. 3d at 664-67, 415 N.E.2d at 1313-15. Not all courts follow the second rule, however.
A few courts presume an intent on the part of the wrongdoer to restore funds. See, e.g.,
Church v. Bailey, 90 Cal. App. 2d 501, 203 P.2d 547 (1949); Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla.
1126, 125 So. 360 (1929), cited in Oesterle, supra note 472, at 208 n.66.
474. See, e.g., C.O. Funk & Son, Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d at 664-67, 415 N.E.2d at 1313-
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curity interest in the new goods only in cases in which it cannot claim
the goods under an after-acquired property clause, in such cases, treat-
ing withdrawals as first depleting nonproceeds can work to the disad-
vantage of the secured party. To illustrate this problem, consider the
following:
ILLUSTRATION 18-Finance Company has a perfected security in-
terest in specific items of Debtor's inventory. Finance Company does
not, however, have a security interest in Debtor's after-acquired in-
ventory. Debtor maintains a deposit account at Bank, and on May 31
the balance in the account was $5,000. No portion of this balance rep-
resented proceeds from the sale of inventory. On June 1 Debtor de-
posited cash proceeds of $10,000 into the account, raising the balance
to $15,000. On June 2 Debtor withdrew $5,000 to purchase new inven-
tory, reducing the balance in the account to $10,000. On June 3
Debtor withdrew the remaining $10,000 to pay unsecured creditors.
On June 4 Debtor deposited $5,000 in nonproceeds funds.
Under the analysis of Illustration 17 Finance Company cannot as-
sert a security interest upon the bank account. The June 3 withdrawal
completely exhausted the proceeds component of the account. More-
over, if the June 4 deposit was not intended as restitution, that deposit
did not replenish the invaded proceeds. The critical issue is whether
Finance Company may claim a security interest in the inventory pur-
chased on June 2 on the theory that the new inventory constituted
proceeds of cash proceeds. Under a literal application of the lowest in-
termediate balance method of tracing, the answer is no. Pursuant to
the first rule, the withdrawal on June 2 was of nonproceeds funds.
Therefore, the new inventory was not acquired with proceeds, and
hence did not qualify as proceeds.
Although the first rule of the lowest intermediate balance method
of tracing apparently precludes Finance Company in Illustration 18
from establishing a security interest in the June 2 inventory, that re-
sult is inconsistent with policy underlying the rule. The purpose of the
rule is to protect the secured position of the secured party. Therefore,
it seems inappropriate to apply the rule in a way that undermines that
policy. Moreover, in non-Code cases, the courts have recognized an ex-
ception to the first rule of tracing when a wrongdoer uses funds from a
commingled account to acquire specific property. 7 5 These courts have
held that the specific property is acquired with trust funds, even
though the account contained nontrust funds at the time of the acqui-
sition.476 Therefore, in a Code case in which the issue before the court
475. See, e.g., Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935);
Hertslet v. Oatway (In re Oatway), 2 Ch. 356 (1903).
476. Republic Supply Co., 79 F.2d at 378; Oatway, 2 Ch. at 359-60 (1903); see Oes-
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is whether new property purchased with funds withdrawn from a com-
mingled account constitutes proceeds (as opposed to whether a secured
party can claim a security interest in the account), the court should not
apply the first rule of the lowest intermediate balance method to pre-
clude the secured party from establishing a claim. The secured party
should have the right to claim that any property acquired with funds
drawn from a commingled account was purchased with cash proceeds
to the extent that the account contained cash proceeds when the
debtor withdrew the funds to purchase the property.'77 If Finance
Company in Illustration 18 had such a right it could claim the June 2
inventory was proceeds, since on that date the account contained suffi-
cient proceeds to cover the withdrawal.
A response to this argument is the assertion that Finance Com-
pany's dilemma resulted from its own negligence, and that a court
should not manipulate tracing principles to assist a negligent party.
Although Finance Company could have protected its claim to the June
2 inventory, either by including an after-acquired property clause in its
security agreement or by precluding Debtor from commingling cash
proceeds in a general bank account, the failure to establish such pro-
tection does not necessarily reflect negligence on the part of Finance
Company. First, Finance Company may have had a valid business rea-
son for not claiming a security interest in Debtor's after-acquired in-
ventory. For example, if Finance Company financed Debtor's acquisi-
tion of the business, Finance Company may have left the Debtor's
after-acquired inventory unencumbered to enable Debtor to acquire
the inventory financing necessary to conduct business and generate
revenues sufficient to repay Finance Company. Second, Debtor may
have commingled cash proceeds even though the security agreement
required Debtor to deposit all cash proceeds in a segregated account
containing only cash proceeds and even though Finance Company
monitored Debtor's business to insure that Debtor complied with the
terms of the agreement. Therefore, the equities sometimes weigh in
favor of modifying the rigors of the lowest intermediate balance
method to permit Finance Company to claim the June 2 inventory as
proceeds.
In summary, by employing the lowest intermediate balance
method of tracing in noninsolvency situations, an inventory financer
probably has the right to establish a security interest in a bank account
into which cash proceeds have been commingled. Such a claim, how-
terle, supra note 472, at 208 n.66 (briefly discussing holdings in Republic Supply and
Oatway).
477. See Henning, supra note 468, at 245 (suggesting a similar rule without provid-
ing a precedential basis).
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ever, may be both less than generous and difficult to prove. Therefore,
an inventory financer normally is well advised to require the debtor to
deposit all cash proceeds in a segregated account and to monitor the
debtor's compliance with this requirement.
Furthermore, although in theory an inventory financer may be
able to claim after-acquired inventory as proceeds of cash proceeds, the
problems of tracing may, as a practical matter, preclude such a
claim.47 1 Accordingly, if an inventory financer perceives any potential
need to rely on after-acquired inventory as security, the financer
should include an after-acquired property clause in the security
agreement.
Although by retaining a security interest in after-acquired inven-
tory the inventory financer may make it more difficult for the'debtor to
acquire subsequent financing secured by inventory, the claim to after-
acquired property will not preclude such financing. If the subsequent
inventory financer retains a purchase money security interest in the
new inventory, the subsequent financer can prime the prior secured
party under revised section 9-312(3). 9 Moreover, the subsequent non-
purchase money inventory financer may be able to obtain priority
through a subordination agreement if the financing provided is essen-
tial to the operation of the debtor's business.
480
b. Insolvency Situations
When insolvency proceedings have been instituted by or against a
debtor, revised section 9-306(4) 4s" applies to define the extent to which
a perfected secured party can claim a security interest in proceeds.
8 2
The most significant portion of this provision is revised section 9-
306(4)(d), which limits a secured party's security interest in a bank
account in which cash proceeds have been commingled with other
funds. 4 1 In the event that insolvency proceedings are commenced by
478. See, e.g., C.O. Funk & Son, 92 Ill. App. 3d 659, 415 N.E.2d 1308 (evidence at
trial did not support finding that funds were proceeds of Funk's collateral and thus court
ordered funds distributed to bank).
479. See supra notes 114-291 and accompanying text (analyzing revised section 9-
312(3)).
480. See U.C.C. § 9-316 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-316 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) (authorization of subordination agreements).
481. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(4) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
482. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 23-7, at 1102-05 (discussing corre-
sponding provision of Model Act).
483. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 10.03, at 10-37 to -39 (discussing the
problem of commingled funds); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 23-7, at 1105-09
(discussing the relationship of section 9-306(4)(d) to bankruptcy law); Skilton, The Se-
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or against the debtor, revised section 9-306(4)(d) preempts the right of
a secured party to establish a security interest in such an account by
tracing under the lowest intermediate balance method,"" and normally
provides the secured party with a less generous recovery than could be
obtained through tracing.
4 5
The 1988 Amendments, which enacted the 1972 Official Text of
section 9-306(4), clarified the rules for claiming a security interest in a
bank account into which cash proceeds were commingled. Although
former section 9-306(4)(d) produced rational results when a debtor ei-
ther commingled cash proceeds in the debtor's general account or re-
tained the cash proceeds without depositing them in a bank account, a
literal application of the statute produced odd results when the debtor
endorsed cash proceeds checks over to the secured party or other pay-
ees. 4ss The revised statute corrects these aberrations.
Revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) provides that a secured party's per-
fected security interest in a bank account into which cash proceeds
have been commingled with other funds is limited to an amount not
greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings. 481
cured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under Section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1978 S. ILL. L.J. 60 (analyzing problems that arise concerning
section 9-306(4)(d)).
484. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 48 Bankr. 317 (N.D. Tex. 1985); In re
Glaubinger Mach. Co., 58 Bankr. 38 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). But see In re Datair Sys.
Corp., 42 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1984) (larger recovery under section 9-306(4)(d)
than would have been available under tracing principles). To the extent that section 9-
306(4)(d) grants a secured party a greater interest in a commingled bank account than it
could claim under tracing principles, the validity of section 9-306(4)(d) against the bank-
ruptcy trustee is, at least, debatable. See Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re
Gibson Prods.), 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); see gener-
ally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 6.03[4][a]-[b], at 6-40 to -44; WHrrE & SUMMEs, supra
note 87, § 23-7, at 1105-09; Skilton, supra note 483, at 80-87. To avoid a conflict between
the Bankruptcy Code and section 9-306(4)(d), one court has interpreted the latter provi-
sion as a limitation upon otherwise identifiable proceeds. Moister v. National Bank (In
re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co.), 5 Bankr. 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). Under Guar-
anteed Muffler, a secured party claiming a security interest under section 9-306(4)(d)
must first identify the cash proceeds under tracing principles. Once the cash proceeds
are identified, section 9-306(4)(d) would limit the security interest to an amount not
greater than the amount of cash proceeds received within the 10 days prior to the com-
mencement of the insolvency case. Therefore, under Guaranteed Muffler a secured party
cannot recover more under section 9-306(4)(d) than it could recover by tracing.
485. See, e.g., In re Security Alumninum Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 47
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1971); see generally Skilton, supra note 483, at 73-75 (analyzing
formula substituted for conventional tracing techniques in insolvency).
486. See generally Skilton, supra note 483, at 75-77 (comparing 1962 and 1972 ver-
sions of section 9-306(4)(d)).
487. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
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The revised statute then provides that this maximum amount is sub-
ject to two reductions. First, under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) the
maximum recovery is reduced by any payments to the secured party on
account of cash proceeds received within the ten-day period prior to
the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. 488 Second, under re-
vised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) the maximum recovery is further re-
duced by the amount of cash proceeds the debtor received within the
ten-day period that the secured party can claim under revised section
9-306(4)(a) through (c). 48 9 These reductions include cash proceeds that
the debtor has deposited in a separate bank account containing only
proceeds,'4 0 cash proceeds in the form of money that the debtor has
neither commingled nor deposited in a bank account, 4  and cash pro-
ceeds in the form of checks that the debtor has not deposited in a bank
account.492 In addition, revised section 9-306(4)(a) and (d)(ii) may be
interpreted to require a reduction of the security interest in the general
deposit account to the extent that cash proceeds received within ten
days prior to the commencement of an insolvency proceeding can be
traced to identifiable noncash proceeds.
493
The operation of revised section 9-306(4)(d) can be analyzed
through a series of illustrative examples. First, the basic operation of
the provision is evidenced by the following:
ILLUSTRATION 19-Finance Company holds a security interest in
Debtor's current and after-acquired inventory, which Finance Com-
pany perfected by filing. Although the terms of the security agreement
require Debtor to deposit all cash proceeds from the sale of inventory
in a separate deposit account containing only proceeds, on occasion
Debtor breached this requirement and deposited cash proceeds in
Debtor's general bank account and thereby commingled the cash pro-
ceeds with other funds. On May 31 the balance in the segregated ac-
count was $1,000, and the balance in Debtor's general bank account
was $20,000. Under the lowest intermediate balance method of trac-
306(4)(d)(ii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
488. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(ii)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
489. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(ii)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
490. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(4)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
491. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(4)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
492. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(4)(c)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
493. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 48 Bankr. 317 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (secured party
cannot invoke tracing to claim the funds withdrawn from a commingled account consti-
tute a separate account under section 9-306(4)(a)).
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ing, the entire $20,000 balance in the general bank account consti-
tuted cash proceeds.
On June 10 Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. On June 10 the balance in the segregated account was
$7,000, and the balance in Debtor's general bank account was $25,000.
During the ten-day period prior to the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy case, Debtor received checks totalling $18,000 as proceeds from
the sale of encumbered inventory. Debtor deposed of these checks as
follows:
$6,000-deposited in segregated account;
$5,000-deposited in general bank account;
$4,000-placed in desk drawer and did not deposit in a bank
account prior to bankruptcy;
$3,000-endorsed over to Finance Company.
The primary issue presented in this illustration is the extent to
which Finance Company can claim a security interest in Debtor's gen-
eral bank account. To resolve this issue, however, one must consider
Finance Company's rights to both the cash proceeds deposited in the
segregated account and to those left in the desk drawer.
The analysis of Illustration 19 must commence with the observa-
tion that if Finance Company were permitted to trace proceeds under
the lowest intermediate balance method, Finance Company could
claim the entire $25,000 balance in the general bank account as cash
proceeds. Revised section 9-306(4)(d), however, precludes Finance
Company from using tracing principles to establish its security interest
in the commingled account.4 94 Under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) Fi-
nance Company's security interest in the general bank account cannot
exceed $18,000, the amount of cash proceeds received by Debtor within
ten days before commencement of the bankruptcy. Moreover, this
maximum amount is subject to several reductions.
Under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) Finance Company's claim
must be reduced by $3,000 to reflect the payment Debtor made to Fi-
nance Company. 9 5 Since this payment was made by endorsing over
proceeds checks received within the ten days prior to bankruptcy, it is
clear that the payment was "on account of cash proceeds received by
the debtor during the [ten-day] period.'
96
Under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) Finance Company's secur-
ity interest in the general bank account is subject to two additional
reductions. First, under revised section 9-306(4)(a) Finance Company
494. See sources cited supra notes 484-85 and accompanying text.
495. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(ii)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
496. U.C.C, § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(ii)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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is entitled to a perfected security interest in the segregated bank ac-
count, which contains only proceeds.4  Therefore, Finance Company's
security interest in the general bank account must be reduced to the
extent that cash proceeds received within the ten-day period were de-
posited in the segregated account. Finance Company's security interest
in the general bank account thus must be reduced by an additional
$6,000. A second reduction results under revised section 9-
306(4)(d)(ii)(II) because Finance Company is entitled to a perfected
security interest in the checks in the desk drawer under revised section
9-306(4)(c). 411 Accordingly, Finance Company's security interest in the
general bank account is subject to an additional reduction of $4,000.
Thus, under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) Finance Company's per-
fected security interest in Debtor's general bank account is limited to
$5,000.
As applied in Illustration 19, the rules of revised section 9-
306(4)(d) are unambiguous and produce an unremarkable result. Al-
though Finance Company's security interest in the general bank ac-
count is limited to $5,000, Finance Company is entitled to the benefit
of the entire $18,000 in cash proceeds collected within the ten-day pe-
riod. This result is unremarkable because all the cash proceeds in issue
were directly and demonstrably related to improving the Finance Com-
pany's position.
The operation of revised section 9-306(4)(d) becomes somewhat
remarkable when cash proceeds received within the ten-day period are
demonstrably applied for purposes other than paying to or providing
security for a secured party. To illustrate this situation consider an
example inspired by a well-known decision.499
ILLUSTRATION 20-Finance Company has a perfected security in-
terest in Debtor's current and after-acquired inventory. Debtor main-
tains a general bank account into which cash proceeds have been com-
mingled with other funds. On May 31 the balance in Debtor's account
is $24,000, $4,000 of which constitute proceeds under the lowest inter-
mediate balance method of tracing. On June 10 Debtor filed for relief
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 10 the balance in
Debtor's account was $25,000. During the ten-day period prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, Debtor received $21,000 in
497. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
498. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(ii)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(c) (1972) (amended
1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(4)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (secured party entitled
to checks not deposited in an account prior to insolvency proceedings).
499. See Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson Prods.), 543 F.2d 652
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
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cash proceeds in the form of checks. Of this amount Debtor deposited
$1,000 in Debtor's general bank account and endorsed $20,000 to meet
current expenses and pay unsecured creditors.
Although under the lowest intermediate balance method of trac-
ing, the proceeds component of Debtor's bank account could not ex-
ceed $5,000, under revised section 9-306(4)(d) Finance Company's per-
fected security interest in the account equals $21,000. This result raises
two issues. First, how can the Code justify awarding Finance Company
a $21,000 security interest in the bank account on account of cash pro-
ceeds received within ten days prior to the commencement of the insol-
vency proceedings, when only $1,000 of those proceeds were deposited
in the bank account? In response, the secured party can assert that
because unsecured creditors have been paid with cash proceeds that
rightfully belonged to the secured party, neither the unsecured credi-
tors nor the bankruptcy trustee as their representative should be heard
to complain when the secured party is awarded a compensating inter-
est in the bank account.500
The more difficult issue raised by this illustration is whether re-
vised section 9-306(4)(d) is invalid against the bankruptcy trustee to
the extent that it grants Finance Company a larger interest in the bank
account than it would have had insolvency proceedings not been insti-
tuted. Although commentators have discussed this issue, 50 1 the courts
have yet to resolve it.
502
Although the propriety of the outcome in Illustration 20 is ques-
tionable, the language of the statute is not ambiguous. Any problem of
statutory interpretation in Illustration 20 arises because of the appar-
ent conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. 03 Some situations, however, do
disclose ambiguities in the language of the provision. To illustrate two
problems of interpretation, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 21-Finance Company has a security interest in
Debtor's current and after-acquired inventory, which it perfected by
an appropriate filing. Debtor maintained a general bank account into
which Debtor commingled cash proceeds with other funds. On May 31
500. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 23-7, at 1105-06.
501. See, e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 8, 6.03[4][a]-[b], at 6-40 to -44; 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 56, § 45.9, at 1336-40; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 23-7, at 1105-09;
Skilton, supra note 483, at 80-87.
502. See, e.g., Arizona Wholesale Supply Co., 543 F.2d at 655-56 (section 9-
306(4)(d) invalid against bankruptcy trustee to extent that it grants greater security in-
terest than could be established under tracing principles); Moister v. National Bank (In
re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co.), 5 Bankr. 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (section 9-
306(4)(d) interpreted to limit security interest in identifiable proceeds and thereby avoid
conflict with Bankruptcy Code).
503. See Guaranteed Muffler, 5 Bankr. at 238.
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the balance in Debtor's account was $20,000, no portion of which con-
stituted cash proceeds. On June 10 Debtor petitioned for relief under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 10 the balance in the
account was $19,000. During the ten days prior to the commencement
of the bankruptcy case Debtor made the following transactions:
(1) On June 1 Debtor drew a check for $5,000 to Finance Com-
pany, which was paid on June 3;
(2) On June 4 Debtor received $8,000 in cash proceeds, which
Debtor immediately deposited in Debtor's account and for
which Debtor was given immediate credit;
(3) On June 5 Debtor drew a check on Debtor's account for
$4,000 payable to Finance Company, which was paid on June 7;
(4) On June 8 Debtor received cash proceeds in the form of a
$3,000 check, which Debtor immediately endorsed over to a sup-
plier in exchange for new inventory.
During the ten days before the commencement of the bankruptcy case
Debtor received cash proceeds totalling $11,000. Therefore, Finance
Company's security interest in the bank account cannot exceed
$11,000. The issue presented is whether this amount must be reduced
pursuant to revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) or (II).
Under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) Finance Company's maxi-
mum claim must be reduced by payments to it "on account of cash
proceeds received by the debtor during the [ten-day] period [prior to
the commencement of the insolvency proceedings]."5°4 The issue raised
is whether the June 3 payment of $5,000 and the June 5 payment of
$4,000 are within the scope of this statutory language. It is clear that
the June 3 payment was of nonproceeds funds, since when the check
was paid Debtor's account did not contain any proceeds. The June 5
payment is more troublesome. When the June 5 check was paid, the
account contained both $15,000 of nonproceeds and $8,000 of cash pro-
ceeds. The $4,000 withdrawal might have been made from either the
proceeds or the nonproceeds component of the account. Moreover,
rather than attempting to trace the withdrawals to the proceeds and
nonproceeds, one could invoke an analysis under which all payments
from the account during the ten-day period would be deemed on ac-
count of cash proceeds received within the ten-day period to the extent
that cash proceeds were deposited in the account.
Choosing among the suggested alternatives raises several issues.
To the extent that the payments from the account are not deemed "on
account of cash proceeds," the provision invites a challenge under the
Bankruptcy Code. If Finance Company were undersecured when the
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payments were made, the payments could be challenged as a prefer-
ence unless they were offset by a compensating reduction in Finance
Company's security in the bank account. 0 5 Thus, avoiding a conflict
with the Bankruptcy Code suggests an application of a net result ap-
proach. This approach also is consistent with the basic function of re-
vised section 9-306(4)(d), in that it eliminates the need to trace the
payments to component parts of the fund.50 6
As noted, however, the net result approach does not fit comforta-
bly within the statutory language. It is difficult to maintain that the
June 3 payment is on account of cash proceeds when it clearly was
paid with nonproceeds funds. On the other hand, to presume that the
June 5 payment was made from proceeds as opposed to nonproceeds is
consistent with the statutory language. On balance, the resolution most
consistent with the language of the statute and the conflicting policies
at play would be one finding that only the $4,000 payment was on ac-
count of cash proceeds reached during its ten-day period. Thus, tl.e
reduction under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(I) would be limited to
$4,000. Accordingly, if the trustee is to recover the $5,000 payment, the
trustee will have to do so directly by avoiding it as a preference rather
than attacking it indirectly through reducing Finance Company's se-
curity interest in the bank account.
5 0 7
The final issue presented in Illustration 21 is whether Finance
Company's security interest in the bank account must be reduced by
$3,000 to reflect Finance Company's security interest in the inventory
acquired on June 8. The new inventory in Illustration 21 is identifiable
noncash proceeds because the inventory was obtained in exchange for
cash proceeds. Therefore, under revised section 9-306(4)(a) Finance
Company is entitled to assert a perfected security interest in the inven-
tory. The critical question is whether Finance Company's security in-
terest in the bank account must be reduced by noncash proceeds to
which Finance Company is entitled under paragraph (a).
A literal reading of revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) indicates that
605. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988); see also Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d
504 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that regular installment payments on consumer debt voida-
ble to the extent they are credited to unsecured claims).
506. See generally, Skilton, supra note 483, at 77-79 (discussing extent of secured
party's claim versus the fund subject to claim).
507. In the event the trustee sought to attack the payment as a preference, Finance
Company could assert a defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988), which excepts from
avoidance certain ordinary course payments. See generally, B. CLARK, supra note 8,
6.03[2][b][i] at 6-32 to -33 (discussing defenses against trustee's preference powers). But
see Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the
1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DuKE L.J. 78 (arguing on policy grounds that sec-
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Finance Company's security interest in the bank account should be re-
duced only by the amount of cash proceeds that Finance Company can
claim under paragraphs (a) through (c). Thus, the security interest in
the bank account arguably should not be reduced by the amount of
noncash proceeds to which Finance Company is entitled under para-
graph (a). Such an interpretation of the statute, however, effectively
allows Finance Company a double recovery, since it would have a
$3,000 security interest in both the inventory and the bank account.
Although one might argue that allowing the double recovery is reasona-
ble in light of the statutory bar to claiming a security interest in the
account through tracing, under the facts of Illustration 21, such a re-
covery might well call into question the validity of the statute against
the bankruptcy trustee. Therefore, revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II)
should be interpreted as requiring a reduction of the security interest
in the bank account to the extent Finance Company can claim, under
paragraphs (a) through (c), either cash proceeds received within the
ten-day period or noncash proceeds obtained with cash proceeds. Thus,
Finance Company's security interest in the bank account should be re-
duced by an additional $3,000 to reflect the June 8 inventory.
A variation in Illustration 21 discloses a final problem with the
application of revised section 9-306(4)(d). If Debtor had deposited
June 8 cash proceeds in the bank account and purchased the inventory
with a check drawn on that account, it would be unclear whether the
inventory constituted identifiable noncash proceeds. Assuming the
check was presented and paid on June 9, when the balance in Debtor's
account was $19,000, the check could have been paid with either pro-
ceeds or nonproceeds funds. Under conventional tracing principles, the
account contained at least $4,000 of proceeds on June 9. If the inven-
tory is deemed to have been purchased with proceeds, and revised sec-
tion 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) requires a reduction for noncash proceeds which
can be traced to cash proceeds, Finance Company's security interest in
the bank account must be reduced by $3,000.
In contrast, if the inventory is deemed to have been purchased
with nonproceeds, then section 9-306(4)(a) and (d)(ii) do not require a
reduction in Finance Company's security interest in the bank account.
Under modern tracing principles, withdrawals by a trustee from a com-
mingled account are deemed made from nontrust funds until those
funds are exhausted. 508 Moreover, some courts have applied this princi-
ple even when the withdrawals resulted in the trustee's acquisition of
identifiable property.509 If the latter interpretation were adopted, how-
508. The stated rule is commonly known as the Rule of Jessel's Bag. See supra note
472.
509. See, e.g., Covey v. Cannon, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S.W. 514 (1912).
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ever, Finance Company would realize a double recovery because of the
$3,000 in cash proceeds received on June 8. Receipt of these cash pro-
ceeds would enhance Finance Company's security interest in the bank
account.
Additionally, although Finance Company could not claim the June
8 inventory as proceeds, Finance Company could claim a security in-
terest in the inventory under the after-acquired property clause in its
security agreement with Debtor. This double recovery is difficult to
justify. Revised section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)(II) thus should be interpreted as
mandating a reduction in Finance Company's security interest in the
bank account to the extent that the account contained cash proceeds
sufficient to cover the check at the time it was drawn and paid.5 10
The above analysis shows that an inventory financer asserting a
security interest in cash proceeds may encounter substantial problems
in establishing a security interest in a deposit account in which a
debtor has commingled cash proceeds. If insolvency proceeding have
not been instituted by or against the debtor, the inventory financer can
claim a security interest in a general deposit account only to the extent
the financer can trace cash proceeds into the account. If insolvency
proceedings have been commenced, however, revised section 9-
306(4)(d)(ii) limits an inventory financer's security interest in a deposit
account in which cash proceeds have been commingled with other
funds to an amount not greater than the amount of cash proceeds re-
ceived by the debtor within ten days prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings.
5 11
An inventory financer can attempt to avoid the problems of claim-
ing a security interest in a general bank account by requiring the
debtor to deposit all cash proceeds in a segregated account containing
only proceeds. Such protection, however, may prove to be illusory be-
cause a financially embarrassed debtor is likely to breach this require-
ment and deposit cash proceeds in a general account in order to have
access to the funds. As an alternative form of protection, an inventory
financer can obtain a security interest directly in the deposit account.
Although revised section 9-104(1)512 provides that Article 9 does not
510. Although the authorities are divided, a line of cases affords a party invoking
tracing the opportunity to claim identifiable property when a wrongdoer has withdrawn
funds from a commingled account to acquire the property. See, e.g., Republic Supply Co.
v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935); General Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day
Adventists, Inc. v. General Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, 410 S.W.2d 256
(Tex. Ct. App. 1966); see generally Oesterle, supra note 472, at 208 n.66 (describing the
approaches taken by the courts).
511. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(ii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
512. U.C.C. § 9-104(l) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(l) (Law.
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apply to a transfer of an interest in a deposit account,5 1 by obtaining
an assignment of the debtor's interest in the account, the inventory
financer may be able to acquire a non-Code security interest in the
account. 14
Under South Carolina law it appears that priority among assignees
of a chose in action is determined by the order of assignment and with-
out reference to which party first notified the obligor.5 5 Therefore, an
inventory financer may be able to establish a prior claim to the entire
balance in a debtor's general bank account simply by obtaining an as-
signment of the account in the security agreement. Nevertheless, to en-
hance its priority in the account against the depositing bank, which
may assert a right of set off, the inventory financer should give the
bank notice of the assignment.
5 1
1
2. Priority of Conflicting Claims to Cash Proceeds
An inventory financer's claim to cash proceeds may conflict with
two types of interests. First, other creditors claiming an interest in the
inventory may claim the cash proceeds as proceeds of their collateral.
Second, other creditors may claim the cash proceeds as their primary
collateral. This section first considers conflicts between inventory
financers over cash proceeds, then analyzes the more complex issue of
whether an inventory financer's interest in cash proceeds is entitled to
priority over creditors who claim an interest directly in the cash
proceeds.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
513. The revised section defines a deposit account as "a demand, time, savings,
passbook, or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association, credit
union, or like organization, other than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit."
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-105(1)(e) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1989).
514. See McLaughlin, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: Unresolved
Problems and Unanswered Questions Under Existing Law, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 70-
72, 74-75 (1988); see generally Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing into
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 MINN.
L. REv. 899 (1984) (arguing that deposit account financing should be integrated into Ar-
ticle 9).
515. See Standard Oil Co. v. Powell Paving and Contracting Co., 139 S.C. 411, 426-
27, 138 S.E. 184, 188-89 (1927) (master's report); see also McLaughlin, supra note 476, pt
76-77 (discussing common law assignment).
516. See McLaughlin, supra note 514, at 85; see generally infra notes 579-618 and
accompanying text (analyzing priority of a bank's right to set-off).
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a. Inventory Financers Asserting Conflicting Article 9 Security
Interests in Cash Proceeds
As a general rule under the revised statute, an inventory financer's
priority with respect to inventory will carry over to cash proceeds re-
ceived in exchange for the inventory. Revised section 9-312(6) provides
that for purposes of determining priority under the first to file or per-
fect rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a), "a date of filing or perfection as
to collateral is also a date of filing or perfection as to proceeds.1
5 17
Therefore, if an inventory financer were entitled to priority with re-
spect to the inventory as the first secured party to file or perfect, the
inventory financer also would be entitled to priority with respect to the
cash proceeds realized on the sale of the inventory. Moreover, if an
inventory financer were entitled to priority with respect to inventory
under revised section 9-312(3),18 the financer's purchase money prior-
ity would extend to "identifiable cash proceeds received [by the
debtor] on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer."5 19 To
illustrate the application of these rules consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 22-On June 1 Bank entered into a written security
agreement with Debtor under which Bank retained a security interest
in Debtor's current and after-acquired inventory to secure an initial
loan and any future advances. On June 1 Bank properly filed a financ-
ing statement to perfect its security interest. On July 1 Seller entered
into a written contract with Debtor under which Seller agreed to sell
certain items of inventory to Debtor on credit. The contract granted
Seller a purchase money security interest in these items of inventory
to secure Debtor's obligation to pay the purchase price. On July 1
Seller properly filed a financing statement to perfect its security inter-
est. On July 10 Seller delivered the new inventory to Debtor. Seller,
however, failed to give Bank written notice of its purchase money se-
curity interest before Debtor received possession of the new inventory.
On August 1 Debtor sold the new inventory to Buyer. Buyer paid
for the inventory by cashier's check. On August 15 Debtor deposited
the cashier's check in Debtor's general bank account. On August 20
Debtor defaulted on Debtor's obligations to both Bank and Seller, and
both secured parties claimed a security interest in Debtor's general
bank account.
Both Bank and Seller in Illustration 22 had perfected Article 9
security interests in the new inventory sold by Debtor on August 1.
517. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
518. See supra note 114.
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Additionally, the cashier's check received by Debtor in exchange for
the inventory was cash proceeds under revised section 9-306(1).52 0
Therefore, under revised section 9-306(2) the security interests of both
Bank and Seller continued in the cashier's check in the possession of
Debtor because the check was "identifiable proceeds. 5 21 Under revised
section 9-306(3) the security interests of the Bank and Seller were au-
tomatically perfected for ten days following Debtor's receipt of the
check.22 Moreover, since both Bank and Seller had filed financing
statements covering the inventory sold, under revised section 9-
306(3)(b) their security interests continued perfected after the expira-
tion of the ten-day period, provided theproceeds remained "identifi-
able cash proceeds.
'523
The first significant issue raised by Illustration 22 is whether the
cash proceeds remained identifiable after Debtor commingled the cash
proceeds with other funds by depositing the cashier's check in Debtor's
general bank account. If the cash proceeds ceased to be identifiable
upon commingling, the security interests of Bank and Seller would not
merely cease to be perfected, they would cease to exist. Although cash
proceeds arguably lose their identity when commingled with other
funds in a general deposit account, 24 as discussed above, if no insol-
vency proceedings have been instituted by or against the debtor, the
courts have permitted secured parties to identify cash proceeds com-
mingled in a general deposit account by tracing under the lowest inter-
mediate balance method. 25 Therefore, to the extent Bank and Seller
can identify the cash proceeds by tracing, both secured parties can
claim perfected security interests in the bank account.
Since both Bank and Seller can assert conflicting perfected secur-
ity interests in the bank account, the priority conflict must be resolved.
In resolving this dispute, one must first determine whether the conflict
is within the scope of revised section 9-312(3), which defines the
purchase money priority with respect to both inventory and pro-
ceeds.526 Although Seller had a purchase money interest in the new in-
ventory527 and perfected it in a timely manner,5 28 Seller failed to give
520. See supra text accompanying note 464.
521. See supra text following note 464.
522. See supra notes 450-51 and accompanying text.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 457-61.
524. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.4, at 736.
525. See supra notes 467-68 and accompanying text.
526. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
527. See U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 36-9-107(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
528. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
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Bank prior notification as required under revised section 9-312(3)(b)
through (d). 529 Therefore, Seller is precluded from asserting a purchase
money priority.in the cash proceeds, and the conflict between Bank
and Seller must be resolved under the residual first to file or perfect
rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a).
5 3 0
Under former section 9-312(5) resolution of this type of dispute
between Bank and Seller was a matter of some uncertainty. A plausible
argument could be made that the security interests of both Bank and
Seller in the proceeds, as distinct from the inventory, were originally
perfected automatically under former section 9-306(3). 531 Therefore,
the conflict was subject to the first to perfect rule of former section 9-
312(5)(b).5 2 Under this rule the security interests of Bank and Seller
arguably were perfected simultaneously when Debtor acquired rights in
the cash proceeds. 33 As a result, one could argue that the security in-
terests of Bank and Seller were of equal priority. Fortunately, the re-
vised statute clarifies the application of the residual priority rules to
proceeds .1 4 As noted above, revised section 9-312(6) provides that for
312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
529, See generally supra text accompanying notes 162-291 (analysis of notification
requirement under section 9-312(3)).
530. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp, 1989). This section applies in "cases of purchase money security in-
terests which do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4)
of this section." U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
531. See, e.g., Weiss, Original Collateral and Proceeds: A Code Puzzle, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 785, 788-90 (1967).
532. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
533. See, eg., Weiss, supra note 531, at 789-90.
534. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., paras. E-33 to -38, at 223-26; see also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312 reporter's note 6 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (describing the
1972 text's treatment of priority in proceeds). The resolution of one significant issue,
however, remains debateable under the revised statute. This issue can arise when a
debtor has granted two or more inventory financers perfected security interests in dis-
tinct items of inventory. The debtor then sells items of inventory securing the various
loans and commingles the cash proceeds realized into the debtor's general bank account.
Finally, the debtor files for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. In such a case revised
section 9-306(4)(d) defines the extent to which the inventory financers can claim a per-
fected security interest in the commingled account. See supra notes 480-514 and accom-
panying text. The priority issue arises when the balance in the account is insufficient to
satisfy all of the claims established under revised section 9-306(4)(d). In Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 76 Bankr. 836 (M.D. Ala. 1986), the court ad-
dressed this priority issue. First the court rejected the argument that revised section 9-
312(5)(a) determined priority based upon the order of filing. The court reasoned that
revised section 9-312(5)(a) applies only when both secured parties have a perfected se-
curity interest in the same collateral, and hence was inapplicable when the secured par-
ties perfected in different items of collateral. Id. at 839. The court then held that the
bank account should be divided pro rata between the inventory financers on the basis of
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purposes of subsection (5), the date of filing or perfection with respect
to the collateral is the date of filing or perfection with respect to pro-
ceeds. Therefore, because Bank filed on June 1 and Seller filed on July
1, Bank is entitled to priority with respect to the cash proceeds identi-
fied in Debtor's general bank account.
A slight variation in the facts of Illustration 22 will illustrate the
application of the purchase money priority to cash proceeds of inven-
tory. If Seller had given Bank proper written notice of its purchase
money security interest before Debtor received possession of the new
inventory, Seller would have primed Bank as to that inventory under
revised section 9-312(3).51 The question then posed is whether Seller's
purchase money priority extends to the cash proceeds Debtor received
on the sale of the collateral.
The 1962 Official Text of Article 9 did not expressly address either
this question or the basic issue of whether priority in inventory ex-
tended to proceeds.5 36 The failure of the 1962 Official Text to address
this basic question created an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in
inventory financing and spawned an outpouring of academic commen-
tary advocating various resolutions. 53 7 One of the virtues of the revised
statute is that it provides clear rules defining the extent to which the
purchase money priority extends to proceeds. Although the wisdom of
various aspects of these rules is debatable, as applied to our variation
of Illustration 22, the rules produce a result that is both certain and
rational.
As a general rule, revised section 9-312(3) does not extend the
purchase money priority in inventory to proceeds. The statute, how-
ever, does afford a purchase money financer of inventory who meets
the conditions of revised section 9-312(3)(a) through (d) priority in
"identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the
inventory to a buyer."538 Therefore, since Seller in the variation of 11-
their security interests established under revised section 9-306(4)(d). Id.; see also Mur-
phy & Peitzman, Without a Trace: The Secured Creditor's Interest in Deposit Account
Proceeds, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 318-20 (1975).
535. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
536. See Coogan, supra note 2, at 516-17; Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85;
Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifiying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and Priorities, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 709-10 (1966).
537. See, e.g., Coogan &*Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code upon
Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1529, 1555-68 (1968); Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85; Henson, "Proceeds"
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 232, 239 (1965); Kripke, supra
note 536, at 709-719; Weiss, supra note 531, at 785-86.
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lustration 22 had a purchase money priority in the inventory sold, it
had priority under revised section 9-312(3) in the cashier's check the
debtor received on delivery of the inventory to Buyer. Moreover, as-
suming that the cash proceeds remained identifiable following the de-
posit of the check, Seller can claim priority in the bank account.
Awarding Seller a purchase money priority in the cash proceeds in
the variation of Illustration 22 is consistent with the basic Code policy
of encouraging purchase money financing. Unless a purchase money fi-
nancer of inventory is assured of priority with respect to the cash pro-
ceeds the debtor realizes upon sale of the collateral, the financer's
purchase money priority would afford little incentive to extend credit.
The notable aspect of revised section 9-312(3) as applied to cash
proceeds, however, is the limited extent of purchase money priority.
For example, if the debtor sells the collateral on credit and collects the
purchase price after delivery of the goods to the buyer, the purchase
money priority does not extend to the cash proceeds. This result
clearly was intended.
5 39
As discussed below, the purchase money financer is denied priority
in order to protect secured parties who lend against a debtor's ac-
counts. 140 The literal language of revised section 9-312(3), however,
also may deny a purchase money priority in cash proceeds even when a
debtor did not extend credit to the buyer. For example, if a debtor sold
the inventory under a contract that authorized the debtor to ship the
goods, delivery would occur when the debtor put the goods in the pos-
session of a carrier under a proper contract for transportation and noti-
fied the buyer.541 The buyer, however, would not be obligated to tender
payment until the buyer received the goods and had a reasonable op-
portunity to inspect them.54 2 Therefore, even though the debtor did
not extend credit to the buyer, the debtor would not receive payment
until after delivery.
Under revised section 9-312(3) the purchase money priority would
not extend to this type of payment. This result may have been in-
tended. If accounts financers lend against "contingent" accounts,
which arise when goods are shipped and prior to acceptance by the
buyer, the result is consistent with the decision to insulate accounts
and the proceeds thereof from the purchase money priority of a inven-
539. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 224-26; Coogan, supra
note 2, at 517.
540. See infra notes 945-58 and accompanying text; see also sources cited supra
note 539.
541. See U.C.C. §§ 2-503(2), -504 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-503(2), -504 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
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tory financer. Nevertheless, depriving a purchase money financer of
priority in this context all but eliminates the financer's priority in cash
proceeds. The purchase money financer will prevail over a floating lie-
nor, as to cash proceeds, only if the buyer pays for the goods before the
debtor ships them.
Although analyzed in more detail below,543 an apparent irony in
the rule limiting the purchase money priority in proceeds should be
noted at this point. The Code restricts a purchase money inventory
financer's priority in proceeds in order to insure that the subsequent
inventory financer will not prime an accounts financer who filed first.
This rationale, however, does not appear to support a rule subordinat-
ing a purchase money financer's interest in proceeds to the claim of a
prior inventory financer claiming the proceeds as proceeds of after-ac-
quired property unless the prior financer relies upon the accounts in
making advances. Nevertheless, that the 1972 Amendments adopted
this rule provides insight into the nature of inventory financing under
revised Article 9.
b. Inventory Financers Versus Creditors Asserting an Interest
Directly in Cash Proceeds
An inventory financer asserting a security interest in cash proceeds
may confront creditors who claim an interest directly in the cash pro-
ceeds. For example, a secured party may claim a security interest di-
rectly in the cash proceeds or in a bank account into which the debtor
has deposited cash proceeds. The most significant adverse claim as-
serted directly in cash proceeds, however, is that of a creditor bank
asserting a right to set off against a deposit account containing cash
proceeds. This section will analyze the resolution of these conflicts.
(i) Pledges of Cash Proceeds
The cash proceeds a debtor receives upon a sale of encumbered
inventory will consist of checks and money. 4 4 In theory, the debtor can
grant Article 9 security interests in both the checks and the money.
The checks are instruments 45 and a transaction creating a security in-
terest in instruments is within the scope of Article 9.546 A security in-
543. See infra text accompanying notes 987-1000.
544. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) (defining cash proceeds as "[m]oney, checks, deposit accounts, and
the like").
545. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
105(1)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
546. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(1)(a)
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terest taken directly in checks, however, must be perfected by taking
possession of the collateral.547 The treatment of money as collateral
was unclear under the 1962 Official Text.54 8 Under revised sections 9-
304(1) and 9-305, however, it is clear that a creditor can perfect a se-
curity interest in money through possession.
54 1
Although it is unlikely that a debtoi would pledge money or
checks that an inventory financer claimed as cash proceeds, a pledge of
checks is at least conceivable. Moreover, a debtor may use proceeds
checks to pay debts and meet operating expenses. Therefore, an inven-
tory financer may confront transferees asserting a claim directly in
checks that the financer claims as cash proceeds. In these priority con-
flicts the inventory financer will be able to assert a perfected security
interest in the checks. Under revised section 9-306(3)(b) an inventory
financer's filing with respect to inventory continues the perfected sta-
tus of its security interest in identifiable cash proceeds beyond the ten-
day period of automatic perfection. 50 Moreover, the proceeds checks
would remain identifiable following their transfer provided they have
not been paid on presentment. In addition, under revised section 9-
312(6) the date on which the inventory financer filed with respect to
the inventory fixes its priority with respect to proceeds for purposes of
revised section 9-312(5)(a). 551 Therefore, if the residual first to file or
perfect rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a) governs a dispute between
the inventory financer and a transferee of a proceeds check, the inven-
tory financer will prevail. The problem confronting the inventory fi-
nancer is that one of two special priority rules may preempt revised
section 9-312(5)(a) and award priority to the transferee.
If the transferee of a proceeds check qualifies as a holder in due
course,552 section 9-309553 applies and grants the transferee priority
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
547. U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1), -305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-304(1),
-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
548. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, I1 7.02, at 7-4 to -6.
549. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304 reporter's note 1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989);
U.C.C. § 9-304 Official Reasons for 1972 Change.
550. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 10.01[2][a] n.19, at 10-5. But see id. 1 3.06, at 3-
63 to -65.
551. See supra text accompanying note 517.
552. For a transferee of a proceeds check to qualify as a holder in due course the
transferee must take possession of a properly endorsed check for value, in good faith,
and without notice of the inventory financer's claim to the check. U.C.C. § 3-302(1)
(1972), § 1-201(20) (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-302(1), -1-201(20) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
553. U.C.C. § 9-309 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). The statute provides:
Nothing in this chapter limits the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument (Section 36-3-302) or a holder to whom a negotiable doc-
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over the inventory financer.554 To qualify as a holder in due course the
transferee must take the check without notice of the inventory fi-
nancer's claim to it.555 The mere fact that the inventory financer has
filed, however, does not constitute notice of its security interest, even if
the filing expressly covered cash proceeds in the form of checks. 5
If the transferee of a proceeds check has actual notice of the in-
ventory financer's security interest, and hence fails to qualify as a
holder in due course, the transferee may still prime the inventory fi-
nancer under revised section 9-308(b).5 57 As amended, section 9-308
applies to purchasers of instruments as well as chattel paper who give
new value and take possession in the ordinary course of their busi-
ness.5 s Therefore, if the transferee of a proceeds check gives new value
and takes possession of the check, the transferee will prime an inven-
tory financer who claims the check merely as proceeds, even though
the transferee has knowledge of the inventory financer's security
interest.559
(ii) Assignees of Bank Accounts into Which Cash Proceeds Have
Been Commingled
If a debtor neither pledges nor spends cash proceeds, the debtor
ument of title has been duly negotiated (Section 36-7-501) or a bona fide pur-
chaser of a security (Section 36-8-301), and the holders or purchasers take pri-
ority over an earlier security interest even though perfected. Filing under this
chapter does not constitute notice of the security interest to the holders or
purchasers.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
554. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, T 3.06, at 3-64 (arguing that granting the
transferee priority in this situation is one of the most important aspects of section 9-
309).
555. Id.
556. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-309 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
557. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308 reporter's note (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see
generally infra text accompanying notes 697-743 (analysis of revised section 36-9-308).
558. See U.C.C. § 9-308 Official Reasons for 1972 Change (1972); FINAL REPORT,
supra note 2, app., para. E-7, at 214.
559. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, T 3.06, at 3-65 to -67. Although analyzed in the
context of cash proceeds in the form of checks, the extension of section 9-308 to cover
instruments may be of greatest significance when the proceeds of inventory take the
form of a negotiable note. If the note is transferred to a holder with notice of the inven-
tory financer's proceeds claim, section 9-309 will not protect the transferee because the
transferee fails to qualify as a holder in due course. Nevertheless, if the transferee gave
new value and took possession of the note in the ordinary course of his business, under
revised section 9-308(b) the transferee will prime the inventory financer claiming the
note, even if the transferee had knowledge of the inventory financer's security interest.
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likely will deposit the cash proceeds in a bank account.56 0 Assuming an
inventory financer can identify the cash proceeds deposited in the
bank account,5 1 the financer may confront two conflicting claims made
directly upon the account. First, a creditor may have a non-Code secur-
ity interest in the account. Second, and more significantly, the right to
set-off may be asserted by the bank in which the debtor maintains the
account.
Revised section 9-104(l) provides that Article 9 is inapplicable to a
transfer of an interest in a deposit account other than an interest
claimed as proceeds. 56 2 Nevertheless, a creditor may be able to estab-
lish a non-Code security interest in a debtor's bank account either by a
pledge of a passbook or through an assignment of the debtor's right to
withdraw funds from the account.5 3 If a creditor has established a
non-Code security interest in a debtor's bank account through an as-
signment, one must determine whether this non-Code security interest
is entitled to priority over an inventory financer's security interest in
the account to the extent of identifiable cash proceeds.
The resolution of this conflict is not clear.564 Revised section 9-
104(1) suggests that revised section 9-312 can be applied to determine
priorities with respect to proceeds in a deposit account.56 Revised sec-
tion 9-312(5)(a) and (6), which set forth the residual priority rules with
respect to proceeds, however, apply only if both competing claims are
perfected Article 9 security interests.566 Therefore, revised section 9-
312 should not apply to resolve a conflict between a non-Code security
interest on the account and a perfected Article 9 security interest in
cash proceeds.
560. Under revised section 9-105(1)(e) the debtor's bank account is a "deposit ac-
count." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-105(1)(e)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Under revised section 9-306(1) the deposit account constitutes
"cash proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
561. See supra text accompanying notes 464-73.
562. U.C.C. § 9-104(l) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(l) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
563. See Guardian Fidelity Corp. v. First S. Say. Bank, 297 S.C. 63, 374 S.E.2d 690
(Ct. App. 1988) (security interest in nontransferable certificate of deposit created by as-
signment); see also B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 7.09[21, at 7-34 to -35 (nontransferable
certificate of deposit should be considered a type of deposit account excluded from Arti-
cle 9 and perfection of security interests therein should be governed by common-law
principles); see generally McLaughlin, supra note 514, at 60-75 (discussing creation and
perfection of security interests in nonpassbook deposit accounts).
564. McLaughlin, supra note 514, at 79-80.
565. See U.C.C. § 9-104(l) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(l)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
566. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), (6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(5)(a), (6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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At least three plausible rules may apply to resolve this conflict.
First, the inventory financer asserting a security interest in cash pro-
ceeds can argue that section 9-201 provides the applicable priority
rule.567 Section 9-201 provides that the terms of a security agreement
are effective against creditors unless the Code otherwise provides.
,6 s If
section 9-201 is applied, the inventory financer invariably will prime
the assignee of the account because the Code nowhere otherwise pro-
vides priority to the holder of a non-Code security interest in a deposit
account.
The second plausible source for a priority rule is the body of law
giving rise to the non-Code security interest. For example, the courts
have consistently turned to landlord-tenant law to resolve priority dis-
putes between an Article 9 secured party and a landlord asserting a
non-Code landlord's lien.5 69 If this approach were adopted, the South
Carolina law on assignments would provide the priority rule.
The South Carolina courts apparently resolve conflicts between
competing assignees by awarding priority to the first assignee to obtain
an assignment. 510 Under this rule an inventory financer would prime an
assignee of the debtor's bank account if the financer obtained a secur-
ity interest in the account before the debtor assigned the account to
the conflicting creditor. Application of this rule in a typical commercial
context is fraught with uncertainty because, unlike Article 9, the com-
mon law does not validate present assignments of future rights.0 1
567. McLaughlin, supra note 514, at 79-80.
568. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-201 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989). This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this title a security agreement is effective
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates any charge or practice
illegal under any statute or regulation under the statute governing usury, small
loans, retail installment sales, or the like, or extends the application of any
statute or regulation to any transaction not otherwise subject to the statute or
regulation.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
569. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors, Inc., 246 Md.
380, 228 A.2d 463 (1967); Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 454
N.E.2d 357 (1983); see also Distrained Property Act, 1977 S.C. Acts 106 (codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-39-260 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1989)) (providing that distrained
property remained subject to any prior perfected security interest).
570. See Guardian Fidelity Corp. v. First S. Sav. Bank, 297 S.C. 63, 374 S.E.2d 690
(Ct. App. 1988) (first assignee of nontransferable certificate of deposit entitlied to prior-
ity); Standard Oil Co. v. Powell Paving & Contracting Co., 139 S.C. 411, 138 S.E. 184
(1927) (master's report); see generally 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 902, at 614-
20 (1951) (discussing priority between successive assignees).
571. See 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 570, § 874, at 503; E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
11.5, at 766-68 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 321(2) (1979).
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Therefore, a security agreement which granted an inventory financer a
right to future cash proceeds of unsold and after-acquired inventory
would not effect a valid assignment. 57 2 Moreover, although some courts
recognize equitable assignments of future rights, an equitable assign-
ment is not valid against a subsequent good faith purchaser who ob-
tained an assignment of the right after it canfie into existence. 7 3 Under
this analysis a secured party who obtained an equitable assignment of
a debtor's future cash proceeds under a security agreement would lose
to an assignee of the debtor's bank account who took an assignment
after the cash proceeds had been deposited.
57 4
Finally, it has been suggested that the rules applicable in nonin-
solvency situations for determining priority conflicts between a secured
party claiming cash proceeds in a commingled account and a bank ex-
ercising a right to set-off be applied to resolve the conflict between a
secured party and the older of a non-Code security interest.7 5 The ba-
sis for this suggestion and its possible effect are unclear. As discussed
below, under the "legal rule" a bank exercising its right to set-off is
entitled to priority unless it had knowledge or notice that the account
contained cash proceeds.7 6 Under the "equitable rule" the bank is en-
titled to priority only if it relied upon the cash proceeds deposited in
the account. 77 Apparently, under the legal rule the assignee of the ac-
count would prime the secured party unless the assignee had notice
that cash proceeds had been commingled into the account. Under the
equitable rule, however, the assignee would prevail only if the assignee
relied upon the cash proceeds by making a loan against the commin-
gled account.
In summary, while it is probable that a creditor can obtain a non-
Code security interest in a deposit account, the priority of that interest
against an inventory financer's Article 9 security interest in identifiable
cash proceeds in the account is highly uncertain. This uncertainty sup-
ports the argument that Article 9 should be amended to encompass
security interests in deposit accounts.
57 8
572. See sources cited supra note 571.
573. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 571, § 11.5, at 770.
574. See, e.g., Stokely Bros. & Co. v. Conklin, 131 N.J. Eq. 552, 26 A.2d 147 (Ch.
Div. 1942).
575. See McLaughlin, supra note 514, at 79-80.
576. See infra text accompanying notes 608-10.
577. See infra text accompanying notes 611-14.
578. See McLaughlin, supra note 514, at 82-93; Zubrow, supra note 514, at 899.
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(iii) Bank's Right to Set-Off Against Deposit Accounts Into Which
Cash Proceeds Have Been Commingled
As discussed above, an inventory financer's ability to identify cash
proceeds is jeopardized when the debtor commingles the cash proceeds
with other funds by depositing them in a general deposit account.
579
The inventory financer's problems are exacerbated if the debtor main-
tains the deposit account at a creditor bank. In the event the debtor
defaults on an obligation to the creditor bank, the bank may claim the
deposit account under the common law right to set-off."' Therefore,
when cash proceeds have been deposited in a general account at a cred-
itor bank, an inventory financer must not only identify the commingled
cash proceeds, but also establish that its security interest is entitled to
priority over the bank's right to set-off.
An analysis of the conflict between a secured party asserting a se-
curity interest in a deposit account to the extent of identifiable cash
proceeds and a bank asserting a right to set-off against the account
must commence with an analysis of the right to set-off. The right to
set-off is limited to mutual debts.5"' When a bank exercises a right to
set-off, the debts at issue are the loan obligation of the depositor to the
bank, and the deposit account, which is a debt the bank owes to the
depositor.582
If the depositor defaults on an obligation to the bank, the bank
can set-off its debt to the depositor against the depositor's debt to the
bank, provided the debts are mutual. For the debts to be mutual, the
depositor must have incurred the loan obligation to the bank and cre-
ated the debt from the bank (i.e. the deposit account) in the same ca-
pacity.5 3 As a general rule if a depositor borrows from the bank in the
depositor's personal capacity and maintains a trust account with the
bank as a trustee for a third party, the bank cannot set-off the trust
account against the depositor's personal debt in the event the deposi-
tor defaults on the personal loan obligation.
8 4
The courts, however, have recognized two exceptions to this gen-
579. See supra text accompanying notes 464-516.
580. See generally Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff: Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANK-
ING L.J. 196, 219-22 (1981) (bank set-off versus secured creditor's claim to proceeds);
Note, Conflicts Between Set-Offs and Article 9 Security Interests, 39 STAN. L. REv. 235
(1986) (outlining problems with current rules and arguing for new rules that would make
the credit system more efficient).
581. See Clark, supra note 580, at 197; Zubrow, supra note 514, at 942; Note, supra
note 580, at 238.
582. See Zubrow, supra note 514, at 942.
583. See Clark, supra note 580, at 197.
584. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 324 comment i (1959).
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eral rule of mutuality. First, some courts invoke the "legal rule" under
which the bank can set-off against a trust account if the bank lacks
knowledge or notice that the deposit account is a trust account. 8 5 Sec-
ond, other courts invoke the "equitable rule" which affords a more nar-
row exception to the requirement of mutuality. 8 Under the equitable
rule, even if the bank lacks knowledge or notice that the account is a
trust account, a court will sustain a set-off against the trust account
only if the bank reasonably relied upon the account as a personal ac-
count of the depositor.
58 7
The mutuality requirement and its exceptions could resolve the
issue of whether a bank can set-off against identifiable cash proceeds in
a deposit account. If a deposit account is deemed to be a trust account
to the extent it contains identifiable cash proceeds, the bank appar-
ently has no right to set-off against the cash proceeds component of
the account, unless the bank can establish an exception to the mutual-
ity requirement under the legal or equitable rule. Therefore, a secured
party claiming a security interest in cash proceeds can assert that un-
less the legal or equitable rule applies, a bank has no right to set-off
against a debtor's deposit account to the extent the account consists of
identifiable cash proceeds. In short, the secured party can argue that
no priority conflict exists because the bank has no right to set-off
against cash proceeds.
Most courts, however, have not resolved the conflicting claims of a
secured party and a bank exercising a right of set-off in terms of the
scope of the bank's right. Rather, the courts have viewed the conflict as
raising a priority question. Moreover, although some courts have in-
voked the requirement of mutuality and the exceptions thereto as an
applicable priority rule,588 a majority of courts have turned to Article 9
to determine priority.589
585. See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F.
Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1314 (4th Cir.
1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 324 comment j (1959) (bank must
lack notice both at time deposit is made and at time debt arises); Note, supra note 580,
at 251-52 (arguing legal risks should be changed to protect bank that has a prior interest
and that has given notice).
586. See, e.g., Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671,
214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
587. See Skilton, supra note 465, at 191-96; Note, supra note 580, at 249-50.
588. See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. of Am., 498 F. Supp. 1078 (legal rule, alter-
native grounds); Commercial Discount Corp., 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (equitable
rule).
589. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Cotton Growers Hail Ins., Inc., 155 Ariz. 526, 747 P.2d
1225 (Ct. App. 1987); Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. National Bank, 145 Mich. App. 717, 377
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When confronted with conflicting claims to a bank account as-
serted by a secured party claiming a security interest in cash proceeds
and a bank claiming a right of set-off, most courts commence their
analysis by interpreting revised section 9-104(i). 9° This provision
states that Article 9 does not apply "to any right of setoff."591 All au-
thorities agree that this section means that Article 9 does not apply to
the creation of the right to set-off. 92 The question that remains is
whether revised section 9-104(i) should be read as rendering the prior-
ity rules of Article 9 inapplicable to resolve disputes between Article 9
secured parties and creditors exercising a right to set-off.593 Under a
narrow interpretation of the exclusion, the priority rules of Article 9
would remain applicable. Under a broad interpretation, however, non-
Code priority rules would be applied to resolve the conflict between a
security interest and a right of set-off.
Although the authorities are divided, most courts have interpreted
section 9-104(i) narrowly and have applied Article 9 priority rules to
resolve priority disputes between secured parties and creditors assert-
ing a right to set-off.594 The principal reason advanced by the courts
adopting a narrow interpretation of revised section 9-104(i) is that re-
vised section 9-306(4)(d)(i) 55 sets forth a priority rule applicable to the
right to set-off, and the presence of this priority rule undercuts the
argument that the drafters intended to exclude priority conflicts in-
volving set-off from the scope of Article 9.59
The analysis, however, does not end with a decision to apply Arti-
cle 9. If insolvency proceedings have been instituted by or against the
debtor when the creditor asserts a right to set-off, Article 9 appears to
provide a specific priority rule: under revised section 9-306(4)(d)(i) a
secured party's security interest in the deposit account is "subject to
590. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Columbian Peanut Co., 649 F. Supp.
1116 (E.D.N.C. 1986); National Acceptance Co. of Am., 498 F. Supp. 1078; Valley Nat'l
Bank, 155 Ariz. 526, 747 P.2d 1225; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 177 Ind.
App. 548, 380 N.E.2d 1243 (1978); Southeastern Fin. Corp., 145 Mich. App. 717, 377
N.W.2d 900.
591. U.C.C. § 9-104(i) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(i) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
592. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 626 F.2d
764 (10th Cir. 1980); Insley Mfg. Corp., 717 P.2d 1341.
593. See Clark, supra note 580, at 219-20.
594. See Valley Nat'l Bank, 155 Ariz. 526, 747 P.2d 1225; Southeastern Fin. Corp.,
145 Mich. App. 717, 377 N.W.2d 900.
595. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
596. See, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank, 155 Ariz. 526, 747 P.2d 1225; Bank of Kansas v.
Hutchinson Health Servs., Inc., 12 Kan. App. 2d 87, 735 P.2d 256 (1987); Insley Mfg.
Corp., 717 P.2d 1341.
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any right to set-off. 5, 7 If revised section 9-306(4)(d)(i) is a priority
provision, then in all cases in which the right to set-off is asserted after
insolvency proceedings have been instituted, the bank asserting the
right to set-off will prime a secured party asserting a perfected security
interest in the deposit account.5 98
Revised section 9-306(4)(d)(i) applies, however, only if insolvency
proceedings have been instituted by or against the debtor when the
bank asserts its right to set-off.5 9  Therefore, a court adopting a narrow
interpretation of revised section 9-104(i) must look elsewhere in Article
9 for a priority rule to resolve disputes that arise when the right to set-
off is asserted before insolvency proceedings are commenced.
The rule that the courts have applied in noninsolvency situations
is the fundamental priority rule of section 9-201.611 Section 9-201 pro-
vides, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this title a security agree-
ment is effective according to its terms . .. against creditors."' 1 In
applying section 9-201, the courts reason that for purposes of Article 9
a creditor exercising a right to set-off is simply an unsecured creditor,
and that with the exception of revised section 9-306(4)(d)(i), the Code
does not provide such a creditor priority over a secured party. 02
Therefore, the courts have applied section 9-201 to award priority to
the secured party in cases in which the bank has exercised its right to
set-off before the commencement of insolvency proceedings by or
against the debtor.
6 0 3
The application of Article 9 priority rules to resolve conflicts over
deposit accounts between secured parties asserting a security interest
in identifiable cash proceeds and banks asserting a right of set-off pro-
duces clear results. If insolvency proceedings have been instituted by
or against the debtor before the bank asserts its right of set-off, revised
section 9-306(4)(d)(i) awards priority to the bank. 04 In contrast, if in-
597. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(4)(d)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
598. See, e.g., Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 152 Ga. App. 176, 262
S.E.2d 485 (1979).
599. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 177 Ind. App. 548, 380 N.E.2d
1243 (1978).
600. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Columbian Peanut Co., 649 F. Supp.
1116 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Valley Nat'l Bank, 155 Ariz. 526, 747 P.2d 1225; Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 177 Ind. App. 548, 380 N.E.2d 1243.
601. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
602. See, e.g., Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. National Bank, 145 Mich. App. 717, 719-
20, 377 N.W.2d 900, 901 (1985); Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d
1341, 1345 (Utah 1986).
603. See, e.g., Southeastern Fin. Corp., 145 Mich. App. 717, 377 N.W.2d 900; Insley
Mfg. Corp., 717 P.2d 1341.
604. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
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solvency proceedings have not been instituted by or against the debtor
when the bank exercises its right to set-off, section 9-201 awards prior-
ity to the secured party.6 05 Although these results are certain, they are
disturbing. The Article 9 priority rules provide different results de-
pending upon whether insolvency proceedings have been instituted
before the bank exercises its right to set-off. These different results
militate against reading revised section 9-104(i) narrowly and applying
the priority rules of Article 9.
A minority of courts have interpreted revised section 9-104(i)
broadly to exclude from the scope of Article 9 both the creation of the
right to set-off and the determination of the priority of that right when
it conflicts with an Article 9 security interest.6 0 6 The courts adopting
this broad interpretation of the exclusion of set-off have brushed aside
the argument that revised section 9-306(4)(d)(i) establishes that the
drafters intended Article 9 to govern priority disputes between a se-
cured party and a creditor exercising a right to set-off. These courts
have interpreted the provision to mean that a secured party's security
interest in a commingled account in an insolvency situation is subject
to whatever priority the right to set-off may have under applicable
non-Code law.607 The virtue of a broad interpretation of revised section
9-104(i) is that it produces a single priority rule applicable in both in-
solvency and noninsolvency situations. A problem with the broad inter-
pretation is that at least two non-Code priority rules could apply.
A court applying non-Code law to determine whether a bank's
right to set-off primes a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds
could invoke the "legal rule. '60 8 Under the legal rule, a bank cannot
set-off against funds that it knows or has reason to know are subject to
306(4)(d)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
605. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-201 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
606. See, e.g., State Bank v. First Bank, 320 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1982); Bank of
Crystal Springs v. First Nat'l Bank, 427 So. 2d 968 (Miss. 1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Lone
Star Life Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1975); see also Citibank, N.A. v. Interfirst Bank,
N.A., 784 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1986) (set-off versus possessory security interest in nonnego-
tiable certificate of deposit); Clark, supra note 580, at 221-22 (discussing possible read-
ings of section 9-306(4)(d)(i)); Skilton, supra note 483, at 79-80 (discussing the "subject
to any right of set-off" language of section 9-306(4)(d)).
607. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 76 Bankr. 836, 839
(M.D. Ala. 1986); Bavely v. Fort Thomas Bellevue Bank (In re Triple A Coal Co.), 55
Bankr. 806, 812 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super.
474, 274 A.2d 306 (App. Div. 1971); Middle Atl. Credit Corp. v. First Pa. Banking &
Trust Co., 199 Pa. Super. 456, 185 A.2d 818 (1962).
608. See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F.
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a third party's security interest.60 9 Therefore, if the bank knows that a
debtor has deposited cash proceeds subject to a security interest in the
account, the creditor bank has no right to set-off against the account to
the extent of the identifiable cash proceeds. Moreover, even if the bank
lacks actual knowledge that the account contains cash proceeds, the
legal rule subordinates the bank's right of set-off if the bank has
knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to
inquire as to the source of the funds, and a reasonable inquiry would
have disclosed that the funds were cash proceeds subject to a security
interest. 10
The alternative non-Code priority rule that a court could invoke is
the "equitable rule," which further limits a bank's right to set-off.61'
Under the equitable rule even if the bank has neither knowledge nor
notice that the accounts contains cash proceeds, the bank cannot set-
off against and retain the cash proceeds unless it has detrimentally
changed its position in reliance on the debtor's ownership of the
funds.6 12 Moreover, merely setting off against a depositor's account is
not sufficient reliance to invoke the equitable rule. 13 To benefit from
this rule the bank must either release collateral or extend credit in reli-
ance upon the depositor's account.
61
4
The South Carolina courts have not resolved the question of which
priority rules govern conflicts between a secured party and a bank ex-
ercising a right to set-off. On balance, the best solution would be to
resolve such conflicts under non-Code law. Such a resolution focuses on
the extent of the right to set-off, rather than a mechanical application
of statutory language. Moreover, application of non-Code law would
not produce different results in insolvency as opposed to noninsolvency
situations. If the South Carolina courts adopt a broad interpretation of
revised section 9-104(i), the courts probably would recognize the "equi-
table rule" as the only exception to the doctrine of mutuality. 15 Under
the equitable rule, the secured party would prevail over the bank only
if the bank had no knowledge or notice that the account contained
609. See TeSelle, Banker's Right of Setoff-Banker Beware, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 40, 71
(1981); Note, supra note 580, at 54.
610. See supra note 585.
611. See, e.g., Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671,
214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
612. See Clark, supra note 580, at 220-21; Skilton, supra note 465, at 191-96;
TeSelle, supra note 609, at 72.
613. Citibank, N.A. v. Interfirst Bank, N.A., 784 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1986).
614. Id.
615. See Peurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S.C. 107, 126, 160 S.E. 156, 163 (1931); see also
Commercial Discount Corp., 61 Wis. 2d at 680-81, 214 N.W.2d at 37-38 (listing South
Carolina among jurisdictions adopting equitable rule).
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cash proceeds and the bank reasonably relied upon the depositor's ac-
count in releasing collateral or extending credit.
Although application of non-Code law to resolve disputes between
secured parties and banks exercising a right to set-off conforms the
priority rules to the nature of the right to set-off, one policy argument
can be made in favor of the majority position that Article 9 provides
the priority rules. When a bank exercises its right to set-off against a
financially embarrassed debtor's general bank account, the impact
upon the debtor is both immediate and pronounced. The loss of its
account may preclude the debtor from paying employees and suppliers,
and thus force the debtor into bankruptcy. The debtor's bankruptcy,
in turn, may injure its employees and unsecured creditors. 16
Congress' recognized this phenomenon and drafted section 553(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code to discourage banks from exercising a right to
set-off. 17 Under section 553(b), a bank that exercises a right to set-off
within 90 days before a debtor files for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code can be forced to disgorge funds upon which the bank could have
established a secured claim had it refrained from asserting its right to
set-off until after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 8 '
Albeit coincidentally, application of the Article 9 priority rules
furthers the policy effected by section 553(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
If a bank exercises a right to set-off before insolvency proceedings have
been instituted by or against the debtor, section 9-201 applies to grant
a secured party priority over the bank when the secured party is claim-
ing a security interest in commingled but identifiable proceeds. In con-
trast, if the bank refrains from asserting its right to set-off until after
616. See generally 2 W. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 33.03
(1981) (deterring set-off against financially troubled debtor may allow debtor to avoid
bankruptcy).
617. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). This section provides:
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section
362(b)(6), 362(b)(7), 365(h)(2), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a
mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the debtor on or
within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition, then the trustee
may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that any
insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the later
of -
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediatley preceding the date of the
filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a
claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the
holder of such claim.
Id. (footnote omitted).
618. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Compton Corp. (In re Compton Corp.), 22 Bankr. 276
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); see also Clark, supra note 580, at 229-31.
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the insolvency proceedings have been commenced, revised section 9-
306(4)(d)(i) applies and awards priority to the bank. Thus, application
of the Article 9 priority rules furthers the policy of discouraging banks
from exercising a right to set-off prior to the institution of insolvency
proceedings.
C. Non-Cash Proceeds
The principal types of noncash proceeds generated by the sale of
encumbered inventory are chattel papers19 and accounts.1s 0 An inven-
tory financer asserting a security interest in such proceeds may face
two distinct types of priority conflicts. First, another inventory fi-
nancer may claim a conflicting security interest in the chattel paper or
accounts as proceeds. Second, the inventory financer's security interest
in proceeds may conflict with a security interest asserted directly in
the chattel paper or accounts.
The 1962 Official Text left many of these priority disputes un-
resolved.621 In contrast, the 1972 Official Text provides definite rules
for resolving priority disputes which involve secured parties asserting
security interests in accounts and chattel paper as proceeds of encum-
bered collateral. These priority rules, however, reflect the drafters' pre-
occupation with a single priority conflict involving noncash proceeds of
inventory.
The drafters focused on the conflict between an accounts financer
who files covering a debtor's current and after-acquired accounts, and
a subsequent purchase money inventory financer who claims accounts
as proceeds.022 The priority dispute arose when items of new inventory
were sold, generating an account subject to the security interests of
both the accounts financer and the inventory financer. The drafters of
the 1972 Official Text concluded that an earlier-filed accounts financer
should prime a subsequent purchase money inventory financer claim-
619. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
105(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
620. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-106 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) (revised definition of account).
621. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-33, at 223-24, para. E-38, at 224-
26; R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 136-38 (1973); WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK, SUPRA note 169, at 908-09.
622. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 224-26; A Second Look at
the Amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Bus. LAW. 973, 1000-
03 (1974) (remarks by R. Haydock, Jr., H. Kripke, P. Coogan, and J. Edmonds presented
in a program of section's committee on U.C.C. in Washigton, D.C. on August 8, 1973)
[hereinafter Second Look]; see generally Henson, supra note 537, at 239 (noting that
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ing accounts as proceeds of collateral.6 13 Therefore, the drafters in-
cluded provisions in revised section 9-312 to effect this result. 24 Al-
though one may question the wisdom of this decision, the principal
concern with the drafters' resolution of this conflict is the manner in
which they effected the result. The revisions adopted to enable an ac-
counts financer to prime a subsequent purchase money inventory fi-
nancer's claim to accounts as proceeds also produce results in other
priority conflicts involving noncash proceeds of inventory.2 5 The reso-
lution of these conflicts, however, largely defines the role of inventory
financing under the revised Code.
1. Chattel Paper as Proceeds
Chattel paper is one of the two principal types of noncash pro-
ceeds generated by the sale of encumbered inventory. The Code de-
fines chattel paper as "a writing or writings which evidence both a
monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific
goods. 6 26 Perhaps the most common form of chattel paper is the in-
stallment sales contract. Under such a contract a retailer sells goods to
a consumer on credit and retains a purchase money security interest in
the goods sold to secure the consumer's obligations to pay the purchase
price and finance charge in periodic installments.627 If the retailer mak-
ing the installment sale previously had granted a secured party a secur-
ity interest in the item of inventory sold, the inventory financer can
assert a security interest upon the installment sales contract as pro-
ceeds of its collateral.
62 8
An inventory financer asserting a perfected security interest in
chattel paper as proceeds may face several conflicting claims to the
chattel paper. First, other creditors with security interests in the
debtor's inventory also may claim the chattel paper as proceeds. Sec-
ond, and more significantly, the inventory financer may face conflicting
claims of secured parties who assert security interests directly in the
623. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 224-26; Second Look,
supra note 622, at 1000-03.
624. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(3), (6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
625. See infra text accompanying notes 669-84, 969-1000.
626. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-105(1)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
627. See U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
628. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1), (2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also supra notes 447-49 and accompanying text
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chattel paper. This class includes both creditors who retain security
interests in a debtor's chattel to secure a loan,629 as well as purchasers
who buy a debtor's chattel paper.6 30 Moreover, an inventory financer
claiming chattel paper as proceeds also may encounter a priority dis-
pute with a purchaser of the chattel paper over the underlying goods if
those goods are returned to or repossessed by the debtor.631 This sec-
tion will analyze these priority problems.
a. Conflicting Claims of Inventory Financers to Chattel Paper as
Proceeds
Revised sections 9-312(5) 6 2 and (6)633 control the resolution of pri-
ority disputes between inventory financers asserting conflicting secur-
ity interests in chattel paper as proceeds. Revised section 9-312(6) pro-
vides that for purposes of the first to file or perfect rule of revised
section 9-312(5)(a), the date of filing or perfection as to collateral is the
date of filing or perfection as to proceeds.6 The application of these
provisions to conflicting security interests in chattel paper as proceeds
of inventory would be unremarkable but for the fact that revised sec-
tion 9-312(5)(a), rather than revised section 9-312(3),6s5 governs a
purchase money inventory financer's priority in chattel paper as
proceeds.
Revised section 9-312(3) provides that purchase money priority
with respect to inventory extends to proceeds only if the proceeds are
629. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(1)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
630. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(1)(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). But see U.C.C. § 9-104(0 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-104(0 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (assignments of chattel paper as part of sale
of business and for collection only excluded from Article 9); see generally B. CLARK,
supra note 8, 1 1.04, at 1-24 to -26, 1.08[6], at 1-94 to -98 (discussing the scope of
Article 9 relating to the sale of chattel paper and accounts).
631. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
632. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
633. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides, "For the purposes of subsection (5) a date of
filing or perfection as to collateral -is also a date of filing or perfection as to proceeds."
U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law. Co-op.
Supp, 1989).
634. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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cash proceeds received on or before delivery of inventory to a buyer.63 6
This limitation has the effect of relegating the determination of a
purchase money financer's priority with respect to chattel paper as
proceeds to the residual rule of revised section 9-312(5). To illustrate
the problem raised by the limited scope of revised section 9-312(3),
consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 23-On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a
written security agreement, which granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory to secure a contempora-
neous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank filed a fi-
nancing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering Dealer's
inventory. On June 30 Seller and Dealer entered into a written con-
tract under which Seller agreed to sell new inventory to Dealer on
credit. This contract granted Seller a purchase money security inter-
est in the new inventory to secure Dealer's obligation to pay the
purchase price. Also on July 1, Seller properly filed a financing state-
ment covering the new inventory in the Secretary of State's office. Fi-
nally on July 1, Bank received written notification stating that Seller
had a purchase money security interest in the new inventory and
describing that inventory by item. On July 10 Seller delivered the new
inventory to Dealer. On August 1 Dealer sold an item of the new in-
ventory to Consumer under an installment sales contract, which
granted Dealer a security interest in the goods sold to secure Con-
sumer's obligation to pay purchase price and finance charge in period
installments. On September 1 Dealer defaulted on both obligations to
Bank and Seller, and both secured parties sought to assert their re-
spective security interests in the installment sales contract, which re-
mained in Dealer's possession.
Had the dispute in Illustration 23 been over the item of new in-
ventory before its sale to Consumer, Seller would have had priority
over Bank. Although Bank was the first secured party to file or perfect,
Seller established a purchase money "super priority" in the new inven-
tory under revised section 9-312(3).137 The dispute in issue, however,
involves chattel paper as proceeds of the new inventory. 3s The critical
question is whether Seller's purchase money priority in the new inven-
tory extends to proceeds of that inventory.
The resolution of the priority conflict in Illustration 23 under the
636. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
637. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
638. Note that if Dealer does business only in South Carolina, or has its chief execu-
tive office in South Carolina, the filings of Bank and Seller with respect to inventory will
be effective to continue the perfected status of their security interests in the chattel
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1962 Official Text was uncertain. The former statute did not expressly
address either priority conflicts over proceeds or the extent to which a
purchase money priority in collateral extended to proceeds. 39 In con-
trast, the 1972 Official Text enacted in South Carolina in 1988, ad-
dresses these issues and awards priority to Bank in Illustration 23. Al-
though a clear priority rule is preferable to uncertainty, application of
the revised statute in Illustration 23 calls the wisdom of the new prior-
ity rules into question.
Under the 1962 Official Text, application of the residual priority
rules of former section 9-312(5)(a) and (b) to proceeds was a matter of
some uncertainty. A court applying the 1962 Official Text probably
would extend the purchase money priority to the chattel paper so as to
award priority to Seller in Illustration 23.40 A court applying the 1962
Official Text, however, possibly could apply the first to file rule of for-
mer section 9-312(5)(a)6 ' 1 and award Bank priority in the chattel pa-
per. As a final possibility, a security interest in proceeds could be
viewed as distinct from a security interest in the collateral, and thus
originally perfected automatically under former section 9-306(3) when
the debtor received the proceeds.142 Under this interpretation of the
1962 Official Text, the first to perfect rule of former section 9-312(5)(b)
would control the dispute between Bank and Seller in Illustration 23.
Moreover, under this interpretation the security interests of Bank and
Seller would be co-equal liens because their security interests were si-
multaneously perfected when Dealer received the chattel paper.
Revised section 9-312(3) expressly addresses the extent to which a
purchase money priority in inventory extends to proceeds. Under this
section the purchase money priority in inventory extends to proceeds
only if the proceeds are "identifiable cash proceeds received on or
before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer. 6 43 Therefore, revised
section 9-312(3) does not afford Seller in Illustration 23 a purchase
money priority in the chattel paper as proceeds of its collateral. Since
revised section 9-312(3) is inapplicable, the resolution of the conflict
between Bank and Seller must be resolved under the residual priority
rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a).
639. See R. HENSON, supra note 621, at 136-39.
640. See Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc. (In re Per-
rotto Refrigeration, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 284 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); see generally R. HEN-
SON, supra note 621, at 136-39 (discussing conflicting claims to proceeds under the 1962
version of Code).
641. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383.
642. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.4, at 796; Coogan & Gordon, supra note
537, at 1562-63.
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The 1972 Official Text clarifies the application of the residual pri-
ority rule to proceeds. As provided under revised section 9-312(6), the
date of filing or perfection as to collateral is also the date of filing or
perfection with respect to proceeds . 4 4 Therefore, under the revised
statute Bank in Illustration 23 primes Seller with respect to the chattel
paper because Bank was the first to file or perfect with respect to
inventory.
Although the result in Illustration 23 is clear under the revised
statute, the illustration raises an obvious question. Why should Seller,
who was entitled to priority with respect to the item of inventory sold
under revised section 9-312(3), be subordinated to Bank with respect
to the chattel paper as proceeds? This result undercuts the Article 9
basic policy of encouraging purchase money financing by* affording
purchase money financers priority over conflicting security interests
which attach to the collateral as after-acquired property. Therefore,
the rationale for awarding priority to Bank in Illustration 23 should be
compelling. This article maintains that when a purchase money fi-
nancer has met the conditions of revised section 9-312(3) there is no
satisfactory justification for subordinating a purchase money financer's
claim to proceeds in the form of chattel paper to the claim of an ear-
lier-filed secured party who held a subordinate interest in the
inventory.
Any justification for the result in Illustration 23 stems from the
fact that the question presented in the illustration is but one manifes-
tation of the most celebrated priority issue under the 1962 Official
Text of Article 9. Broadly stated, this issue was whether a purchase
money priority in collateral extends to proceeds generated by the sale
of the collateral. As noted, the 1962 Official Text did not expressly re-
solve this issue. This issue was, however, discussed at length by com-
mentators,6 5 and this scholarship played a significant role in the draft-
ing of the revised statute.
646
The commentators viewed the issue of whether the purchase
money priority extended to proceeds as arising primarily in a context
distinct from that presented in Illustration 23. Specifically, the com-
mentators were concerned about the priority conflict between an ac-
counts financer who was the first secured party to file and a subse-
quent purchase money financer of inventory who asserted a perfected
644. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
645. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.4, at 791-95; Coogan & Gordon,
supra note 537, at 1558-66; Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85 (1963); Henson, supra
note 537, at 239-40.
646. See U.C.C. § 9-312 Official Reasons for 1972 Change (1972).
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security interest in accounts as proceeds of the financed collateral.647
Most commentators asserted that accounts financing was more signifi-
cant than purchase money inventory financing, and that to extend the
purchase money priority in inventory to accounts as proceeds would
significantly impair accounts financing.648
Basically, these commentators asserted that an accounts financer
who filed first should be entitled to rely upon the priority with respect
to all subsequent accounts generated by the debtor, including those
that arose out of sales of purchase money collateral. Moreover, the
commentators argued that preferring the prior accounts financers
would benefit purchase money inventory financers, since the accounts
financers would make future advances to the debtor in reliance on af-
ter-acquired accounts and the debtor would typically use these ad-
vances to pay the debtor's inventory suppliers. 69
In drafting the priority rules of the 1972 Official Text, the drafters
adopted the position of these commentators. By limiting the purchase
money priority in proceeds under revised section 9-312(3) to cash pro-
ceeds received on or before delivery of the inventory to a buyer, and by
including revised section 9-312(6), the drafters insured that a prior ac-
counts financer would prime a purchase money inventory financer's se-
curity interest in accounts as proceeds."'
Although the necessity of awarding a prior accounts financer an
unqualified priority over the proceeds claim of a subsequent purchase
money inventory financer is questionable, 51 the decision to prefer the
accounts financer is not unreasonable. The problem with the revised
statute is the method selected by the drafters to prefer the prior ac-
counts financer. In subordinating the proceeds claim of the purchase
money inventory financer to the claim of an earlier-filed accounts fi-
nancer, subsections (3), (5)(a), and (6) of revised section 9-312 also
subordinate the purchase money financer's proceeds claim to the pro-
ceeds claim of an earlier-filed inventory financer who had a
subordinate position in the inventory sold.
647. See id.
648. See, e.g., Second Look, supra note 622, at 1002.
I think everybody said that if one could practically protect the financer who
furnishes new inventory, without cutting the heart out of accounts financing,
we would have been willing to do it, but the difficulty is that if you protected
the inventory financer you make the accounts financing so problematical that
you cut off the most likely source of cash that is going to be used to pay the
inventory financer.
Id. (comment of Peter Coogan). But see Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85.
649. See, e.g., Second Look, supra note 622, at 1000-03.
650. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 224-26.
651. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85.
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The source of this problem is revised section 9-312(3). Arguably,
this provision is irrelevant to the resolution of a conflict between a
prior accounts financer and a purchase money financer of inventory
who claims accounts as proceeds, since revised section 9-312(3) ad-
dresses conflicts between a purchase money security interest in inven-
tory and conflicting security interests in the same inventory. Because
an accounts financer does not have a conflicting security interest in
inventory, a dispute between an accounts financer and a purchase
money inventory financer claiming accounts as proceeds is not within
the scope of the provision. In other words, the limitation in revised
section 9-312(3) on the extent to which the purchase money priority
extends to proceeds is unnecessary to protect a prior accounts financer.
Since revised section 9-312(3) is limited to disputes between 'inventory
financers, it does not provide a basis for affording a purchase money
inventory financer priority over an accounts financer. Therefore, even
if the proceeds limitations were omitted for revised section 9-312(3),
the priority dispute would be subject to the rules of revised sections 9-
312(5)(a) and (6).
Under section 9-312(5)(a) and (6), the prior accounts financer
would prevail. Accordingly, the proceeds limitation of revised section
9-312(3) controls priorities only if the security interests of a purchase
money inventory financer and a nonpurchase money inventory financer
conflict over proceeds. Moreover, the proceeds limitations affect the
resolution of such conflicts only in cases in which the purchase money
financer would have been entitled to priority with respect to the collat-
eral. In such cases the proceeds limitations operate to subordinate the
proceeds claim of the purchase money financer to all proceeds other
than identifiable cash proceeds received by the debtor on or before de-
livery of the inventory to a buyer. At first blush this result appears
difficult to defend.1
52
Before concluding that the proceeds limitations of revised section
9-312(3) produce an anomalous result when applied in Illustration 23,
one must determine whether there is a rational basis for preferring a
prior floating lienor over a subsequent purchase money inventory fi-
nancer with respect to proceeds in the form of chattel paper. One pos-
sible basis for favoring the floating lienor (i.e., Bank in Illustration 23)
is that the floating lienor may rely on after-acquired chattel paper in
652. See id. at 1383 (asserting that subordinating the purchase money financer to a
prior-filed floating lienor "seems to be completely wrong and should be avoided if hu-
manly possible"); see also Boss, Purchase Money Security Interests, in 1B SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19.04[3][a][iii], at 19-64 to -65
(P. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts & J. McDonnell eds. 1987) (discussing the problems
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making future advances. This rational, however, should be rejected for
at least three reasons.
First, a secured party with a floating lien on inventory probably
would not rely on after-acquired chattel paper in making future ad-
vances. Second, the notice the purchase money inventory financer gives
the floating lienor to obtain priority with respect to the inventory ef-
fectively warns the floating lienor not to rely on chattel paper gener-
ated by a sale of that inventory.6 53 Third, if the floating lienor does
make future advances in reliance on after-acquired chattel paper,
under revised section 9-308(b) the floating lienor can prime the
purchase money financer's claim to chattel paper as proceeds if the
floating lienor takes possession of the chattel paper.654 In short, the
legitimate interests of the floating lienor can be protected without sub-
ordinating the purchase money financer's claim to proceeds under sec-
tion 9-312(3).
b. Inventory Financer's Claim to Chattel Paper as Proceeds Versus
Secured Party's Claim of Security Interest Directly in Chattel
Paper
The security interest an inventory financer claims in chattel paper
as proceeds may conflict with a security interest claimed directly in the
chattel paper. The conflicting security interest may be claimed by a
creditor who retained a security interest in the chattel paper to secure
the debtor's obligation to repay a loan. 5 5 In the alternative, the con-
flicting security interest may be asserted by a buyer of the chattel pa-
per. 5" This section analyzes the rules applicable to resolve priority dis-
putes between an inventory financer asserting a perfected security
interest in chattel paper as proceeds and a secured party claiming a
perfected security interest directly in the chattel paper.
Article 9 provides that a security interest in chattel paper as col-
lateral may be perfected either by filing a financing statement 57 or by
taking possession of the chattel paper.658 These methods of perfection,
653. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(b) to (d)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra notes 162-291 and accompanying text
(analysis of notification requirement for purchase money priority).
654. See infra notes 710-43 and accompanying text.
655. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(1)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
656. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(1)(b)
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1989).
657. U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
658. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-305 (Law. Co-op.
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however, are not equivalent. As the analysis below illustrates, perfec-
tion by possession affords substantially greater protection to a secured
party than does perfection by filing. The priority conflict between an
inventory financer claiming chattel paper as proceeds and a secured
party asserting a nonpossessory security interest in the chattel paper
which was perfected by filing will be considered first. The conflict be-
tween the inventory financer's proceeds claim and a possessory security
interest in the chattel paper then will be analyzed.
(i) Nonpossessory Security Interests in Chattel Paper
A conflict between an inventory financer claiming a perfected se-
curity interest in chattel paper as proceeds and a secured party assert-
ing a perfected nonpossessory security interest directly in the chattel
paper can arise in several contexts. The rules for resolving such con-
flicts, however, remain constant. The residual priority rules of revised
section 9-312(5)59 and (6)660 will control the outcome of all such dis-
putes. To illustrate the most straightforward of these disputes, con-
sider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 24-On June 1 Bank enters into a written security
agreement with Debtor under which Bank obtains a security interest
in Debtor's current and after-acquired chattel paper to secure a con-
temporaneous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank
filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering
Dealer's chattel paper. On July 1 Finance Company entered into a
written security agreement under which it obtained a nonpurchase
money security interest in Debtor's current and after-acquired inven-
tory to secure a contemporaneous loan and any future advances. Also
on July 1, Finance Company filed a financing statement in the office
of the Secretary of State. On August 1 Debtor sold an item of inven-
tory to a buyer under an installment sales contract. On September 1
Debtor defaulted on both obligations to Bank and Finance Company
and these parties sought to enforce their respective security interests
in the installment sales contract, which remained in Debtor's
possession.
Assuming the installment sales contract in Illustration 24 evi-
denced both a monetary obligation and a security interest in the goods
sold, the contract constituted chattel paper. 61 Under section 9-304(1)
Supp. 1989).
659. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
660. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
661. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-105(1)(b)
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Bank's filing in the Secretary of State's office was effective to perfect
its security interest in the installment sales contract.6 2 Since Debtor
received the installment sales contract in exchange for inventory sub-
ject to Finance Company's security interest, the installment sales con-
tract constituted proceeds 6 3 subject to Finance Company's security in-
terest.66 4  Moreover, under revised section 9-306(3)(a) Finance
Company's filing with respect to Debtor's inventory was effective to
continue the perfected status of its security interest in the installment
sales contract as proceeds 6 5 Thus, Illustration 24 presents a priority
conflict between two secured parties holding conflicting perfected non-
possessory security interests in chattel paper.
The Code does not provide a special priority rule for resolving this
conflict.66  One must, therefore, turn to the residual priority rules set
forth in revised section 9-312(5)(a) and (6). Bank's date for determin-
ing priority under the first to file or perfect rule is June 1, the date on
which it filed with respect to Debtor's chattel paper. Pursuant to re-
vised section 9-312(6), Finance Company's date for determining the
priority of its security interest in the chattel paper as proceeds is the
date on which it filed with respect to Debtor's inventory on July 1.6
6 7
Consequently, under revised section 9-312(5)(a) Bank in Illustration 24
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
662. U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-304(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
663. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
664. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra notes 447-49 and accompanying text (analysis of
creation of security interest in proceeds). -
665. Under revised section 9-306(3)(a) the filing with respect to inventory would be
effective to continue Finance Company's perfection in the chattel paper as proceeds only
if Finance Company filed in the same office with respect to the chattel paper as it filed
with respect to Debtor's inventory. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). If Debtor did business solely in
South Carolina or had its chief executive office in South Carolina, the South Carolina
inventory financing would be effective under revised section 36-9-306(3)(a). See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-103(3)(d), (4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). In contrast, if Debtor did
business in more than one state and its chief executive office was located in another
jurisdiction, Finance Company would have to file in that jurisdiction to continue the
perfected status of its security interest in the chattel paper proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-
103(3)(d), (4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-103(3)(d), (4) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
666. Revised section 9-303 provides a special priority rule applicable to certain pur-
chasers of chattel paper. To claim priority under this provision, however, the purchaser
must have a possessory security interest as required by section 9-308. See U.C.C. § 9-308
(1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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is entitled to priority over Finance Company.66 8
The analysis of Illustration 24 indicates that the order of filing will
determine the priority of a claim to chattel paper as proceeds against a
nonpossessory security interest asserted directly in the chattel paper.
Therefore, if Finance Company had filed with respect to Debtor's in-
ventory before Bank filed with respect to the chattel paper, Finance
company would have been entitled to priority with respect to the in-
stallment sales contract in issue. From the perspective of an inventory
financer asserting a security interest in chattel paper as proceeds, how-
ever, the more significant question is whether that security interest can
ever prime an earlier-filed chattel paper financer. The response is not
encouraging.
Consider first the rights of an inventory financer who held a
purchase money security interest s 9 in goods sold to generate the chat-
tel paper. This conflict can be raised by varying Illustration 24 to pro-
vide that Finance Company held a purchase money security interest in
the goods sold by Debtor under the August 1 installment sales con-
tract. As a purchase money financer of inventory, Finance Company
could prime conflicting security interests in the inventory by meeting
the requirements of revised section 9-312(3).670 Establishing a purchase
money priority in the inventory, however, appears irrelevant to Fi-
nance Company's dispute with Bank. Revised section 9-312(3) ad-
dresses only conflicting security interests in inventory,6 17 and Bank
does not assert such an interest.
Moreover, even if revised section 9-312(3) were applicable to the
dispute, it would afford Finance Company no protection. Under this
provision the purchase money priority in inventory extends to proceeds
only if the proceeds are cash proceeds secured on or before the delivery
of the inventory to the buyer. 72 Therefore, the purchase money prior-
ity would not extend to proceeds in the form of chattel paper. As a
result, even if Finance Company established a purchase money priority
in the inventory sold on August 1, the priority of its security interest in
the resulting chattel paper would be determined under revised section
9-312(5)(a) and (6). Under these provisions Finance Company's secur-
ity interest in the installment sales contract would be subordinate to
668. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
669. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) (defining "purchase money security interest").
670. See supra notes 114-291 and accompanying text.
671. But see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 224-26.
672. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra notes 535-43 and accompanying text (analysis of
purchase money priority in cash proceeds).
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that of Bank.The drafters clearly intended to subordinate a purchase money in-
ventory financer's security interest in chattel paper as proceeds to the
claim of an earlier-filed chattel paper financer who asserted a conflict-
ing security interest under an after-acquired property clause. The jus-
tification for this decision, however, is somewhat illusive. Apparently
the drafters sought to protect the chattel paper financer's ability to
rely upon its priority in after-acquired collateral in making future ad-
vances.6 73 If this were the drafters' objective, it could have been real-
ized without completely undercutting the position of the purchase
money inventory financer. For example, the drafters could have condi-
tioned the extension of the purchase money priority to proceeds in the
form of chattel paper on the inventory financer's giving prior written
notice of its purchase money security interest to the chattel paper fi-
nancer. This notice would alert the chattel paper financer not to make
future advances in reliance on a nonpossessory security interest in the
after-acquired chattel paper generated by the sale of inventory subject
to the inventory financer's purchase money security interest.
The suggestion that an extension of the purchase money priority
to chattel paper proceeds should be conditioned on prior notice to a
chattel paper financer is not entirely novel.174 The drafters considered
and rejected a comparable proposal conditioning the extension of the
purchase money priority to proceeds in the form of accounts upon the
inventory financer giving prior notice to an earlier-filed accounts fi-
nancer 6 75 The drafters rejected this proposal because it would be diffi-
cult for an accounts financer to trace after-acquired accounts to the
particular items of inventory subject to the purchase money security
interest and because accounts financing cannot be easily or safely ter-
minated on receipt of the inventory financer's purchase money no-
tice. 76 These difficulties may well have justified the rejection of the
proposal to extend conditionally the purchase money priority to pro-
ceeds in the form of accounts. They provide a much less firm founda-
tion, however, for rejecting the proposal with respect to proceeds in the
form of chattel paper.
673. Cf. Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 26 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1489 (1971) (offering justification for comparable decision not
to extend purchase money priority to accounts as proceeds); Second Look, supra note
622, at 1000-03 (offering justification for comparable decision not to extend purchase
money priority to accounts as proceeds).
674. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1384-85 (advocating a notice requirement for
the extension of the inventory purchase money priority to proceeds in the form of
accounts).
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Chattel paper financers probably do not routinely make future ad-
vances in reliance on a nonpossessory security interest in after-ac-
quired chattel paper. Therefore, the extension of the purchase money
priority to proceeds in the form of chattel paper would not appear to
upset a more significant form of financing.6 7 Furthermore, the task of
tracing items of purchase money inventory to chattel paper probably is
significantly less difficult than tracing such inventory to accounts.
Moreover, the task of tracing could be simplified by conditioning prior-
ity on a more demanding notice than required under revised section 9-
312(3)(d). For example, a statute could be enacted to require the in-
ventory financer to provide the chattel paper financer with the serial
numbers of all items of collateral on which it claimed a purchase
money security interest. Such a requirement does not appear unreason-
able for "big ticket" items such as motor vehicles, over which priority
with respect to proceeds in the form of chattel paper can be crucial.
More significantly, however, even if the purchase money priority
were extended to proceeds in the form of chattel paper, a financer
making a future advance against after-acquired chattel paper could
prime the inventory financer by taking possession of the chattel paper.
Under revised section 9-308(b)67 8 a purchaser of chattel paper who
gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper in the ordi-
nary course of his business has priority over a conflicting perfected se-
curity interest claimed merely as proceeds of inventory, even though
the purchaser knows the chattel paper is subject to the inventory fi-
nancer's security interest.179 No comparable new value priority provi-
sion applicable to accounts exists. Therefore, a decision to extend the
purchase money priority to proceeds in the form of accounts would
preclude an accounts financer giving new value in exchange for an in-
terest in the accounts claimed as proceeds from priming the inventory
financer.
In summary, the justification advanced in support of the decision
not to extend the purchase money priority to proceeds in the form of
accounts does not support the decision to preclude an inventory fi-
nancer from establishing a purchase money priority in proceeds in the
form of chattel paper. Therefore, it appears that in principle a priority
rule extending the purchase money priority to proceeds in the form of
chattel paper, provided that prior notice were given to an earlier-filed
677. The drafters based their fundamental decision not to extend the purchase
money priority to proceeds in the form of accounts upon the significance of accounts
financing. See id.; Second Look, supra note 622, at 1000-03.
678. U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(b) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
679. See generally infra notes 697-743 and accompanying text (analysis of priority
afforded to holders of possessory security interests in chattel paper).
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chattel paper financer, would have been preferable to the rules adopted
by the drafters.8 0
A return to the variation of Illustration 24 will demonstrate the
operation of the proposed priority rule. If Finance Company failed to
give Bank timely written notice of its purchase money security interest
in the specified items of inventory, Bank would be entitled to priority
with respect to the August 1 chattel paper.6 81 In contrast, if Finance
Company provided Bank with a timely purchase money notice, Fi-
nance Company would be entitled to priority over Bank's nonposses-
sory security interest in the August 1 chattel paper as after-acquired
property.8 2 Such a result is reasonable because it preserves the secured
position of Finance Company without jeopardizing the position of
Bank. Bank is protected because Finance Company's notice effectively
warned Bank not to make additional advances in reliance on the non-
possessory security interest. If Bank, after receipt of Finance Com-
pany's purchase money notice, elects to make an advance against the
August 1 chattel paper, it can do so by taking a possessory security
interest in the chattel paper. Under revised section 9-308(b) Bank's
possessory security interest would prime Finance Company's security
interest in the chattel paper as proceeds, even though Finance Com-
pany's security interest qualifies for the purchase money priority.
As illustrated above, the proposed rule extending the purchase
money priority to proceeds in the form of chattel paper is consistent
with the Article 9 basic policy of encouraging new value financing.
68 3
Finance Company gave new value to Debtor in exchange for its
purchase money security interest in the inventory. If Finance Company
is diligent and gives timely and adequate notice to Bank, Finance
Company's position is preserved by awarding its proceeds claim in the
chattel paper priority over Bank's claim under an after-acquired prop-
erty clause. If Bank gives further new value by making an advance
against the chattel paper and is diligent by taking possession of the
chattel paper, then Bank, the most recent party to extend new value, is
awarded priority.
8 4
The residual priority rules of revised Article 9 preclude an inven-
680. That such a rule is preferable in principle does not establish that a jurisdiction
should enact an inconsistent amendment providing such a rule. Arguably, considerations
of uniformity outweigh the consequences of the flow in the Official Text.
681. See generally notes 162-291 (analysis of notification condition on section 9-
312(3) priority).
682. Id.
683. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, -308, -312(3) to (4), -313(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-107, -308, -312(3) to (4), -313(4)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
684. See U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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tory financer from establishing a nonpossessory security interest in
chattel paper as proceeds that will prime a nonpossessory security in-
terest in the chattel paper asserted by a chattel paper financer who was
the first party to file. If the inventory financer is to prime an earlier-
filed nonpossessory security interest in chattel paper, the financer must
do so under a special priority rule. Therefore, the questions become
whether such a rule exists, and, if so, whether the inventory financer
can bring himself within its protection.
Revised section 9-308(a)6 8" affords the inventory financer the pos-
sibility of priming a nonpossessory security interest in chattel paper.
8 6
To prime a security interest in chattel paper perfected by a permissive
filing, the inventory financer must qualify as a purchaser of chattel pa-
per who gave new value and took possession of the chattel paper in the
ordinary course of his business and without knowledge that the specific
chattel paper is subject to a security interest.687 The inventory financer
will qualify as a purchaser of chattel paper if the financer holds an
Article 9 security interest in the chattel paper.6 88 To qualify under re-
vised section 9-308(a), the inventory financer must give new value. 8 9
An original loan made to finance the acquisition of the inventory is not
new value. In contrast, an advance made directly against the chattel
paper after the sale of the underlying inventory apparently constitutes
new value.6 90 The inventory financer must also take possession of the
chattel paper to be protected, and thus cannot rely on having filed.8 1
Finally, and most critically, the inventory financer must give value and
take possession of the chattel paper without knowledge that the chattel
paper is subject to the chattel paper financer's security interest. If the
chattel paper financer has stamped the chattel paper indicating its se-
685. U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(a) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
686. See U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
308 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Section 9-308(a) can be asserted by a secured
party who gives value against chattel paper "whether or not he financed the inventory
whose sale gave rise to it." U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-308 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
687. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.05[2], at 3-60 to -61 (analyzing pur-
chaser's rights when chattel paper is claimed directly).
688. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201(32)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (defining "purchase" to include any "voluntary transaction creating
an interest in property").
689. U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(9) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
690. See 2 G. GrmmoRE, supra note 56, § 27.3, at 730; see also U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972)
(amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-108 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (illustrations of
new value).
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curity interest, the inventory financer will take with knowledge of the
security interest.6 92 Moreover, although the mere filing of a financing
statement will not disqualify the inventory financer under revised sec-
tion 9-308(a),' 9 3 if the inventory financer has discovered the financing
statement before taking possession of the chattel paper, the inventory
financer apparently cannot prevail.
Accordingly, although revised section 9-308(a) affords an inventory
financer the possibility of prevailing over an earlier-filed chattel paper
financer if the inventory financer gives new value and takes possession
of the chattel, the absence of knowledge requirement probably severely
limits the utility of this provision. Furthermore, if the inventory fi-
nancer fails to meet the requirements of revised section 9-308(a), both
a nonpossessory security interest in the chattel paper as proceeds and a
possessory security interest in the chattel paper which secures the new
value will be subordinate to the security interest of the chattel paper
financer under the residual first to file or perfect rule of revised section
9-312(5)(a).694
In summary, revised Article 9 provides an inventory financer little
hope of succeeding in a priority dispute with an earlier-filed chattel
paper financer over chattel paper generated by the sale of encumbered
inventory. The only oasis for the inventory financer on this bleak land-
scape is the fact that revised section 9-308 discourages chattel paper
financers from taking nonpossessory security interests.6 95 If chattel pa-
per financers took only possessory security interests, an inventory fi-
nancer could gain protection by taking possession of the chattel paper
that constituted proceeds of its collateral.6 96 On closer inspection, how-
ever, this oasis may be a mirage. A secured party that lends against
substantially all of a debtor's chattel paper and regularly takes posses-
sion of its collateral is well advised to further collateralize its loans by
taking a blanket security interest in the debtor's chattel paper and to
perfect by filing. If the chattel paper financer takes this precaution and
its filing is prior in time to that of the inventory financers, the chattel
paper financer will prime the inventory financer's claim to the chattel
paper as proceeds. Moreover, despite the fact that the inventory fi-
nancer took possession of the chattel paper, the financer's claim under
692. U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308
comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
693. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(25) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (knowledge means actual knowledge).
694. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comments 1, 4 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
9-312 comments 1, 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
695. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.051], at 3-58 to -60 (chattel paper
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revised section 9-308(a) will fail unless the financer also gave new value
and acted without knowledge of the chattel paper financer's security
interest.
(ii) Possessory Security Interests in Chattel Paper
If an inventory financer files before a secured party claiming a
nonpossessory security interest in chattel paper, the inventory fi-
nancer's security in chattel paper as proceeds will be entitled to prior-
ity over the claim of the chattel paper financer under revised section 9-
312(5)(a). The inventory financer, however, also may face a challenge
from a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper claiming a possessory se-
curity interest in the chattel paper. Although the inventory financer
would prime this purchaser under the residual first to file or perfect
rule, the purchaser with a possessory security interest in the chattel
paper may be able to establish priority under the special rules of re-
vised section 9-308.6
9 7
Revised section 9-308 sets forth two special priority rules under
which certain purchasers of chattel paper can prime an earlier per-
fected nonpossessory security interest in chattel paper. To qualify for
protection under either of these rules a purchaser must give new value
and take possession of the chattel paper in the ordinary course of his
business. The critical requirement is taking possession of the chattel
paper, since the protection available under section 9-308 is limited to
secured parties holding security interests perfected by possession.
Moreover, this requirement reflects the policy of making chattel paper
quasi-negotiable.9 8
The new value requirement has been interpreted in light of section
697. See U.C.C. § 9-308 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). The statute provides:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value and
takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a
security interest in the chattel paper or instrument:
(a) which is perfected under Section 36-9-304 (permissive filing and temporary
perfection) or under Section 36-9-306 (perfection as to proceeds) if he acts
without knowledge that the specific paper or instrument is subject to a security
interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security in-
terest (Section 36-9-306), even though he knows that the specific paper or in-
strument is subject to the security interest.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
698. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 25.5, at 666-70 (discussing the
Article 9 treatment of chattel paper as a commercial specialty); WHITE & SUMMaS,
supra note 87, § 24-18, at 1181 (discussing the quasi-negotiable treatment of chattel pa-
per under Article 9 as accomodating business expectations).
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9-108,99 which lists making an advance, incurring an obligation, and
releasing a perfected security interest as illustrations of new value.700
The courts have held that a purchaser does not give new value for
chattel paper when chattel paper is taken in satisfaction of a prior
debt.7
01
The effect of the ordinary course of his business requirement is
uncertain. The requirement may simply mean that the purchaser must
be in the business of discounting chattel paper or lending against chat-
tel paper.70 2 The sole decision on this issue held that a purchaser satis-
fies the requirement if the purchaser acquires the chattel paper at is-
sue in the same manner in which the purchaser normally purchases
chattel paper, even though failing to comply with regular commercial
practices. 703 More significantly, however, there is no authority for read-
ing the requirements of section 1-201(9)," °" which defines a buyer in
the ordinary course, into the ordinary course requirement of section 9-
308. Indeed, the existing authority is to the contrary.7 5 Therefore, a
purchaser of chattel paper apparently can qualify for protection under
revised section 9-308, even if the purchaser knows that the sale is in
violation of the security interest of a third party.706
Revised section 9-308(a) sets forth the first special priority rule
applicable to purchasers of chattel paper. Under subsection (a), a pur-
chaser of chattel paper who gives new value and takes possession in the
699. U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-108 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
700. See U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-108 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, at 1181 (stating that if
transactions go beyond the examples of new value given in the Code, courts are on their
own in defining the term).
701. See, e.g., Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynwood Equip., Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 980 (W.D. Wash.), reconsidered, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1701 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd, 841 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Dr. C. Huff Co.), 44 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1984).
702. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 25.5, at 667.
703. See Rex Fin. Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 532 P.2d 558
(1975).
704. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(9) (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1989).
705. See Rex Fin. Corp., 23 Ariz. App. at 289, 522 P.2d at 561 ("The term 'buyer in
the [sic] ordinary course of business' with its requirements of good faith, as used else-
where in the Uniform Commercial Code, is to be distinguished from the use here of
'[buyer] in the ordinary course of his business.'" (emphasis in original) (brackets in orig-
inal)); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-18, at 1183 ("The 'ordinary course of
business' requirement of 9-307 is totally different from the 'ordinary course of his busi-
ness' requirement of 9-308." (emphasis in original)).
706. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.3, at 731.
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ordinary course of his business primes all previously perfected nonpos-
sessory security interests in chattel paper, provided that the purchaser
acquires the chattel paper without knowledge7 0 7 of the security inter-
est." 8 The "without knowledge" limitation enables a secured party
holding a nonpossessory security interest in chattel paper to preclude a
subsequent purchaser from establishing a prior claim under subsection
(a) by stamping the chattel paper with a notice conspicuously stating
that the paper is subject to the purchaser's security interest.7 09
Although revised section 9-308(a) can be significant to an inven-
tory financer 7 11 the second special priority rule, set forth in subsection
(b), is much more important. Under revised section 9-308(b), a pur-
chaser of chattel paper who gives new value and takes possession in the
ordinary course of his business primes a prior perfected security inter-
est "claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security in-
terest,"7' even though the purchaser knows the chattel paper is sub-
ject to the security interest.712 Since an inventory financer normally
claims a security interest in chattel paper merely as proceeds, subsec-
tion (b) will control most priority disputes between an inventory fi-
nancer and a purchaser of chattel paper. If subsection (b) applies, a
purchaser who meets the basic requirements of section 9-308 will prime
the inventory financer, even if the purchaser knows that the chattel
paper purchased was subject to the inventory financer's security inter-
est at the time of the purchase.7 1 3 Moreover, such a purchaser appar-
ently will prevail even if such purchaser also knew that the sale was in
violation of the security interest held by the inventory financer .7 4
To illustrate the application of revised section 9-308, consider the
following:
ILLUSTRATION 25-On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a
written security agreement under which Dealer granted Bank a secur-
707. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(25) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (knowledge means actual knowledge).
708. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 3.05[2], at 3-60 to -61 (discussing prior-
ity when chattel paper claimed directly).
709. See U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
308 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
710. See infra notes 735-43 and accompanying text.
711. U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(b) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
712. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 3.05[1], at 3-58 to -60 (reviewing court
decisions and examples of situations in which chattel paper financers who take posses-
sion and give new value prime financers who claim chattel paper as proceeds).
713. See, e.g., Rex Fin. Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 532 P.2d
558 (1975); Commercial Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp., 251 Ark. 541, 473 S.W.2d
876 (1971).
714. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.3, at 731.
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ity interest in Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory of appli-
ances to secure a contemporaneous loan and any future advances. The
security agreement further required Dealer to surrender all proceeds
from the sale of the collateral to Bank. On June 1 Bank filed a financ-
ing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering Dealer's in-
ventory. On July 1 Dealer sold an appliance to Buyer under an install-
ment sales contract, which granted Dealer a purchase money security
interest in the appliance to secure Buyer's obligation to pay the
purchase price and finance charge in periodic installments. Also on
July 1, Dealer sold the installment sales contract to Finance Com-
pany, which was in the business of discounting chattel paper. Finance
Company paid cash in exchange for the contract and immediately
took possession of the contract. Dealer used the funds derived from
the sale of the contract to meet current operating expenses. On Au-
gust 1 Bank rightfully declared Dealer in default under the terms of
the June 1 security agreement and asserted a security interest in the
installment sales contract in the possession of Finance Company.
The installment sales contract constitutes chattel paper715 upon
which both Bank and Finance Company can claim a perfected Article 9
security interest. Bank's security interest attached to the chattel paper
as proceeds of its collateral, 71 and remained perfected by virtue of its
filing with respect to Dealer's inventory.71  Although Dealer sold the
chattel paper to Finance Company, the transaction was within the
scope of Article 971 and Finance Company acquired a security interest
in the chattel paper.7 1 9 Finance Company perfected its security interest
by taking possession of the chattel paper.
7 20
If the residual priority rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a) con-
trolled the dispute between Bank and Finance Company, Bank would
be entitled to priority. Bank filed with respect to Dealer's inventory on
June 1 and the date of this filing determines Bank's priority in the
715. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
105(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (defining chattel paper); see generally supra text
accompanying notes 626-28 (illustration of chattel paper).
716. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying notes 447-49 (analysis
of attachment of security interest in proceeds).
717. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying notes 450-63 (analysis
of perfection of security interest in proceeds).
718. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
102(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
719. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972) (amended 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
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chattel paper as proceeds.7 2' Finance Company did not perfect its se-
curity interest until it took possession of the chattel paper on July 1.
122
Therefore, under the first to file or perfect rule of revised section 9-
312(5)(a), bank would prime Finance Company.
Finance Company, however, will assert that the special priority
rules of revised section 9-308 preempt the residual rule of revised sec-
tion 9-312(5)(a), and that under revised section 9-308 Finance Com-
pany is entitled to priority. Finance Company can establish that
Bank's security interest is vulnerable to a qualified purchaser of chat-
tel paper, since bank holds a perfected nonpossessory security interest
in the chattel paper as proceeds from the sale of its collateral. More-
over, under the facts stated, Bank has no basis for asserting that its
security interest is not claimed merely as proceeds of encumbered in-
ventory. Therefore, if Finance dompany can establish that it pur-
chased the chattel paper for new value and took possession of the chat-
tel paper in the ordinary course of its business, Finance Company can
claim priority over Bank under either subsection (a) or subsection (b)
of revised section 9-308.
If Finance Company purchased the chattel paper without knowl-
edge that the specific chattel paper was subject to Bank's security in-
terest, Finance Company can establish priority under revised section 9-
308(a). If Finance Company knew at the time it purchased the chattel
paper that the chattel paper was subject to Bank's security interest,
Finance Company can establish priority under revised section 9-308(b),
since Bank's security interest was claimed merely as proceeds of
inventory.
Under the facts in Illustration 25, Finance Company also can es-
tablish that it qualifies as a purchaser of chattel paper entitled to pro-
tection under revised section 9-308. As a buyer of the chattel paper,
Finance Company was clearly a purchaser of chattel paper. 23 By pay-
ing cash for the chattel paper, Finance Company gave new value as
well."" Furthermore, under the facts of Illustration 25, Finance Com-
pany took possession of the chattel paper. Finally, Finance Company
721. See U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying note 517 (analysis of
revised section 9-312(5)(a), (6)).
722. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-303(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (analysis
of time of perfection).
723. Both the U.C.C. and the South Carolina Code define "purchase" to "include[]
taking by sale .... U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
201(32) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
724. See U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972) (ameneX,d 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-108 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) (providing illustrations of new value).
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was in the business of purchasing chattel paper and followed its nor-
mal business practices in purchasing the chattel paper at issue. Fi-
nance Company thus satisfied the requirement of giving new value and
taking possession of the chattel paper "in the ordinary course of [its]
business. "7 25 Accordingly, Finance Company in Illustration 25 primes
Bank's security interest in the chattel papei.
The special priority rules of revised section 9-308 apparently un-
dercut the position of an inventory financer. If the debtor has sold the
encumbered inventory to a buyer in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness, the proceeds of that sale are the inventory financer's sole source
of security.726 Revised section 9-308 then undercuts the inventory fi-
nancer's claim to proceeds in the form of chattel paper by enabling the
debtor to grant a purchaser of the chattel paper priority in the paper,
even if the purchaser has knowledge of the inventory financer's secur-
ity interest. Nevertheless, several solid arguments support a conclusion
that the priority rules of revised section 9-308 are not inconsistent with
the interests of inventory financers.
First, although revised section 9-308 subordinates the security in-
terest of an inventory financer in chattel paper as proceeds to the
claim of a qualified purchaser of chattel paper, the inventory financer
can claim a security interest in the new value given by the purchaser in
exchange for the chattel paper.727 In most cases, however, the new
value will be cash proceeds.7 28 Because cash proceeds can be easily dis-
bursed or commingled with other funds giving rise to tracing
problems,7 20 the protection the inventory financer derives from a secur-
ity interest in the new value may be illusory. Therefore, this argument
standing alone is not fully persuasive.7
30
Second, even if a security interest in the new value is unlikely to
protect the position of an inventory financer in the event of default, by
rendering chattel paper "quasi-negotiable," revised section 9-308 may
enhance the position of inventory financers generally. Because revised
section 9-308(b) grants a new value purchaser of chattel paper priority
725. See supra notes 702-06 and accompanying text.
726. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972), § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); SC. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-1-201(9), -9-307(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989); see generally supra text ac-
companying note 14 (dilemma passed to inventory financer by section 9-308(1)).
727. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
728. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
729. See generally supra text accompanying notes 464-516 (analysis of identification
of commingled cash proceeds).
730. But see B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.05[1], at 3-58 to -59 (because inventory
financer has security interest in new value given by purchaser of chattel paper as pro-
ceeds of proceeds it "is not really harmed by the rule [of revised § 9-308(b)].").
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over inventory financers claiming the chattel paper as proceeds, the
provision encourages sales of chattel paper. By selling or discounting
chattel paper, a debtor accelerates the date on which the debtor re-
ceives payment for the sales of inventory. Moreover, in the normal
course of events the debtor will use the cash derived from the sale of
the chattel paper to pay the inventory financer. Therefore, revised sec-
tion 9-308 tends, to enhance a debtor's ability to repay the inventory
financer in a timely fashion.7
3 1
Finally, if the risks posed by revised section 9-308 are unaccept-
able to an inventory financer, the financer can adopt some strategies to
avoid the effect of the provision. The most straightforward course of
action is for the inventory financer to take possession of all chattel pa-
per generated by the sale of the collateral. 3 2 Although such a practice
entails monetary costs 33 and may be ineffective in the event of
fraud, 3 4 it limits the risk that the debtor will grant a purchaser a prior
right to the chattel paper that the inventory financer claims as pro-
ceeds. In order to prime an inventory financer under revised section 9-
308, a purchaser must take possession of the chattel paper. Therefore,
if the inventory financer takes possession of the chattel paper, no pur-
chaser can establish a prior claim to the paper under revised section 9-
308.
An inventory financer who elects not to take possession of chattel
paper can adopt an alternative strategy to protect a security interest in
the chattel paper from subordination under revised section 9-308. The
basic thrust of this strategy is to remove the conflict with the pur-
chaser of chattel paper from the scope of revised section 9-308(b), and
to defeat purchaser under revised section 9-308(a). If the inventory fi-
nancer can establish that subsection (a) rather than subsection (b) con-
trols the priority dispute, the inventory financer will prevail if the
chattel paper purchaser had knowledge of the inventory financer's se-
curity interest in the chattel paper.13 5
The inventory financer can take steps that will reasonably insure
731. Cf. Second Look, supra note 622, at 1003 (comparable analysis to justify prior-
ity to accounts financer over purchase money inventory financer claiming accounts as
proceeds).
732. See 2 G. GmMORE, supra note 56, § 27.3, at 731.
733. See id.
734. For example, if a debtor prepared duplicate installment sales contracts for a
single transaction and surrendered one to the inventory financer and sold the other to a
chattel paper purchaser, the chattel paper purchaser should prevail. Cf. Walter E. Heller
W., Inc. v. Foothill Capital Corp. (In re New Mexico Ice Mach. Co.), 32 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1647 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (fraud by sale of single equipment lease to
two chattel paper purchasers).
735. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.0511], at 3-58 to -60; 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
56, § 27.3, at 731-32.
1990]
153
Lacy: Conflicting Security Interests in Inventory and Proceeds under th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that a purchaser will acquire the chattel paper with knowledge of the
inventory financer's security interest. If the inventory financer
prepares the form contracts used by the debtor to effect sales of inven-
tory, and those contacts conspicuously disclose that they are subject to
the inventory financer's security interest, a purchaser will have a diffi-
cult time establishing that the purchase of the chattel paper was with-
out knowledge of the security interest.7 6 The purchaser's knowledge of
the security interest, however, will not entitle the inventory financer to
priority unless the financer can remove the conflict from the scope of
revised section 9-308(b). Therefore, to prime the purchaser, the inven-
tory financer also must establish that the security interest is not
"claimed merely as proceeds of inventory. '737
It is not an easy task for an inventory financer to establish that
the security interest in chattel paper is not claimed merely as pro-
ceeds.73 Merely including chattel paper in the description of collateral
in the security agreement and financing statement will not enable an
inventory financer to avoid the effect of revised section 9-308(b). 739
The comments indicate that an inventory financer's security interest in
chattel paper arises merely as proceeds unless the financer has entered
into a "new transaction" with the debtor under which the financer ac-
quired a specific interest in the chattel paper.740
Gilmore asserts that the new transaction envisioned by the Official
Comment occurs when a debtor repays an inventory advance after sell-
ing an item of encumbered inventory, and then draws a new advance
from the inventory financer secured by a nonpossessory security inter-
est in the chattel paper generated by the sale.741 The parties can com-
736. See U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 3 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
308 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
737. See U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
738. See, eg., B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 3.05[2], at 3-60 ("It is ... extremely diffi-
cult to imagine a situation where the chattel paper is other than mere proceeds, at least
if the creditor is lending against the dealer's inventory.").
739. See, e.g., International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430 (1974); see also B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 3.05[1], at 3-58 to
-59 (the "substance" of giving new value wins over the "form" of including chattel paper
in the description in the security agreement). But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87,
§ 24-18, at 1182 (when loan is secured by inventory and proceeds, but lender relied pri-
marily on chattel paper proceeds in making loan, authors are inclined to allow lender to
so testify to establish that chattel paper is not claimed merely as proceeds).
740. U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 2 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. 36-9-308
comment 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
741. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.3, at 351; see also B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1
3.0512], at 3-61 (recognizing possibility of transaction, but asserting that "[s]uch a trans-
action is about as rare as ice on the Sahara"); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, § 24-18,
at 1182 n.11 (suggesting that a lender's claim may become more than mere proceeds if
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press the repayment of the inventory advance and the new loan against
the chattel paper into a single transaction. Therefore, the transaction
is, in effect, a discount of the chattel paper with the proceeds of the
discount being used to pay the inventory financer. As a result, it is
reasonable to treat the inventory financer as a secured party who per-
fected by permissive filing and whose rights against subsequent pur-
chasers who take possession are defined under section 9-308(a).
In summary, under the new transaction strategy, the inventory fi-
nancer must insure that the chattel paper generated by the financer's
debtor discloses the security interest. Furthermore, the financer must
execute the formalities of the new transaction described above. These
formalities include both a security agreement granting the inventory
financer a security interest in the chattel paper to secure the chattel
paper advances and a financing statement covering chattel paper. An
assertion by an inventory financer that the security interest in chattel
paper was not claimed merely as proceeds would be substantially un-
dercut if the financer were forced to rely upon revised section 9-306(2)
and (3) to establish the existence and perfection of the security interest
in the chattel paper. 42 Given the formalities of the new transaction
strategy, it is as cumbersome as taking possession of the chattel paper.
Nevertheless, when chattel paper financing is done under an "indirect
collection" method, 4 3 the new transaction device affords protection to
the inventory financer.
c. Inventory Financers Versus Chattel Paper Purchasers with
Respect to Returns and Repossessions
The preceding subsection analyzed the resolution of priority dis-
putes over chattel paper between an inventory financer claiming the
chattel paper as proceeds and a purchaser of the chattel paper. The
potential conflicts between these parties, however, are not limited to
disputes over chattel paper. In the event the goods, the sale of which
generated the chattel paper, are returned to the debtor, a priority dis-
pute will arise between the inventory financer and the purchaser of the
chattel paper concerning the returned goods. The critical provision in
the lender acquires a specific interest in the chattel paper through a separate
transaction).
742. See supra text accompanying notes 447-63 (analysis of attachment and perfec-
tion of security interests in proceeds).
743. Under an indirect collection method of financing the chattel paper is left in the
possession of the dealer-debtor, and account debtors make payments to the dealer-
debtor who in turn remits the payments to the chattel paper purchaser. See U.C.C. § 9-
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analyzing this dispute is section 9-306(5). 744 Section 9-306(5) not only
grants both the inventory financer and chattel paper purchaser a se-
curity interest in the returned goods, but also provides rules for perfec-
tion and priority.7 " This subsection will analyze the application of sec-
744. U.C.C. § 9-306(5) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides:
(5) If a sale of goods results in an account or chattel paper which is trans-
ferred by the seller to a secured party, and if the goods are returned to or are
repossessed by the seller or the secured party, the following rules determine
priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale, for an indebtedness of
the seller which is still unpaid, the original security interest attaches again to
the goods and continues as a perfected security interest if it was perfected at
the time when the goods were sold. If the security interest was originally per-
fected by a filing which is still effective, nothing further is required to continue
the perfected status; in any other case, the secured party must take possession
of the returned or repossessed goods or must file.
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the
goods against the transferor. The security interest is prior to a security interest
asserted under paragraph (a) to the extent that the transferee of the chattel
paper was entitled to priority under Section 36-9-308.
(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the goods
against the transferor. The security interest is subordinate to a security inter-
est asserted under paragraph (a).
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under paragraph
(b) or (c) must be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor
and purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
745. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 10.02[2], at 10-23 to -32 (discussing the
general rules of priority governing returned or repossessed goods); 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 56, § 27.5, at 736 (discussing priorities in returned goods); Barnes, Reaffirming the
Dominance of Notice in Article 9: A Proposed Modification of Priorities in Returned
and Repossessed Goods, 48 U. PTrr. L. REV. 353 (1987) (criticizing section 9-306(5) and
proposing a modified statute); Kripke, A Draftsman's Wishes that He Could do Things
Over Again-U.C.C. Article 9, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7-20 (1989) (analyzing drafting
history and flaws in section 9-306(5)); Lord, Rights of Secured Creditors in Returned
and Repossessed Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study of Section 9-
306(5), 15 Duq. L. REV. 165 (1976) (discussing problems that may develop between credi-
tors over returns and repossessions and the relevant case law); Skilton & Dunham, Se-
curity Interests in Returned and Repossessed Goods Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 WILLAME=TE L. REV. 779 (1981) (discussing potential disputes be-
tween creditors regarding repossessed and returned goods and analyzing pertinent cases).
At the outset it must be noted that section 9-306(5) purports to control priorities in
"repossessions" as well as returns. See supra note 744. Moreover, the courts have applied
9-306(5) in cases in which a chattel paper transferee has repossessed goods following a
keeper's default and returned the repossessed goods to the dealer to await sale under
section 9-504(3). See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d
543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). Nevertheless, section 9-306(5) should not be interpreted to ap-
ply to such a repossession. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code, Commentary on Section 9-306(5), published in 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
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tion 9-306(5) to conflicts between an inventory financer and a chattel
paper purchaser with regard to returns.
To analyze the resolution of such conflicts, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 26-Dealer is in the business of selling construction
equipment. On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a written secur-
ity agreement, which granted Bank a security interest in Dealer's cur-
rent and after-acquired inventory of construction equipment to secure
a contemporaneous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1,
Current Material Highlights, Part II (June 1989) [hereinafter Commentary on Section 9-
306(5)]; Kripke, supra, at 12-13. Under section 9-306(5)(a) an inventory financer is
granted a security interest in returned and repossessed goods. In cases such as J.L Case
Co., however, the repossessed goods in the dealer's possession remain property of the
buyer subject to the chattel paper transferee's security interest and right of possession.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -504(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-503, -504(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Therefore, the dealer holds the goods as a mere bailee. Signifi-
cantly, a bailee in possession of another's goods does not have sufficient rights in the
goods to create a security interest in favor of the bailee's creditor. See A. Lassberg & Co.
v. Atlantic Cotton Co., 291 S.C. 161, 352 S.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1986); see also authorities
cited supra note 415. As a result it would be improper to interpret section 9-306(5)(a) to
grant a dealer's inventory financer a security interest in repossessed goods that the
dealer holds as a bailee for the chattel paper transferee. Moreover, Kripke asserts that
section 9-306(5) "cannot govern priorities of conflicting claims by [an inventory financer]
and [a chattel paper transferee] against the dealer before the dealer owns the repos-
sessed goods." Kripke, supra, at 13. In the same vein, the Permanent Editorial Board
has asserted that a chattel paper transferee obtains a security interest in returned or
repossessed goods against the dealer under section 9-306(5)(b) only "upon Dealer acquir-
ing 'rights in the collateral' by reason of the (i) revocation of acceptance or (ii) agreement
with BIOCOB (buyer in ordinary course of business) or (iii) purchase of the goods at the
foreclosure sale or (iv) repurchase agreement." Commentary on section 9-306(5), at 3.
Since section 9-306(5) controls priorities in repossessed goods only when the dealer
has obtained rights in the goods, the provision is inapplicable when the chattel paper
transferee has repossessed the goods and delivered them to the dealer for sale under
section 9-504(3) or when the dealer has repossessed the goods as an agent of the chattel
paper transferee. Moreover, since a dealer typically obtains possession of repossessed
goods in these situations, this article focuses upon goods that are returned to the dealer
pursuant to a revocation of acceptance and cancellation of a sales contract. See U.C.C. §§
2-608, -711(1) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-608, -711(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976). In such
cases title revests in the dealer by operation of law. See U.C.C. § 2-401(4) (1972); S.C.
CODE § 36-2-401(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Therefore, in a revocation of acceptance case the
dealer has rights in the returned goods and section 9-306(5) is applicable.
That section 9-306(5) does not apply when a dealer holds repossessed goods as a
bailee does not eliminate a potential priority conflict between an inventory financer and
a chattel paper transferee. From the perspective of the inventory financer, the dealer's
possession of the goods may create a problem of apparent ownership. See Kripke, supra,
at 19-20 (criticizing section 9-306(5)(b) for awarding priority to chattel paper transferees
despite absence of notice). This article, however, asserts that this problem of apparent
ownership should be controlled by the Code provisions regulating consignments. See in-
fra notes 854-84 (analysis of application of sections 2-326(3) and 9-114 to returns and
repossessions); see also Kripke, supra, at 13 n.37.
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Bank properly filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State's
office covering Dealer's inventory. On July 1 Dealer sold a bulldozer to
Contractor, a buyer in the ordinary course of business, under a condi-
tional sales contract, which granted Dealer a security interest in the
bulldozer to secure Contractor's obligation to pay the purchase price
in monthly installments. On July 2 Dealer sold the conditional sales
contract to Finance Company, which gave new value for and took pos-
session of the contract in the ordinary course of its business. On July
2 Finance Company also filed a financing statement in the Secretary
of State's office to perfect its assigned security interest in the bull-
dozer. This financing statement listed Contractor as the debtor. On
August 10, before making any installment payments, Contractor right-
fully revoked acceptance and returned the bulldozer to Dealer. On
September 1 Bank rightfully declared Dealer in default under the
terms of the June 1 security agreement and sought to enforce its se-
curity interest against the bulldozer, which remained in Dealer's
possession.
The primary issue presented in this illustration is whether Bank is
entitled to priority over Finance Company with respect to the returned
bulldozer. Section 9-306(5) applies to provide the rules for resolving
the priority issue.7 46 In applying section 9-306(5), however, two prelimi-
nary sub-issues must be resolved before the ultimate issue of priority
may be addressed. First, do Bank and Finance Company hold security
interests in the returned bulldozer? Second, if the parties have security
interests in the returned bulldozer, are those security interests
perfected?
Bank has a security interest in the returned bulldozer under sec-
tion 9-306(5)(a). Under this provision, if the goods in issue were collat-
eral at the time of the sale and the debt of the seller remains unpaid,
"the original security interest attaches again to the goods" when they
are returned to the seller.747 Under facts in Illustration 26, however,
Bank could claim a security interest in the returned bulldozer under
the after-acquired property clause in its security agreement. 748 There-
fore, the grant of a security interest under section 9-306(5)(a) appar-
ently is significant only when a secured party does not have a security
interest in after-acquired property. The failure of an inventory financer
to claim a security interest in after-acquired property is common only
in purchase money financing.7 49 Moreover, even in such cases, the se-
746. See supra note 744 (quoting text of section 9-306(5)).
747. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
748. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 784.
749. See Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240 (11th
Cir. 1985) (secured party could not claim a purchase money security interest when it
[Vol. 41
158
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss2/4
CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
cured party could argue that the returned goods were proceeds of pro-




Finance Company has a security interest in the returned bulldozer
again.st Dealer under section 9-306(5)(b). This provision expressly
grants an unpaid transferee of chattel paper a security interest in re-
turned goods against the transferor of the chattel paper. Since Finance
Company has not received the installment payments under the as-
signed conditional sales contract, Finance Company is an unpaid trans-
feree of chattel paper within the meaning of section 9-306(5)(b)."' An
interesting question arises concerning whether Finance Company could
claim a security interest in the returned bulldozer independently of
section 9-306(5)(b). By virtue of its purchase of the conditional sales
contract, Finance Company acquired a security interest in the bull-
dozer against Contractor. This security interest, however, does not di-
rectly assist Finance Company because it must have a security interest
in the returned bulldozer against Dealer. In the absence of section 9-
306(5), Finance Company could argue that the returned bulldozer was
proceeds of the chattel paper and hence subject to Finance Company's
security interest under revised section 9-306(2).751 Although this argu-
ment is reasonable in the case of returned goods, one must strain in
order to characterize a repossession as a "sale, exchange, or other dis-
position" of the chattel paper.
7 53
Although both Bank and Finance Company have security interests
in the returned bulldozer against Dealer, only Bank's security interest
is clearly perfected.7 5 4 Section 9-306(5)(a) not only grants an inventory
financer a security interest in goods returned to the seller, but also sets
forth the rules governing the perfection of that security interest. If the
inventory financer's security interest in the goods was perfected at the
time of the sale, the security interest continues perfected when the
goods are returned.755 Moreover, if the security interest was originally
perfected by filing and that filing is still effective when the goods are
exercised a future advance clause and an after-acquired property clause).
750. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.5, at 737; Commentary on Section 9-
306(5), supra note 745, at 3; see also Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 798-801, 806
(returns but not repossessions are proceeds of chattel paper).
751. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 788 n.34.
752. See sources cited supra note 750.
753. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 799; see generally supra note 745
(arguing that section 9-306(5) does not apply to most repossessions).
754. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
755. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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returned, no further action by the inventory financer is required to
continue its perfected status..75  Because Bank's security interest in the
bulldozer was perfected by filing when Dealer sold the bulldozer and
that filing was still effective when Contractor returned the bulldozer,
Bank's security interest in the returned bulldozer is perfected.
Although the issue of Finance Company's perfection is more com-
plex, most authorities conclude that its security interest in the re-
turned bulldozer against dealer is unperfected. 7  Finance Company
did file to perfect its security interest in the bulldozer against Contrac-
tor, but most authorities assert that this filing is ineffective to perfect
its security interest against Dealer.7 58 Moreover, Finance Company's
security interest in the chattel paper against Dealer was perfected by
possession. Nevertheless, section 9-306(5)(d) indicates that perfection
as to the chattel paper does not carry over to returned goods. 5"
Finally, Finance Company could assert that Dealer was acting as
its agent when Dealer accepted the return of the bulldozer. On this
basis Finance Company could argue that its security interest was per-
fected by Dealer's possession. This argument, however, must be re-
jected. 60 In the transaction at issue, Dealer is Finance Company's
debtor, and possession by the debtor cannot perfect a security inter-
est.7 61 Finance Company may assert, however, that the returned bull-
dozer is proceeds of the chattel pape 76 2 and hence its security interest
in the returned bulldozer was automatically perfected under revised
section 9-306(3) for ten days.7 6 3 Even if Finance Company were to pre-
vail on this point, though, the victory would not enhance Finance Com-
pany's position in Illustration 26, since the period of temporary perfec-
756. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
757. See, e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 8, % 10.02[2][a], at 10-23 to -27. But see infra
notes 765-70 and accompanying text. 1
758. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 4 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §
36-9-306 comment 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also In re Haugabook Auto Co., 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.), (when dealer repossessed
automobiles that were subject to assignee's security interest, noted on certificate of title,
the trustee's rights were superior to assignee's because the automobiles had become part
of dealer's inventory and perfection under the certificate of title statute excluded inter-
ests in inventory), afl'd, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1095 (M.D. Ga. 1971); Skilton &
Dunham, supra note 745, at 828 (when returned goods are involved, Code requires more
than filing against the buyer to protect against conflicting claims to the goods).
759, U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 4 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306
comment 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
760. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 792.
761. See U.C.C. § 9-305 comment 2 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
305 comment 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
762, See sources cited supra note 750.
763. See supra notes 450-51 and accompanying text.
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tion expired before Bank asserted its security interest.
Although Finance Company's security interest in the returned
bulldozer appears to be unperfected, Finance Company can advance an
additional argument to claim perfected status. As discussed below
7
61
the success of this argument is critical to Finance Company. If Finance
Company's security interest in the returned bulldozer is unperfected,
under section 9-306(5)(d) Finance Company's interest will be
subordinate to the claims of subsequent creditors of Dealer, including a
bankruptcy trustee and purchasers of the returned bulldozer.765 More-
over, under South Carolina law, as articulated in Finance America
Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Co.,766 if Finance Company's se-
curity interest in the returned bulldozer is unperfected, its claim will
be subordinate to the security interest asserted by Bank under section
9-306(5)(a).
7 67
Finance Company's argument that its security interest in the re-
turned bulldozer is perfected rests upon revised section 9-402(7).6 s
This section provides that "[a] filed financing statement remains effec-
tive with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor even though
the secured party knows of or consents to the transfer. '769 The most
obvious application of the transfer rule of revised section 9-402(7) is in
cases in which a debtor makes an unauthorized sale of collateral sub-
ject to a properly perfected security interest to a buyer other than a
buyer in the ordinary course.770 In such a case, the buyer takes subject
to the perfected security interest under revised sections 9-306(2)771 and
9-307(1).772 Moreover, under revised section 9-402(7) the filing against
the seller is effective to perfect the secured party's security interest
against conflicting claims asserted by transferees of the buyer.
773
In Illustration 26, Finance Company can invoke revised section 9-
402(7) by asserting that the return of the bulldozer by Contractor was
a transfer of the collateral by the debtor. If the return is viewed as
such a transfer, the financing statement filed against Contractor re-
764. See infra notes 807-21 and accompanying text.
765. See infra note 852 and accompanying text.
766. 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460 (1987).
767. See infra notes 807-21 and accompanying text.
768. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. COD. ANN. § 36-9-402(7) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
769. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. COD. ANN. § 36-9-402(7) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
770. See, e.g., In re Granny Frannies, Inc., 39 Bankr. 377 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1984).
771. See infra text accompanying notes 862-64.
772. See infra text accompanying notes 865-67.
773. See In re Neatex, Inc., 77 Bankr. 808 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987); Loeb v. Franchise
Distrib., Inc. (In re Franchise Sys., Inc.), 46 Bankr. 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); see also
Granny Frannies, 39 Bankr. 377 (same result under 1962 Official Text).
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mains effective to perfect Finance Company's secured interest after the
bulldozer is returned to Dealer."' The effect of the revised section 9-
402(7) argument is to render a chattel paper purchaser's perfection in
the goods against creditors of the buyer effective against creditors of
the dealer in the event the goods are returned. This result is inconsis-
tent with the generally accepted interpretation of section 9-
306(5)(d). 7 5 Nevertheless, characterization of a return effected through
a revocation of acceptance as a transfer appears reasonable, since the
buyer has returned possession of the goods to the dealer in exchange
for a release from the obligation to pay the purchase price.
776
After analyzing the question of perfection, the issue of priority
must be addressed. If a court accepts Finance Company's argument
that its security interest in the returned bulldozer was perfected
against creditors of Dealer pursuant to revised section 9-402(7), the
priority analysis is straightforward. Section 9-306(5)(b) provides that
"[t]he security interest [of an unpaid transferee of chattel paper] is
prior to a security interest asserted under paragraph (a) to the extent
that the transferee of the chattel paper was entitled to priority under
Section 36-9-308. '7 77 Under this provision, Finance Company clearly is
entitled to priority in the returned bulldozer because it had priority
over Bank with respect to the chattel paper under revised section 9-
308(b).7 7 8 Bank's claim to the chattel paper was merely as proceeds of
inventory. 7 7 Therefore, Finance Company, which purchased the chat-
tel paper for new value and took possession in the ordinary course of
its business, would prime Bank as to the chattel paper, even if it had
knowledge of Bank's security interest. 8 °
The priority issue is more complex if the court finds that Finance
Company's security interest in the returned bulldozer is unperfected
against creditors of the dealer. One might reasonably assume that
Bank's perfected security interest primes the unperfected security in-
terest of Finance Company. The provisions of section 9-306(5), how-
ever, do not dictate this result. Section 9-306(5) appears to provide two
arguably inconsistent priority rules that could apply to the conflict be-
tween Bank and Finance Company. Finance Company can argue that
774. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-402(7)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
775. See, e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 8, T 10.02[2][a], at 10-26 to -27.
776. A repossession by a dealer, as opposed to a return to a dealer, lacks the element
of an exchange; but, it also appears to constitute a transfer of the goods by the debtor.
777. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
778. See supra notes 710-14 and accompanying text.
779. See supra notes 738-41 and accompanying text.
780. See supra notes 710-14 and accompanying text.
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section 9-306(5)(b) is the applicable priority rule,"'1 and that under
that provision Finance Company primes Bank despite the fact that Fi-
nance Company failed to perfect. In response Bank can argue that sec-
tion 9-306(5)(d) controls the resolution of the priority dispute. Section
9-306(5)(d) provides that "[a] security interest of an unpaid transferee
asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) must be perfected for protection
against creditors of the transferor and purchasers of the returned or
repossessed goods.1
7 2
If this provision controls the conflict over the returned bulldozer,
Bank is entitled to priority. Under section 1-201(12)713 Bank qualifies
as a creditor of Dealer. Since Finance Company's security interest in
the returned bulldozer is unperfected, under a literal application of
section 9-306(5)(d), Finance Company's security interest is not pro-
tected against Bank's claim to the returned bulldozer.
The apparent conflict between subsections 9-306(5)(b) and (d) has
produced a small body of case law, 78 4 including a recent decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court.78 5 Before these decisions are analyzed,
however, the basic Article 9 policies applicable to inventory financing
should be considered to see if they suggest a proper resolution of the
conflict depicted in Illustration 26.
Any argument in favor of awarding a chattel paper purchaser pri-
ority over an inventory financer with respect to returns and reposses-
sions must begin by considering the positions of the parties immedi-
ately before the return or repossession. Assuming that Contractor
qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course,786 Contractor took free of
Bank's security interest in the bulldozer. 787 Moreover, by permitting
Dealer to sell the resulting chattel paper to Finance Company, Bank
781. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.5, at 738-39.
782. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(d)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
783. U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(12) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
784. See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696 (8th
Cir. 1984); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 980 (W.D. Wash.), reconsidered, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1701
(W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd, 841 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1988); J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); see generally Commentary on
Section 9-306(5), supra note 745, at 1-6 (analyzing conflicting decisions and asserting
intended resolution).
785. Finance Am. Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460
(1987).
786. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(9) (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1989).
787. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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lost its prior claim to the chattel paper as proceeds.7 88 Therefore, until
the bulldozer was returned by Contractor, Bank's security was effec-
tively limited to a security interest in the cash proceeds realized by
Dealer upon the sale of the chattel paper.7 81
In contrast, immediately prior to the return of the bulldozer Fi-
nance Company had a prior claim to the chattel paper.7 9 0 By virtue of
its claim to the chattel paper, Finance Company was entitled to the
installment payments made by Contractor.7 11 Moreover, to the extent
that Contractor failed to make these payments, Finance Company had
a prior claim to the bulldozer. Thus, immediately before the return of
the bulldozer, and while Bank had no claim to the bulldozer, Finance
Company had a security interest in the bulldozer that protected Fi-
nance Company in the event Contractor failed to make the installment
payments.
Against this background, a compelling case can be made for af-
fording Finance Company a prior claim to the bulldozer upon its re-
turn to Dealer. Granting Finance Company a prior claim to the re-
turned bulldozer preserves Finance Company's secured position. 792 In
contrast, if Bank is awarded a prior claim in the returned bulldozer,
Bank's secured position is improved solely because of the return.
Moreover, this improvement in Bank's position is at the expense of
Finance Company. If Bank has a prior claim to the returned bulldozer,
it can claim both the bulldozer and the new value advanced by Finance
Company, leaving Finance Company without security. Therefore, the
Article 9 priority rules governing conflicts among inventory financers,
buyers of inventory in the ordinary course, and purchasers of the re-
sulting chattel paper provide a basis for awarding Finance Company
788. See U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(b)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
789. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) to (2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(1) to (2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also Northwest Acceptance Corp. v.
Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 980, 985 (W.D. Wash.), re-
considered, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1701 (W.D. Wash. 1986), afl'd, 841 F.2d
918 (9th Cir. 1988) (inventory financer's claim to returned' inventory defeated by claim to
same inventory by chattel paper financer).
790. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, T 10.02[2] [a], at 10-25.
791. Illustration 26 assumes a "modification" or "direct collection" arrangement
under which the account debtor, Contractor, is instructed to make payments directly to
the purchaser of the chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 2 (1972) (amended
1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308 comment 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). If Finance Com-
pany and Dealer had entered into a "nonnotification" or "indirect collection" arrange-
ment, Finance Company would have been entitled to collect the payments from Contrac-
tor upon Dealer's default. See U.C.C. § 9-502(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-9-502(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
792. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 806.
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priority in the returned bulldozer.
Awarding Finance Company priority in the returned bulldozer,
however, arguably is inconsistent with the policy effected by sections 9-
114(1)"' and 9-312(3).7 94 From Bank's perspective, the returned bull-
dozer is after-acquired property subject to its security interest. There-
fore, Bank might rely on the returned bulldozer by making a future
advance under the assumption that it had a prior claim. In analogous
situations, to protect an inventory financer from relying to its detri-
ment on after-acquired property, Article 9 conditions the priority af-
forded consignors795 and purchase money financers of new inventory.
796
In order to prime an earlier-filed inventory financer, a consignor or
purchase money financer must both file or perfect with respect to the
new inventory79 7 and give written notice799 to the earlier-filed inventory
financer before the debtor receives possession of the new inventory.1
9
Assuming the debtor deals in used goods, the problem confronting an
inventory financer when inventory is repossessed or returned is identi-
cal to the one that arises when inventory is acquired in a purchase
money transaction or by consignment. Therefore, the protection af-
forded the inventory financer arguably should be identical. Thus, in
principle, Finance Company's priority in the returned bulldozer should
be conditioned on Finance Company's filing with respect to the returns
and giving Bank notice of its security interest in returns before Dealer
obtains possession of the returned bulldozer. 00
The general priority rules applicable to inventory financing, there-
fore, indicate that a purchaser of chattel paper should be entitled to
priority over an inventory financer with respect to returns and repos-
sessions if, but only if, the chattel paper transferee perfects with re-
spect to and gives the inventory financer prior written notice of its
claim in returns and repossessions. The language of section 9-306(5),
however, cannot be interpreted as imposing this rule. Unless the repos-
session or return can be classified as a consignment of the goods by the
793. U.C.C. § 9-114(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-114(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
794. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); see Barnes, supra note 745, at 378-79; Kripke, supra note 745, at 17-
20.
795. See supra note 346 and text accompanying note 362.
796. See supra notes 114-291 and accompanying text.
797. See U.C.C. §§ 9-114(1)(a), -312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
36-9-114(1)(a), -312(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
798. U.C.C. §§ 9-114(1)(b) to (d), -312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-9-114(1)(b) to (d), -312(3)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
799. See supra notes 114-291, 346, 362 and accompanying text.
800. See Kripke, supra note 745, at 19-20.
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chattel paper purchaser, 0 1 the priority of the chattel paper purchaser
cannot be conditioned upon prior written notice to the inventory fi-
nancer. Nevertheless, satisfaction of the perfection requirement of sec-
tion 9-306(5)(d) can be interpreted as a condition on the priority af-
forded the transferee of chattel paper under section 9-306(5)(b). 0 2 The
perfection requirement provides the inventory financer some notice not
to rely upon the returned or repossessed goods by making a future ad-
vance."0 3 Thus, section 9-306(5) would conform to the priority rules of
801. See Home Say. Ass'n v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 101 Nev. 595, 708 P.2d 280
(1985).
802. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696 (8th Cir.
1984); Finance Am. Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460 (1987).
803. Revised Article 9 includes a variety of rules to protect an earlier-filed secured
party, who may rely on after-acquired property by making a future advance, against the
claims of a subsequent financer who gives new value. The most protective provision is
section 9-313(6), which precludes a fixture financer from asserting the purchase money
priority of revised section 9-313(4)(a) over the lien of an earlier-recorded construction
mortgage. See U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-313(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Next in order of protection are the rules of revised sections 9-
114(1) and 9-312(3), which provide two conditions to be met before a consignor and
purchase money inventory financer can be afforded priority over an earlier-filed inven-
tory financer claiming the goods as after-acquired property. They must both file and give
written notice to the prior inventory financer before the consignor or debtor obtains pos-
session of the new inventory. See U.C.C. §§ 9-114(1), -312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-114(1), -312(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
Next in order of protection is the rule of revised section 9-314(3)(c), which condi-
tions an accession financer's priority over a prior secured party claiming a security inter-
est in the whole to the extent the secured party has made an advance after the accession
is installed, upon perfecting with respect to the accession before the advance is made.
See U.C.C. § 9-314(3)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-314(3)(c) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). Finally, revised section 9-312(4) illustrates the least protective rule.
Under this section, the priority afforded a purchase money financer of goods, other than
inventory, over a conflicting security interest is conditioned on the purchase money fi-
nancer's perfecting within 10 days after debtor receives possession of the new goods. See
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(4) (Law. Co-op.
Supp, 1989). The Code provides in section 9-313(4)(a) a similar rule, which applies to
purchase money financers of fixtures in conflict with real estate interests other than con-
struction mortgages that arose before the goods became fixtures. Under revised section 9-
313(4)(a), a fixture financer's purchase money priority is conditioned on making a fixture
filing before the goods become fixtures or within 10 days thereafter. See U.C.C. § 9-
313(4)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-314(4)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989); see generally supra text accompanying notes 138-61 (comparative analysis of vari-
ous conditions upon purchase money priority).
Interpreting section 9-306(5)(d) as conditioning a chattel paper purchaser's priority
in returns upon perfection in goods against the seller would provide a rule comparable to
revised sections 9-312(4) and 9-313(4)(a). The chattel paper purchaser could claim an
automatically perfected security interest in the returns for 10 days under revised section
9-306(3) on the theory that the returns were proceeds of the chattel paper. See sources
cited supra note 750. Continuing its perfection in the returns would require the chattel
[Vol. 41
166
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss2/4
CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
Article 9 if subsection (b) were interpreted as awarding an unpaid
transferee of chattel paper priority in returns and repossessions, pro-
vided the transferee satisfies the perfection requirement of subsection
(d).
The courts are divided over the resolution of the conflict depicted
in Illustration 26. In a decision consistent with" the position of most
commentators,804 the court in J.L Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Accept-
ance Corp.s05 awarded priority to the chattel paper transferee under
section 9-306(5)(b), despite the transferee's failure to perfect with re-
gard to returns and repossessions. The court reasoned that the perfec-
tion requirement of section 9-306(5)(d) applied only to interests which
arose after the goods were returned or repossessed, and hence was in-
applicable to a prior inventory financer asserting a security interest
under section 9-306(5)(a). 06 In contrast, the court in Crocker National
Bank v. Clark Equipment Credit Corp.8 07 held that under section 9-
306(5)(d) a chattel paper transferee's failure to perfect in returns and
repossessions rendered its security interest subordinate to an inventory
financer claiming the goods under section 9-306(5)(a)."'8 Significantly,
in Finance America Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Co.,809 the
South Carolina Supreme Court followed the decision in Crocker Na-
tional Bank.
In Finance America, Galaxy retained a security interest in boats it
manufactured and sold to a dealer for retail sale. In apparent compli-
ance with the applicable certificate of title statue, 10 Galaxy perfected
its security interest in the dealer's inventory by retaining the original
certificate of title to the boats.8l ' The dealer sold a boat to purchasers,
the Marions, under a credit sale contract, which the dealer subse-
quently sold to Finance America. Although the opinion does not state
paper purchaser to file against the seller with respect to the returns or take possession of
the returned goods prior to the expiration of the 10 day period.
804. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 10.02[2][b], at 10-27 to -32; 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 56, § 27.5, at 738-39; see also Commentary on Section 9-306(5), supra note 745, at 6
(concluding section 9-306(5) awards priority to the chattel paper transferee and propos-
ing a new comment to clarify drafters' intent).
805. 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); see supra note 745 (arguing that J.L Case
should not have been resolved under section 9-306(5)).
806. J.L Case Co., 669 S.W.2d at 547; see also Northwest Acceptance Corp. v.
Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 980, 984 (W.D. Wash.), re-
considered, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1710 (W.D. Wash. 1986), afl'd, 841 F.2d
918 (9th Cir. 1988).
807. 724 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1984).
808. Id. at 700.
809. 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460 (1987).
810. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-23-50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
811. Finance Am., 292 S.C. at 495, 357 S.E.2d at 460.
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that Finance America took possession of the contract, it is reasonable
to assume it did. Finance America then filed a financing statement cov-
ering the boat. The opinion, however, does not expressly state whether
this financing statement was filed against the Marions or the dealer.
Nevertheless, the clear indication drawn from the opinion is that the
financing statement was filed against the Marions.
Subsequently, the Marions revoked acceptance of the boat and
agreed to return it to Finance America in exchange for release from the
credit contract. The boat, however, was at the dealer's place of busi-
ness for repairs, and while there was repossessed by Galaxy to enforce
its security interest. Finance America then brought a claim and deliv-
ery action against Galaxy asserting that it had a prior security interest
in the boat under former section 9-308 and section 9-306(5)(b). Al-
though Finance America prevailed on this theory in the trial court, the
supreme court ruled in favor of Galaxy on the grounds that Finance
America's security interest in the returned boat was not perfected.812
The court in Finance America ruled that compliance with the
South Carolina Certificate of Title Statute covering watercraft8 13 pro-
vided the exclusive method for perfecting security interests in the boat
at issue.814 Therefore, the court held that Finance America's security
interest was unperfected 85 and apparently found that Galaxy's secur-
ity interest was perfected.s 6 That Finance America's security interest
812. Id. at 496-97, 357 S.E.2d at 460-61.
813. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 50-23-50(a), -140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
814. Finance Am., 292 S.C. at 496, 357 S.E.2d at 461.
815. Id.
816. Although the court found that Galaxy had retained the original certificate of
title covering the boat, id. at 495, 357 S.E.2d at 460, the court did not expressly hold that
Galaxy's security interest was perfected. Under the law applicable when the transaction
arose, Galaxy's attempted perfection through the certificate was proper. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-302(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988). Significantly, neither former sec-
tion 36-9-302(3)(b) and (4) nor the certificate of title statute applicable to watercraft,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 50-23-10 to -280 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989), excluded security
interests in goods held as inventory by a dealer from perfection under the certificate of
title statute. To be perfected under the certificate of title statute, however, it appears
that Galaxy had to have its security interest indicated on the certificate. See S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-23-50(a) to (b)(1), -90(a)(3), -140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 50-23-140(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1984) (providing that a secur-
ity interest in a watercraft is perfected by delivering to the Wildlife and Marine Re-
sources Department an application for a certificate of title containing the name of the
secured party). Therefore, unless Galaxy's security interest was indicated on the certifi-
cate of title, its security interest apparently was unperfected.
If Galaxy had properly perfected in the boat as inventory of the dealer, its security
interest apparently would have remained perfected when the boat was returned. Section
9-306(5)(a) provides that if the security interest of an inventory financer was "originally
perfected by a filing which is still effective" when the goods are returned, the security
interest in the returned goods continues to have perfected status. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a)
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was unperfected would not have subordinated its claim if the court had
adopted the plaintiff's interpretation of section 9-306(5)(b).8 11 Finance
(1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Sec-
tion 9-306(5)(a), however, further provides that "in any other case" (which would include
a case in which the security interest was not originally perfected by filing), an inventory
financer must take possession of the returned goods or file to continue its perfected sta-
tus. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(a) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
A literal reading of section 9-306(5)(a) suggests that since Galaxy's security interest
was originally perfected through the certificate of title statute rather than by filing, its
security interest in the returned boat was not continually perfected without further ac-
tion. This suggestion, however, must be rejected. Compliance with a mandatory certifi-
cate of title statute is the legal equivalent of filing. Revised section 9-302(4) provides
that "[c]ompliance with a statute . . . described in subsection (3) [i.e., a mandatory cer-
tificate of title statute] is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this
chapter... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Although South
Carolina's 1966 enactment of the 1962 Official Text did not expressly so provide, under
South Carolina Code section 36-11-108, the 1988 amendment to section 36-9-302(4)
should be considered as declaratory of the meaning of South Carolina's 1966 version of
the Uniform Commercial Code. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-11-108 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989).
If Galaxy did not comply with the requirements of the certificate of title statute, it
arguably still perfected its security interest in the boat through possession when it repos-
sessed the dealer's inventory. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-9-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Whether Galaxy's possession of the boat perfected
the security interest, however, is at least debatable. Former section 36-9-302(3)(b) pro-
vided that "[tihe filing provisions of this chapter [Article 9] do not apply to a security
interest in property subject to a statute . . . which requires indication in a certificate of
title." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
Read in isolation, this provision suggests that notation on a certificate of title dis-
placed perfection by filing only, and that perfection by possession remains viable. See,
e.g., Transport Acceptance Corp. v. Crosby (In re Crosby), 19 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982). Former section 36-9-302(3)(b), however, cannot be read in isolation. Former
section 36-9-302(4) provided that "[a] security interest in property covered by a statute
described in subsection (3) [could] be perfected only . . . by indication of the security
interest on a certificate of titld." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(amended 1988); see U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (1962) (amended 1977). In light of subsection (4),
it is difficult to conclude that the certificate of title statute does not displace perfection
by possession under Article 9. But see Mack Fin. Corp. v. Peterbilt, Inc. (In re Glenn),
20 Bankr. 98, 101 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (holding that if repairman had maintained
possession of truck, repairman's lien would have had priority over secured party who
perfected under certificate of title statute).
Moreover, the court in Finance America indicated that the certificate of title statute
provided the exclusive method of perfection. See Finance Am., 292 S.C. at 496, 357
S.E.2d at 461. In cases in which the applicable certificate of title statute was the exclu-
sive manner of perfection of a security interest, the courts have held that a secured
party's taking possession of the collateral is not effective to perfect its security interest.
See, e.g., Bucci v. IRS, 653 F. Supp. 479 (D.R.I. 1987); Waldschmidt v. Associates Comm.
Corp. (In re Groves), 75 Bankr. 227 (M.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Davis, 57 Bankr. 351
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1985).
817. See supra text accompanying notes 804-06, 812.
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America apparently primed Galaxy with respect to the credit sale con-
tract under former section 9-308.818 Therefore, if section 9-306(5)(b)
were the exclusive provision governing priorities in returns, Finance
America would have prevailed with respect to the returned boat.
In Finance America, however, the court rejected the plaintiff's
theory and with little independent analysis adopted the reasoning of
the Eighth Circuit in Crocker National Bank v. Clark Equipment
Credit Corp.""' The court in Finance America held that under section
9-306(5)(d) Finance America's failure to perfect its security interest in
the returned boat precluded it from prevailing over Galaxy. s20 Relying
on section 9-306(5)(a), the court then awarded priority to Galaxy.821 In
essence, the decision in Finance America can be read as conditioning a
chattel paper purchaser's priority over an inventory financer, with re-
spect to returns, on the chattel paper purchaser satisfying both section
9-306(5)(b) and the perfection requirement of section 9-306(5)(d).
Two aspects of the decision in Finance America merit discussion.
First, the opinion raises a number of issues concerning the perfection
of security interests in inventory and returns of goods subject to certifi-
cate of title statutes. Second, the decision to condition a chattel paper
purchaser's priority over an inventory financer, with respect to returns,
on the chattel paper purchaser's perfection in the returns must be ana-
lyzed with reference to the basic policies evidenced by the Article 9
general priority rules governing inventory financing.
The decision in Finance America turned on the court's conclusion
that Finance America's filing was ineffective to perfect its security in-
terest. This conclusion raises several issues concerning the relationship
between the perfection requirements of Article 9 and perfection pursu-
ant to an applicable certificate of title statute. The court in Finance
America failed to analyze these issues fully under then applicable law.
More significantly, the adoption of the 1988 Amendments to the Uni-
form Commercial Code has had a substantial impact on the resolution
of these issues.
The first perfection issue raised in Finance America is whether
Finance America had a perfected security interest in the returned boat
under the law in effect when the case arose. The resolution of this
818. Former section 9-308 was revised for clarification and the revised provision
does not change the rights of purchasers of chattel paper. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308
reporter's note (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Under revised section 9-308(b) Finance Com-
pany is entitled to priority. See generally supra text accompanying notes 699-745 (analy-
sis of priority offered to possessory security interests in chattel paper).
819. See Finance Am., 292 S.C. at 496-97, 357 S.E.2d at 460-61, relying on Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1984).
820. Finance Am., 292 S.C. at 496-97, 357 S.E.2d at 460-61.
821. Id. at 497, 357 S.E.2d at 461.
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question turned on the interplay between the certificate of title statute
covering watercraft and the 1966 South Carolina version of the U.C.C.
then in effect. Former section 36-9-302(3)(b) and (4)822 defined the re-
lationship between the perfection requirements of Article 9 and the
certificate of title statute. Former section 36-9-302(3)(b) provided that
the filing provisions of Article 9 did not apply to a security interest in
goods subject to a mandatory certificate of title statute. 2 3 Moreover,
former section 36-9-302(4) provided that a security interest in goods
subject to a mandatory certificate of title statute could be perfected
only by indication of the security interest on the certificate of title.
8 24
The court then reasoned that because the certificate of title stat-
ute required a lien to be indicated on the certificate of title, former
sections 36-9-302(3)(b) and (4) rendered Finance America's filing inef-
fective to perfect its security interest.2 5 The court clearly was correct
to the extent that it held the financing statement apparently filed
against the Marions was ineffective to perfect Finance America's secur-
ity interest against creditors of the Marions. Moreover, even if the fil-
ing had been effective against creditors of the Marions, most authori-
ties agree that the filing would have been ineffective against creditors
of the dealer following the return of the boat. 26 Therefore, if the fi-
nancing statement filed by Finance America listed the Marions as the
debtor, the court was on firm ground in holding that Finance America's
security interest in the returned boat was unperfected.
The second perfection issue raised in Finance America concerns
the manner in which Finance America should have perfected its secur-
822. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(3)(b), (4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988). For-
mer subsections (3)(b) and (4) provided:
(3) The filing provisions of this chapter do not apply to a security interest
in property subject to a statute
(b) of this State which provides for central filing of, or which requires indi-
cation in a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the filing provisions of § 30-11-20, Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1976, for a security interest in property of any description or
any interest therein created by a mortgage made by a railroad company as
defined in § 58-17-20, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976.
(4) A security interest in property covered by a statute described in sub-
section (3) can be perfected only by registration or filing under that statute or
by indication of the security interest on a certificate or title or a duplicate
thereof by a public official.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(3)(b), (4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
823. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
824. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
825. Finance Am., 292 S.C. at 496-97, 357 S.E.2d at 461.
826. See, e.g., B.CLARK, supra note 8, 10.02 [2][a], at 10-23 to -27. But see supra
notes 768-73 and accompanying text (section 9-402(7) argument).
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ity interest in the returned boat. More specifically, the question
presented is whether Finance America would have been perfected in
the returned boat if it had filed a financing statement listing the dealer
as the debtor. The resolution of this question depends on the water-
craft certificate of title statute and the provisions of former section 36-
9-302.
Most certificate of title statutes include an exception for goods
held by a dealer as inventory. 27 For example, the South Carolina Mo-
tor Vehicle Certificate of Title Statute does not control the perfection
of a security interest created in a vehicle by a dealer who holds the
vehicle for sale.828 As a result, former section 36-9-302(3)(b) and (4) did
not apply to security interests in the inventory of a car dealer, and
such security interests were perfected pursuant to the filing provisions
of Article 9.829 Since goods returned to a dealer become inventory upon
their return, a person who purchased chattel paper from an automobile
dealer could perfect a security interest in returns by filing against the
dealer. Nevertheless, under the law in effect when Finance America
was decided, Finance America could not have perfected its security in-
terest in the returned boat by filing against the dealer. Curiously, the
South Carolina Watercraft Certificate of Title Statute does not contain
an exception for goods held by a dealer as inventory. As a result, when
Finance America was decided, security interests in a boat dealer's in-
ventory had to be perfected under the certificate of title statute by
indicating the security interest on the certificate of title. Therefore, to
perfect its security interest in the returned boat, Finance America
should have indicated its security interest on the boat's certificate of
title. Certificate of title statutes, however, contemplate in rem perfec-
tion and not perfection against particular debtors. 830 Therefore, if a
certificate of title had been issued to the Marions indicating Finance
America's security interest as the retail financer, Finance America
would have been perfected against creditors of the dealer when the
Marions returned the boat.
The next perfection issue is whether the adoption of the 1988
Amendments to South Carolina's version of the U.C.C. affected the
manner in which a chattel paper purchaser perfects a security interest
in boats returned to a boat dealer. Revised section 36-9-302(3)(b) s3'
provides that the filing of a financing statement is neither necessary
nor effective to perfect a security interest in goods subject to either the
827. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 829.
828. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-610(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
829. See In re Sea Island Motor Sales, Inc., 72 Bankr. 170 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986).
830. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 828.
831. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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motor vehicle or watercraft certificate of title statutes. Revised section
36-9-302(3)(b), however, has an express exception for inventory. The
exception provides that "during any period in which collateral is inven-
tory held for sale by a person who is in the business of selling goods of
that kind, the filing provisions of this chapter (Part 4) apply to a secur-
ity interest in that collateral created by him as debtor .... 831
In effect, this exception amends the watercraft certificate of title
statute to require inventory financers of boat dealers to perfect their
security interests by filing under Article 9, rather than by having their
security interests indicated on the certificate of title. Moreover, revised
section 36-9-302(3)(b) apparently requires chattel paper purchasers,
such as Finance America, to perfect their security interests in returns
by filing against the dealer.8 33 Thus, to be fully protected a purchaser
of chattel paper covering goods subject to a certificate of title statute
must take possession of the chattel paper, 34 have its security interest
indicated on the certificate of title, 35 and file against the dealer with
respect to returns.
36
To explore this issue further, consider the plight of a chattel paper
purchaser that has its security interest indicated upon the certificate of
title but fails to file with respect to returns. Specifically, what can the
chattel paper purchaser argue under the revised Article 9 to claim that
its security interest in a returned vehicle or boat is perfected, and
hence entitled to priority under the interpretation of section 36-9-
306(5) adopted by the court in Finance America? If the chattel paper
purchaser acts promptly upon the return of the goods, the chattel pa-
832. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
833. Cf. In re Haugabook Auto Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga.), afl'd, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1095 (M.D. Ga. 1971) (chattel paper
purchaser with a lien noted on a certificate of title must file against dealer with respect
to returned vehicles because the certificate of title does not apply to vehicles held as
inventory). But see infra text accompanying notes 838-40 (section 9-402(7) argument).
834. By taking possession of the chattel paper, a purchaser of chattel paper for new
value can establish priority in the chattel paper over an inventory financer claiming the
paper merely as proceeds under revised section 36-9-308(b). See supra notes 697-701,
710-13 and accompanying text.
835. By having its security interest in the goods indicated on the certificate of title,
the chattel paper purchaser perfects its security interest in the goods against creditors of
the buyer. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
302(3)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-23-50(a), -140(a) (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
836. By filing against the dealer with respect to returned goods the chattel paper
purchaser perfects its security interest in the goods against creditors of the dealer. See
supra notes 831-33 and accompanying text. Moreover, under Finance America, 292 S.C.
494, 357 S.E.2d 460, such perfection appears essential to establishing priority over an
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per purchaser can assert that the returned goods are proceeds of the
chattel paper,83 7 and that the security interest in the returned goods is
automatically perfected for ten days . 38 Then, within the ten-day pe-
riod, the chattel paper purchaser can file against the dealer with re-
spect to the boat.
The question becomes more interesting, however, if the chattel pa-
per purchaser does not file within the ten-day period. Under these
facts the chattel paper purchaser apparently has two arguments. First,
the chattel paper purchaser can argue that revised section 36-9-
302(3)(b) does not except security interests arising under section 36-9-
306(5)(b) from the certificate of title statute. The exception in revised
section 36-9-302(3)(b) applies to security interests in goods created by
the dealer as debtor. 3 9 The chattel paper purchaser can argue that the
dealer as debtor created a security interest in the chattel paper but not
the goods. The chattel paper purchaser would then assert that the se-
curity interest in the boat arose as a matter of law under section 9-
306(5)(b).
Since the security interest in the returned boat was created by
statute, rather than by the dealer, the chattel paper purchaser will ar-
gue that perfection in the returned boat is controlled by the certificate
of title statute rather than Article 9. Moreover, since perfection of a
security interest under the certificate of title statute is in rem, the
chattel paper purchaser can assert that the indication of a security in-
terest on the certificate of title issued in the buyer's name is sufficient
to perfect the security interest in the returned boat. The weakness in
this argument is that by creating a security interest in the chattel pa-
per, the dealer necessarily created a security interest in the proceeds of
the chattel paper.840 Moreover, section 9-306(5)(b) can be read as sim-
ply affirming the fact that a chattel paper purchaser obtains a security
interest in returned goods as proceeds of the chattel paper.841
The second argument concedes that perfection in the returned
goods is governed by Article 9. Under this argument the chattel paper
purchaser argues that perfection against the buyer under the certificate
of title statute is effective against the dealer as a transferee of the boat
under revised section 9-402(7).842 Revised section 9-402(7) provides
that "[a] filed financing statement remains effective with respect to
collateral transferred by the debtor even though the secured party
837. See supra note 750 and accompanying text.
838. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
839. See supra text accompanying note 832.
840. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 799.
841. See id.
842. See supra notes 768-73 and accompanying text.
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knows of or consents to the transfer." '4 3 The chattel paper purchaser
can argue that under revised section 9-302(4) the notation of its secur-
ity interest on the certificate of title is the legal equivalent of filing a
financing statement,8 4 4 and that the return of the goods to the dealer
constitutes a transfer by the debtor within the meaning of revised sec-
tion 9-402(7).
If a court accepts these arguments, a chattel paper purchaser's
perfection in the goods sold against creditors of the buyer will perfect
the security interest in the goods against creditors of the dealer when
the goods are returned to the dealer. Significantly, acceptance of these
arguments would avoid the effect of Finance America. Because the
chattel paper purchaser's security interest in the goods remains per-
fected following their return under revised section 9-402(7), the chattel
paper purchaser satisfies the requirements of section 9-306(5)(d).
Therefore, even under the holding in Finance America, the chattel pa-
per purchaser can establish priority over an inventory financer of the
dealer under section 9-306(5)(b).
Transcending the perfection issues raised by the certificate of title
statute, Finance America is clear in holding that an unpaid transferee
of chattel paper must perfect in returns to claim priority over an in-
ventory financer asserting a perfected security interest under section 9-
306(5)(a). Therefore, unless the court accepts the revised section 9-
402(7) perfection argument discussed above,845 a court applying South
Carolina law would resolve Illustration 26 in favor of Bank.
Although most commentators would resolve the problem in favor
of Finance Company under section 9-306(5)(b), despite its failure to
perfect, 46 the decision in Finance America represents a sound accom-
modation of the conflicting policies reflected in the basic priority rules
governing inventory financing. The decision does not preclude an un-
paid transferee of chattel paper from priming an inventory financer
when the underlying goods are returned or possessed. By meeting the
perfection requirements of section 9-306(5)(d), the chattel paper trans-
feree can extend the new value priority in the chattel paper to the re-
turned or repossessed inventory. Moreover, by conditioning a chattel
paper transferee's subsection (b) priority upon satisfaction of the sub-
section (d) perfection requirements, the court in Finance America af-
forded inventory financers some notice of the chattel paper transferee's
843. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-402(7) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
844. See supra note 810.
845. See supra notes 768-73, 842-44 and accompanying text.
846. See, e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 10.02[2][a], at 10-23 to -37; 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 56, § 27.5, at 739.
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claim to the returned goods. Therefore, the decision affords inventory
financers some protection against making future advances in reliance
upon returned inventory upon which a chattel paper transferee has a
prior claim .
47
Unless the chattel paper transferee has filed a financing statement.
against the dealer covering returns, the inventory financer can make an
advance secured by the returns with the assurance that it will be enti-
tled to priority. If the chattel paper transferee files with respect to re-
turns, the inventory financer is put on notice that it must investigate
the manner in which the debtor acquired the additional inventory. If
the inventory financer discovers that the additional inventory consti-
tutes returns, the inventory financer should not rely on the goods.
The mechanics of complying with the requirements of section 9-
306(5)(d) raise several issues. First, although an inventory financer
would be more effectively protected if the chattel paper transferee
were required to give the inventory financer prior written notice of its
security interest in the specific returned or repossessed goods, section
9-306(5) does not condition the transferee's priority under section 9-
306(5)(b) upon the giving of notice to the inventory financer s48 More-
over, although a financing statement listing the specific goods in which
the chattel paper transferee claims a security interest under section 9-
306(5)(b) would provide a more effective warning to the inventory fi-
nancer, a blanket financing statement covering all returns and repos-
sessions apparently satisfies the requirements of section 9-306(5)(d).
8 49
The time at which a chattel paper transferee must file to comply
with section 9-306(5)(d) also presents a problem. Gilmore has argued
that from the perspective of the chattel paper transferee, returns are
proceeds of the chattel paper. 50 If this argument is accepted, the chat-
tel paper transferee's security interest in the returns is automatically
perfected for ten days under revised section 9-306(3). s51 Therefore,
under Gilmore's analysis, the chattel paper transferee's filing is timely
and preserves its priority if made within ten days after the goods are
returned or repossessed. Treating the returns as proceeds, however,
gives the chattel paper transferee a secret but prior lien on the returns.
This lien may prejudice the inventory financer if it makes a future ad-
vance before the chattel paper transferee files. Therefore, a court
would act rationally if it refused to find that returns are proceeds of
847. See Kripke, supra note 745, at 19-20.
848. But see infra notes 853-63 and accompanying text (treatment of return as a
consignment subject to notice requirements of revised section 9-114).
849. See Kripke, supra note 745, at 14 ("professional financers of chatel paper...
now routinely file in advance to claim a security interest in returns").
850. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.5, at 737.
851. See supra notes 450-51 and accompanying text.
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The lesson to be drawn from Illustration 26 and Finance America
is that a chattel paper transferee should file against the transferor with
respect to returns. Finance America, however, does not increase the
burden borne by a chattel paper transferee. Even if a chattel paper
transferee primed an inventory financer with respect to returns with-
out meeting the perfection requirements of section 9-30645)(d), the
transferee would have to file to prevail over subsequent creditors of the
transferor, including the bankruptcy trustee.85 2 Thus, Finance America
merely gives the chattel paper transferee an additional reason to file
with respect to returns.
A final issue related to Illustration 26 is whether a chattel paper
transferee who complies with the perfection requirement of section 9-
306(5)(d) can lose to an inventory financer on the grounds that a re-
turn constituted a consignment to the debtor by the transferee. If the
return is a consignment, the chattel paper transferee must satisfy the
requirements of new section 9-114(1) to prevail over the inventory fi-
nancer.8 53 Section 9-114 conditions a consignor's priority over the con-
signee's inventory financer upon the satisfying of two requirements.
First, the consignor must file a financing statement before the con-
signee receives possession of the goods.s5 Second, the consignor must
give a filed inventory financer written notice of the consignment, which
must be received by the inventory financer before its consignee re-
ceives possession of the goods.s 55 If section 9-114 applies to a chattel
paper transferee, in order to prevail over an inventory financer with
respect to returns and repossessions the transferee would have to file
against the dealer with respect to returns and repossessions and give
the inventory financer written notice before the goods at issue were
returned to the possession of the dealer.s5
852. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Nixon Mach. Co., (In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 6
Bankr. 847, 852 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Haugabook Auto Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.), affd, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1095
(M.D. Ga. 1971).
853. See supra notes 361-68 and accompanying text.
854. U.C.C. § 9-114(l)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-114(1)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
855. U.C.C. § 9-114(1)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
114(1)(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
856. See Home Say. Ass'n v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 101 Nev. 595, 708 P.2d 280
(1985); see also Buchanan v. Mobile Home Guar. Corp. (In re International Mobile
Homes), 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1974) (defendant
could not prevail over bankruptcy trustee because the property was in dealer's posses-
sion and defendant had not given the notice required by Article 9); In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 242 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1970) (finance company could not
prevail over bankruptcy trustee because goods were in possession of dealer and no notice
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The critical question is whether a return or repossession consti-
tutes a consignment within the scope of section 9-114. If the chattel
paper transferee owned the goods at issue when they were returned to
the dealer, the return can be viewed as a consignment. For example, if
the purchaser of a conditional sales contract repossesses the goods
upon the buyer's default and retains the goods in satisfaction of its
assigned security interest, a subsequent transfer of the goods to the
dealer for resale would appear to be a consignment. The court in Home
Savings Association v. General Electric Credit Corp.,s 7 however,
found a consignment under less compelling facts. In Home Savings the
chattel paper transferee repossessed the goods from the buyers, but did
not retain the goods in satisfaction of its security interest. Rather, the
chattel paper transferee returned the goods to the dealer for the pur-
pose of resale to enforce its security interest. Although the chattel pa-
per transferee's interest in the returned goods was merely a security
interest, the court found that the return was a consignment.8 5 Because
the chattel paper transferee had not satisfied the requirements of sec-
tions 2-326(3) s59 and 9-114(1), the court awarded the priority in the
returned goods to the dealer's inventory financer s60
Under the facts presented in Home Savings, the consignment
analysis does not appear inappropriate. More significantly, the applica-
tion of section 9-306(5) to resolve the conflict therein would have been
inappropriate.8 1 Although the chattel paper transferee had repos-
sessed the goods and delivered them to the dealer for the purpose of
sale, title to the goods remained in the buyer. 62 The dealer's mere pos-
session with the power to sell did not constitute sufficient rights in the
repossessed goods for the inventory financer's security interest to at-
tach." 3 Therefore, section 9-306(5)(a) should not be interpreted to
grant the inventory financer a security interest.864 If the inventory fi-
nancer cannot claim a security interest in the repossessed goods, a con-
of finance company's security interest had been filed).
857. 101 Nev. 595, 708 P.2d 280 (1985).
858. Id. at 599-604, 708 P.2d at 284-86.
859. See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text.
860. Home Sav., 101 Nev. at 604, 708 P.2d at 286.
861. See Kripke, supra note 745, at 12.
862. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-504(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
863. See A. Lassberg & Co. v. Atlantic Cotton Co., 291 S.C. 161, 352 S.E.2d 501 (Ct.
App. 1986); see also authorities cited supra note 415.
864. See Kripke, supra note 745, at 12; see also Commentary on Section 9-306(5),
supra note 745, at 2-3 (dealer must have rights in the collateral to claim a security inter-
est in returned or repossessed goods, and implying that simple repossession by dealer or
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flict within the scope of section 9-306(5) is not present.
Admittedly, the consignment analysis of Home Savings is some-
what strained. In a typical consignment the owner of the goods delivers
them to a consignee for the purpose of sale. 6 5 In Home Savings the
chattel paper transferee, who held only a security interest in repos-
sessed goods, delivered them to the dealer. Nevertheless, upon the
buyer's default, the chattel paper transferee was entitled to possession
of the goods,86 6 and upon repossessing them was under an obligation to
the debtor to dispose of them in a commercially reasonable manner.
8 67
Therefore, is not unreasonable to view the chattel paper transferee as
acting on behalf of the buyer in delivering the goods to the dealer for
sale. Moreover, since the dealer presumably maintained a place of bus-
iness at which the dealer dealt in goods of that kind under a name
other than that of the chattel paper transferee, the transaction falls
within the scope of section 2-326(3).668 More significantly, from the
perspective of the dealer's inventory financer, the transaction gave rise
to the same problem of apparent ownership that flows from a consign-
ment.8 8  Unless the inventory financer had prior notice of an adverse
claim to the goods, it may make an advance against the goods on the
assumption that they constitute after-acquired inventory subject to its
security interest. Therefore, it is reasonable to condition the chattel
paper transferee's claim to the repossessed goods upon compliance
with notification requirements sections 2-326(3) and 9-114
°.87
Although the consignment analysis adopted in Home Savings is
defensible,8 17 at last one court has viewed the decision as "aberrant.
8 72
Nevertheless, the lesson to be drawn from Home Savings is clear: when
a chattel paper purchaser repossesses goods upon a buyer's default and
delivers them to the dealer, or simply authorizes the dealer to repos-
sess the goods on behalf of the chattel paper purchaser, the chattel
paper purchaser should comply with the requirements of section 9-
114(1). The chattel paper purchaser should not only file against the
dealer with respect to returns and repossessions at the time of the
purchase of the chattel paper, but also give the inventory financer
865. See generally supra text accompanying notes 335-43 (attributes of true
consignment).
866. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-503 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989).
867. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-504(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
868. See supra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
869. See supra notes 344-46 and accompanying text.
870. See Kripke, supra note 745, at 13 n.37.
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timely written notice of its security interest in returns and
repossessions.
Illustration 26 and the analysis above assumed that Contractor,
the buyer of the bulldozer, qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course.
As a result, under section 9-307(1), s8 3 Dealer's sale to Contractor had
the effect of discharging Bank's original se6urity interest in the bull-
dozer.17 Therefore, in the conflict depicted in Illustration 26, Bank
claimed a security interest in the returned bulldozer only pursuant to
section 9-306(5)(a).17 5 A more complex priority conflict between an in-
ventory financer and a chattel paper purchaser arises when the
debtor's sale of the inventory which generated the chattel paper does
not discharge the inventory financer's security interest.
In most situations an inventory financer cannot look to the inven-
tory as collateral after it has been sold by the debtor. An inventory
financer typically will authorize the debtor to sell the collateral.8 76 If a
sale of inventory is authorized, section 9-306(2) s87 provides that the in-
ventory financer's security interest does not continue in the goods fol-
lowing their sale. Moreover, even if the debtor's sale was unauthorized
and section 9-306(2) does not shield the buyer from the security inter-
est of the inventory financer, the buyer will take free of that security
interest under section 9-307(1)878 if the buyer qualifies as a buyer in
the ordinary course. 7 9 The protection afforded a buyer, however, is not
absolute. If the debtor's sale was unauthorized and the buyer does not
qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course, the buyer acquires the goods
subject to the inventory financer's security interest.s8 0 In short, in such
cases the inventory financer has priority over the buyer.
The discussion which follows will consider priority conflicts be-
tween an inventory financer who has priority over the buyer and the
buyer'3 retail financer. This analysis begins by considering a dispute
between an inventory financer and a purchaser of chattel paper over
873. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
874. See supra notes 14, 443 and accompanying text.
875. Bank also could have claimed a security interest in the returned bulldozer
under an after-acquired property clause. See supra note 745 and accompanying text. The
significant point, however, is that the sale discharged Bank's security interest and that
the security interest did not reattach until the goods were returned.
876. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 87, at 1066.
877. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
878. See supra notes 14, 443 and accompanying text.
879. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(9) (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1989) (defining "buyer in the ordinary course of business").
880. See, e.g., United States v. Handy & Harman, 750 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1984); O.M.
Scott Credit Corp. v. Apex, Inc., 97 R.I. 442, 198 A.2d 673 (1964).
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ILLUSTRATION 27-Manufacturer produces bulldozers and markets
its product through a network of authorized dealers. On January 1
Manufacturer granted D Corporation a dealership. Under the dealer-
ship contract Manufacturer agreed to sell D Corporation its require-
ments of bulldozers. On January 1 the parties also executed a security
agreement that granted Manufacturer a security interest in all bull-
dozers sold by Manufacturer to D Corporation to secure D Corpora-
tion's obligation to pay the purchase price of the bulldozers. The se-
curity agreement also provided that any sale by D Corporation of an
encumbered bulldozer without obtaining Manufacturer's prior written
consent was unauthorized and an event of default. Finally on January
1, Manufacturer filed a financing statement to perfect its security in-
terest in the bulldozers it would sell to D Corporation.
In authorized transactions D Corporation sold bulldozers to vari-
ous buyers under conditional sales contracts. These contracts granted
D Corporation a security interest in the bulldozer sold to secure the
buyer's obligation to pay the purchase price in installments. D Corpo-
ration also routinely discounted these conditional sales contracts to
Finance Company. On February 1 Finance Company filed a financing
statement against D Corporation to perfect its security interest in all
returned and repossessed bulldozers.
In May, D Corporation began to experience cash flow problems.
In an attempt to meet the demands of its unsecured creditors, D Cor-
poration devised a sham transaction. On June 1 D Corporation pur-
ported to sell a bulldozer to D, the president of D Corporation, under
a conditional sales contract. D Corporation did not obtain Manufac-
turer's prior written consent before making this sale. Immediately fol-
lowing the execution of the conditional sales contract, D Corporation
sold the contract to Finance Company which gave new value and took
possession of the contract. D Corporation used the funds advanced by
Finance Company to pay the claims of unsecured creditors. On June 1
Finance Company filed a financing statement against D covering the
bulldozer sold to D. D took possession of the bulldozer on June 1, but
returned it to D Corporation on June 5. D Corporation continuously
listed this bulldozer as unsold inventory.
D made the July 1 installment payment to Finance Company, but
thereafter defaulted on its obligations under the assigned conditional
sales contract. On September 1 Manufacturer rightfully declared D
Corporation in default under the terms of the January 1 security
agreement. Also on September 1, Manufacturer repossessed all of D
Corporation's inventory of bulldozers, including the bulldozer sold to
D.
The issue presented in this illustration is whether Manufacturer
can prime Finance Company with respect to the bulldozer sold to and
returned by D. If Manufacturer's security interest in the bulldozer
arose solely under section 9-306(5)(a), Finance Company would be en-
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titled to priority under sections 9-306(5)(b) and (d),8s , unless D's re-
turn of the bulldozer was on consignment and the provisions of section
9-114 controlled.8 2 Manufacturer, however, can make a compelling ar-
gument that its security interest arose independently of section 9-
306(5)(a). Manufacturer can assert that its original security interest in
the goods as inventory of D Corporation was'not discharged by the sale
to D. First, Manufacturer will assert that the sale to D was unautho-
rized and therefore its security interest continued in the bulldozer not-
withstanding the sale.8 3 Second, Manufacturer will assert that since D
must have known that the sale to D was in violation of Manufacturer's
security interest, D does not qualify as a buyer in ordinary course.
8 4
Accordingly, Manufacturer will assert that D did not take free of Man-
ufacturer's security interest under section 9-307(1).
If Manufacturer establishes that the sale to D did not discharge its
security interest, Manufacturer's security interest in the bulldozer in
D's possession apparently primes the security interest asserted by Fi-
nance Company. As a general rule, a debtor cannot grant a secured
party a greater interest in collateral than the debtor owned.8 5 Since
D's title to the bulldozer was subject to Manufacturer's security inter-
est, the security interest D granted D Corporation was also subject to
Manufacturer's security interest. Therefore, Manufacturer will assert
that its security interest in the bulldozer in D's possession was prior to
the security interest in the bulldozer asserted by Finance Company be-
cause Finance Company is an assignee of D Corporation's subordinate
security interest.
Assuming Manufacturer establishes that its security interest in the
bulldozer in D's possession was prior to Finance Company's security
interest, the issue becomes whether that result should affect the resolu-
tion of a priority dispute over the returned bulldozer. This issue turns
upon whether section 9-306(5)(b) should be interpreted as awarding a
chattel paper transferee priority over an inventory financer asserting a
security interest in returned goods when that interest was not dis-
881. See supra notes 744-852 and accompanying text.
882. See supra notes 853-70 and accompanying text.
883. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
884. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(9) (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1989).
885. See Harris, Trade Names, Bulk Sales, and Name Changes-The Challenges of
In re McBee to Inventory Financers, in 1C SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 22A.04[4][b] (P. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts, & J. McDonnell eds.
1987); Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests,
59 B.U.L. REv. 811 (1979); see generally R. HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COM-
MON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 18.0112] (1984) (discuss-
ing the common law rule and its application under the Uniform Commercial Code).
[Vol. 41
182
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss2/4
CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
charged by the original sale. Although the courts have so interpreted
section 9-306(5)(b), 88 the policy behind the provision does not support
this result.
As discussed above,88 7 the rationale of section 9-306(5)(b) is to pre-
serve the priorities that existed before the goods at issue were returned
or repossessed. If the original sale discharged the inventory financer's
security interest, the chattel paper transferee would have the only
claim to the goods before they were returned or repossessed. In such
cases the priority rule of section 9-306(5)(b) preserves the secured posi-
tion of the chattel paper transferee and precludes the inventory fi-
nancer from realizing a windfall by virtue of the return or repossession.
In contrast, the application of section 9-306(5)(b) to award priority to
Finance Company in Illustration 27 would seem to undercut the se-
cured position of Manufacturer and award a windfall to Finance Com-
pany by virtue of the return. Therefore, section 9-306(5)(b) should not
be applied to award priority to chattel paper transferees if the inven-
tory financer's claim to the returned goods is based on a security inter-
est that was not discharged by the original sale.
Although the analysis of Illustration 27 advanced above is consis-
tent with the language and apparent policy of the applicable provi-
sions, it has not been accepted by the courts.88" On facts essentially
identical to those presented in Illustration 27, the Court in Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.LT. Corp.8s9 rejected an inventory fi-
nancer's argument that it should prevail over the chattel paper trans-
feree because the buyer in the original sale did not take free of the
inventory financer's security interest. Moreover, in cases not involving
returns or repossessions, the courts have held that the security interest
of a chattel paper purchaser in the underlying goods is prior to the
security interest of an inventory financer, even though the sale of the
inventory was unauthorized and the buyer failed to qualify as a buyer
in the ordinary course.8 90 In effect, these decisions reject the doctrine
886. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 351
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (on rehearing); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.I.T. Corp., 679
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also Aetna Fin. Co. v. Hendrickson 526 N.E.2d
1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (resolving conflict in favor of chattel paper transferee under
section 9-308(b) without reference to section 9-306(5)).
887. See supra text accompanying notes 787-92.
888. See cases cited supra note 886.
889. 679 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
890. See, e.g., American State Bank v. Avco Fin. Servs. of the United States, Inc., 71
Cal. App. 3d 774, 139 Cal. Rptr. 658 (opinion omitted from official reporter), nonpublica-
tion directed, 570 P.2d 463, 141 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1977); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56
Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see generally, Skilton, Buyer in Ordi-
nary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (And Re-
lated Matters), 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 1, 76-88 (status of buyer should not be controlling in
1990]
183
Lacy: Conflicting Security Interests in Inventory and Proceeds under th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of derivative title. Under these decisions a buyer who acquired goods
subject to an inventory financer's security interest can grant a retail
financer a security interest in the goods that is not subject to the claim
of the inventory financer.
In reaching this conclusion, some courts have stressed that section
9-308(b) provides that a purchaser of chattel paper has priority over
the inventory financer's claim to the paper. Section 9-308(b), however,
does not expressly provide a comparable rule with respect to the un-
derlying goods. Ultimately these decisions turn on a policy of protect-
ing chattel paper purchasers and efficiently allocating risk.8 91 The
courts have asserted that chattel paper purchasers must be entitled to
rely on the validity of the security interest represented by the paper.
8 92
Moreover, the courts have maintained that the inventory financer is in
a better position than the chattel paper purchaser to guard against the
sham transactions which give rise to the problem.
8 93
The protection afforded by the courts to chattel paper purchasers
when the underlying sale did not discharge an inventory financer's se-
curity interest is understandable. The chattel paper purchaser has
given new value in reliance on an apparently valid and prior security
interest in the underlying goods. Subordinating the inventory fi-
nancer's security interest in these cases, however, is inconsistent with
the protection generally afforded to such financers when the original
sale of the collateral does not discharge their security interest. For ex-
ample, assume that D Corporation in Illustration 27 had made an un-
authorized sale of the bulldozer to an affiliated equipment dealer for
nominal consideration in a transaction that the affiliated dealer knew
violated Manufacturer's security interest. Assume further that the affil-
iated dealer then resold the bulldozer to a buyer in the ordinary
course. Under the "created by his seller" limitation of section' 9-
307(1), s1 4 the buyer in the ordinary course would take subject to the
priority conflict between inventory financer and chattel paper purchaser).
891. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 351,
357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (on rehearing); see also Skilton, supra note 890, at 87 (resolu-
tion of conflict should depend on assessing the risks an inventory financer can be said to
assume).
892. See, e.g., American State Bank, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 663-66 (opinion omitted from
official reporter); Aetna Fin. Co. v. Hendrickson, 526 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 713 S.W.2d at 357; see generally Skilton, supra
note 890, at 84-85 (discussing potential difficulties of a chattel paper purchaser in discov-
ering a buyer's status).
893. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 713 S.W.2d at 357.
894. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section limits the protection afforded a buyer in the ordinary
course to security interests "created by his seller." See generally, B. CLARK, supra note 8,
3.04[3], at 3-50 to -53 (discussing whether a security interest is created by a seller
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Manufacturer's security interest.8 5 Thus, the courts have extended
more protection to purchasers of chattel paper than to buyers of goods
in the ordinary course.
Although the South Carolina courts have not ruled upon the pre-
cise question presented in Illustration 27, the decision in Sebrite Corp.
v. Transouth Financial Corp.8 9s indicates that the court would hold in
favor of the chattel paper purchaser. In Sebrite, Transouth held a per-
fected security interest in the inventory of a partnership engaged in
the retail sale of mobile homes. The partnership sold a mobile home to
one of its partners. This sale was financed by Sebrite, which perfected
a purchase money security interest in the mobile home against the
partner. The partnership concealed the sale from Transouth. When the
partner defaulted on his obligation to Sebrite, however, a priority dis-




The dispute in Sebrite should have been resolved under sections
36-9-306(2) and 36-9-307(1).898 If the partnership's sale to the partner
was authorized by Transouth, its security interest in the mobile home
would not have continued following the sale.8 99 As a result, Sebrite
would have had the only security interest in the mobile home. More-
over, even if the sale were unauthorized the partner would have taken
free of Transouth's security interest under section 36-9-307(1) if the
partner qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course.90 0 Again, the result
would be that Sebrite had the only security interest in the mobile
home.
The fact that the partnership concealed the sale from Transouth,
however, at least suggests that the partnership's sale was unauthorized.
If the sale were unauthorized, the partner who bought the mobile home
certainly knew that the sale to him violated Transouth's security inter-
est. Therefore, if the sale were unauthorized, the partner did not qual-
ify as a buyer in the ordinary course entitled to protection under sec-
tion 36-9-307(1).21 Furthermore, if the partner bought subject to
under various circumstances).
895. See, e.g., Exchange Bank v. Jarrett, 180 Mont. 33, 588 P.2d 1006 (1979); Na-
tional Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967).
896. 272 S.C. 483, 252 S.E.2d 873 (1979).
897. Id. at 484-85, 252 S.E.2d at 873-74.
898. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, 1 3.04[3], at 3-51 n.144.
899. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
900. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(9) (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1989).
901. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. 36-1-201(9)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989). This section provides that the buyer does not qualify
as a buyer in ordinary course if buyer knows that the sale is in violation of the security
interest of a third party.
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Transouth's security interest, Sebrite's security interest also would ap-
pear to be subject to Transouth's claim.
9 02
The court in Sebrite, however, did not even mention sections 36-9-
306(2) and 36-9-307(1) in resolving the case. The court indicated that
Sebrite was entitled to priority over Transouth under section 36-9-
312(4) because Sebrite had a purchase money security interest in the
mobile home.0 3 The court's reliance upon section 36-9-312(4) was mis-
placed. The priority rules of section 36-9-312 assume that the conflict-
ing security interests secure obligations of the same debtor.904 Since
Transouth's security interest secured an obligation of the partnership-
seller and Sebrite's security interest secured an obligation of the part-
ner-buyer, section 36-9-312(4) was not applicable to resolve the
conflict.
Ultimately, the decision in Sebrite turned on the court's percep-
tion of proper policy, rather than on an application of the statutory
provisions of Article 9. The court doubtlessly was aware of sections 36-
9-306(2) and 36-9-307(1). Although inexplicably citing as authority sec-
tion 36-9-109(4), the definition of inventory, the court asserted that
"[a] buyer, in the ordinary course of the dealer's business, is given pri-
ority over the dealer's inventory financier. '" 5 The court probably did
not pursue an analysis under sections 36-9-306(2) and 36-9-307(1) be-
cause these provisions would have dictated a decision in favor of Tran-
south. In the eyes of the court, such a decision appeared indefensible.
The court disclosed the reason for its decision in favor of Sebrite
when it stated that "[t]o hold that an innocent purchaser for value, or
an innocent retail lender for valuable consideration, must investigate
the right of the dealer to sell and give good title, would stagnate retail
sales so necessary to commerce." 96 Thus, the decision in Sebrite is
consistent with those decisions that award a chattel paper purchaser
priority over an inventory financer in the underlying goods, even
though the inventory financer's security interest in the goods was not
discharged by the sale.9 0 7 Therefore, Sebrite leaves little doubt that a
South Carolina court would award priority to Finance Company in Il-
lustration 27.
902. See B. CLARK, supra note 8, % 3.08[4], at 3-91 to -92; Harris, supra note 885, §
22A.04[4][b].
903. Sebrite Corp. v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 272 S.C. 483, 487, 252 S.E.2d 873, 875
(1979).
904. See Harris, supra note 885, § 22A.04[4][b].
905. Sebrite, 272 S.C. at 487, 252 S.E.2d at 875.
906. Id.
907. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 713 S.W.2d
351 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (on rehearing).
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2. Accounts as Proceeds
a. Inventory Financer Versus Financer Holding a Floating Lien on
Accounts
No issue produced greater debate under the 1962 Official Text
than priority conflict between an inventory financer claiming accounts
as proceeds and a secured party claiming the accounts as original col-
lateral.90 8 As an illustration of this issue, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 28-Dealer is in the business of selling building
materials on unsecured credit terms. On June 1 Bank and Dealer en-
tered into a written security agreement that granted Bank a security
interest in Dealer's current and after-acquired accounts to secure a
contemporaneous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank
filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering
Dealer's accounts. On July I Finance Company and Dealer entered
into a written security agreement that granted Finance Company a
security interest in Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory and
proceeds to secure a contemporaneous loan and any future advances.
Also on July 1, Finance Company filed a financing statement in the
Secretary of State's office covering Dealer's inventory. On August 1
Dealer sold some inventory on unsecured credit to a buyer in the ordi-
nary course, thereby generating an account. On September 1 Dealer
defaulted under the security agreements with both Bank and Finance
Company. Both secured parties assert a security interest in the Au-
gust 1 account.
Bank in this illustration claims a security interest in the account
as original collateral under the after-acquired property clause in its
June 1 security agreement. Finance Company asserts a security inter-
est in the account as proceeds of its inventory collateral. 9 The issue
presented is whether Bank's claim to the August 1 account as original
collateral is entitled to priority over Finance Company's claim to the
account as proceeds.
The priority conflict depicted in Illustration 28 is significant be-
cause its resolution largely defines the respective roles of inventory and
accounts financing. From the perspective of an inventory financer, a
prior position with respect to a debtor's inventory provides less than
complete security if that priority does not extend to the proceeds. In
contrast, financing secured by a floating lien on accounts becomes
908. See, e.g., Coogan & Gordon, supra note 537, at 1556-68; Henson, supra note
537, at 239-42; Kripke, supra note 536, at 709-27; Weiss, supra note 531, at 785.
909. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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problematic unless a secured party who files first with respect the
debtor's accounts is assured of priority with respect to after-acquired
accounts. Therefore, if the Code were to award priority to Bank in Il-
lustration 28, the security of inventory financers would be undercut.
On the other hand, if Finance Company were awarded priority in the
account as proceeds, the viability of accounts financing would be
impaired.9 10
Given the significance of the issue raised in Illustration 28, it is
surprising that the 1962 Official Text did not provide a clear resolu-
tion. 11 The drafters of the 1962 Official Text apparently assumed that
Bank would prevail over Finance Company under former section 9-
312(5)(a),112 but that result was not dictated by the statute. A literal
application of the 1962 Official Text produces a "Solomon-like" re-
sult."1 3 Bank's security interest in the account was perfected by its
June 1 filing. Under former section 9-306(3),""4 Finance Company's se-
curity interest in the account was originally perfected automatically.
9 1 5
910. If the Code provided that an inventory financer's priority in inventory ex-
tended to proceeds in the form of accounts, an accounts financer could obtain priority
with respect to after-acquired accounts by retaining a security interest and filing first
with respect to both the debtor's inventory and accounts. See Kripke, supra note 536, at
714; Weiss, supra note 531, at 795. The ability of an accounts financer to respond to a
priority rule that extended priority in inventory to accounts in the form of proceeds is
significant for two reasons. First, it illustrates that if the Code's priority rules are clear,
the parties can structure a transaction to achieve an intended result. Second, to avoid
the effect of a rule that extended the priority in inventory to accounts as proceeds, a
financer lending against accounts would have to obtain a prior security interest in inven-
tory in order to obtain priority in after-acquired accounts. Forcing an accounts financer
to encumber inventory in order to obtain priority with respect to after~acquired ac-
counts, however, may be an unattractive alternative because it may preclude the debtor
from buying inventory on unsecured credit terms. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 714;
Weiss, supra note 531, at 795. Moreover, the accounts financer's response suggests that
dual financing of accounts and inventory may be unrealistic under a rule that extends
priority in inventory to proceeds in the form of accounts. See infra text accompanying
note 999.
911. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 709-10 ("Without doubt the single area of un-
certainty in the present article 9 [1962 Official Text] affecting the largest volume of oper-
ations is the question of priority between a claim to accounts as the proceeds of inven-
tory and a claim to accounts as original collateral.").
912. Id. at 710.
913. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 710 (arguing that, in such a situation, the con-
flicting claims would have parity); Weiss, supra note 529, at 786-90 (simultaneous perfec-
tion possible under former section 9-312(5), with the result that neither party has
priority).
914. U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(3) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
915. See Coogan & Gordon, supra note 537, at 1562; Weiss, supra note 531, at 789.
But see Goodwin, Priorities in Secured Transactions-Article 9, Uniform Commercial
Code, 20 Bus. LAw. 877, 889-92 (1965).
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Technically, the effect of Finance Company's July 1 filing, which cov-
ered proceeds, was to extend Finance Company's perfection in the ac-
count beyond the ten-day period of automatic perfection.9 16 Therefore,
Bank's security interest was originally perfected by filing, and Finance
Company's security in the account was originally perfected automati-
cally. Former section 9-312(6) 9 17 provided that for purposes of the
residual priority rules of former section 9-312(5),"8 the manner of orig-
inal perfection controlled. Therefore, the dispute at issue is subject to
the "first to perfect" rule of former section 9-312(5)(b), 19 rather than
the "first to file" rule of former section 9-312(5)(a).
92 0
The application of former section 9-312(5)(b) to Illustration 28 re-
quires one to determine the dates on which Bank and Finance Com-
pany perfected their respective security interests in the August 1 ac-
count.9 21 Under former and current section 9-303(1), a security interest
is perfected when it has attached and all steps necessary for protection
have been taken.9 2 1 Former section 9-204(1) provides that a security
interest cannot attach until there is an agreement that it attach, the
secured party has given value, and the debtor has rights in the collat-
eral.923 Bank took the steps necessary to perfect its security interest
when it filed on June 1. Bank also had a security agreement and gave
value on June 1. Moreover, Finance Company did not take the steps to
perfect until it filed on July 1 and it did not have a security interest or
give value until July 1.
The critical issue, however, is when did Dealer have rights in the
August 1 account? Former section 9-204(2)(d) provided that a debtor
had no rights in an account until it came into existence.2 4 Therefore,
the security interests of Bank and Finance Company arguably attached
simultaneously when the account arose on August 1, and hence were
916. See Weiss, supra note 531, at 789.
917. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
918. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
919. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(b)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
920. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
921. See generally supra text accompanying notes 35-39 (analysis of time of perfec-
tion and former section 9-312(5)(b)).
922. U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-303(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989) (former section substantially the same).
923. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-204(1) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
924. U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(d) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-204(2)(d)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1988).
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perfected simultaneously on August 1. As a result, under former sec-
tion 9-312(5)(b), the security interests of Bank and Finance Company
would have been of equal rank and the parties would have divided the
August 1 account on a pro rata basis.925
The pro rata distribution of the August 1 account, however, was
not the only resolution possible under the 1962 Official Text. Some
commentators argued that an inventory financer such as Finance Com-
pany should not be allowed to assert that its security interest in the
account was originally perfected automatically. 26 These commentators
argued that the issue should be resolved under the first to file rule of
former section 9-312(5)(a).9 27 Under this analysis, Bank would prevail
because of its earlier filing. In contrast, other commentators argued
that since Finance Company had a prior claim to the inventory, its
priority should extend to the proceeds of the inventory under the pro-
visions of former sections 9-312(1) and 9-306(1) through (3).928 As a
result, at least three resolutions of Illustration 28 were possible under
the 1962 Official Text: granting Bank priority; granting Finance Com-
pany priority; and granting Bank and Finance Company claims of
equal priority. Obviously, this degree of uncertainty was
unacceptable.
929
The uncertainty under the 1962 Official Text was compounded
when a subsequent inventory financer claimed a purchase money se-
curity interest.92 0 To illustrate this problem, vary the facts of Illustra-
tion 28 by assuming that Finance Company had a purchase money se-
curity interest in the inventory sold on August 1. Assume that Finance
Company also met any applicable requirements for a purchase money
priority under former section 9-312(3). The purchase money priority
status of inventory financer's security interest in inventory does not
appear to enhance its rights against an earlier-filed accounts fi-
nancer.93  Some commentators asserted, however, that purchase money
priority status further justified extending the inventory financer's pri-
ority to proceeds in the form of accounts. 32 In any event, the purchase
925. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 710; Weiss, supra note 531, at 788-89.
926. See Goodwin, supra note 915, at 890-92; Kripke, supra note 536, at 711.
927. See Goodwin, supra note 915, at 891; Kripke, supra note 536, at 711.
928. See Henson, Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 425, 432 (1966); Henson, Countersuggestions Regarding Article 9: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Kripke, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 75-77 (1967).
929. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 709, 715; Weiss, supra note 531, at 786.
930. See generally supra text accompanying notes 114-291 (analysis of purchase
money priority in inventory).
931. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 718.
932. See Henson, supra note 537, at 240; see generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56,




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss2/4
CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
money problem further muddied the waters under the 1962 Official
Text.
Resolution of the conflicts depicted in Illustration 28 and its
purchase money variation constituted one of the most controversial
tasks the drafters undertook in formulating the 1972 Official Text.
9 3 3
In adopting rules to resolve these conflicts, the drafters had to make a
critical decision on the relative significance of accounts and inventory
financing. A rule that extends an inventory financer's priority in inven-
tory to proceeds in the accounts would make accounts financing highly
problematic. Under such a rule an accounts financer such as Bank in
Illustration 28, who filed first with respeft to a debtor's accounts and
before an inventory financer filed, would not be assured of priority
with respect to after-acquired accounts. A subsequent inventory fi-
nancer such as Finance Company could encumber the debtor's inven-
tory and prime the accounts financer with respect to the accounts gen-
erated by the sale of that inventory.
In contrast, a rule that awarded priority to an accounts financer
such as Bank would have a pronounced negative impact on inventory
financing. An inventory financer accepts the fact that the debtor will
sell the inventory and thereby terminate the security interest in the
original collateral . 34 Following the sale of the original collateral, the
inventory financer can look only to proceeds and after-acquired inven-
tory as security. Therefore, a rule that grants an earlier-filed accounts
financer priority in proceeds in the form of accounts significantly un-
dercuts the security available to the inventory financer.
The drafters of the 1972 Official Text addressed the issue raised in
Illustration 28 and determined that an earlier-filed financer with a
floating lien on a debtor's accounts should prime a subsequent inven-
tory financer claiming accounts as proceeds . 35 The decision to protect
an earlier-filed accounts financer apparently rested primarily on two
related arguments, both of which stressed the significance of trade
credit. First, the drafters apparently concluded that financing secured
by a dealer's accounts was more important than financing secured by a
floating lien on inventory.936 The argument supporting the primacy of
933. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 224-25.
934. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), -307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-
306(2), -307(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). See generally supra notes 14, 443 and accom-
panying text (analysis of the affect of sales in the ordinary course upon a security inter-
est in inventory).
935. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 225.
936. See id.; see also 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.4, at 797 (giving priority to
receivables financer is justified as long as new value is given); Coogan & Gordon, supra
note 537, at 1567(serving interests of accounts financers provides greater advantage to
the business community); Kripke, supra note 536, at 716-19 (protecting first-filed ac-
1990]
191
Lacy: Conflicting Security Interests in Inventory and Proceeds under th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
accounts financing rests on the observation that dealers typically pur-
chased their inventories from suppliers on unsecured trade credit.
95 7
The proponents of this argument stressed that suppliers would be
unwilling to extend trade credit to dealers who had encumbered their
inventories with floating liens. 3 8 As a result, commentators asserted,
debtors were reluctant to grant floating liens on their inventories.9 9
These commentators thus contended that financing secured by a float-
ing lien on inventory had evolved as a secondary form of financing
used only when a debtor's accounts were inadequate to secure all the
financing sought by the debtorN ° Because a rule that granted a subse-
quent inventory financer priority in accounts as proceeds would under-
cut the more important financing secured by a floating lien on ac-
counts, this rule was rejected.
The second argument in favor of awarding priority to an earlier-
filed accounts financer was that a rule which granted priority to a sub-
sequent inventory financer, with respect to proceeds in the form of ac-
counts, would impair the availability of trade credit.9 41 Commentators
asserted that in order to avoid the effect of such a rule, accounts
financers would insist upon security interests in both a debtor's ac-
counts and inventory and would file first with respect to both forms of
collateral.9 42 Thus, to obtain accounts financing a debtor would have to
grant a floating lien on the debtor's inventory that, in turn, would dis-
courage suppliers from selling to the debtor on trade credit. Therefore,
a rule that awarded priority to an earlier-filed accounts financer was
necessary to preserve the availability of trade credit.
9 43
Additionally, a rule that awards priority to an earlier-filed ac-
counts financer does not necessarily work to the disadvantage of a sub-
sequent financer claiming a floating lien on a debtor's inventory. If the
accounts financer is assured of priority with respect to all after-ac-
quired accounts, the accounts financer can make advances to the
debtor in reliance upon the accounts. In the normal course of events
the debtor will use these advances to purchase additional inventory
that will secure the inventory financer's loan or to pay down the loan
counts financers against secured party claiming accounts as proceeds is the only worka-
ble solution); Weiss, supra note 531, at 793-94 (accounts financing is generally acknowl-
edged to be more important than inventory financing).
937. See Weiss, supra note 531, at 795.
938. Id.
939. Id.
940. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.4, at 797; Kripke, supra note 536, at 716-
17; Weiss, supra note 531, at 794.
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balance.91" Moreover, the inventory financer can include provisions in
its security agreement under which the debtor will be in default if the
collateral does not exceed the debt by a defined ratio. Therefore, the
inventory financer can limit its exposure by not making advances
against accounts or by requiring that advances made be used to
purchase additional collateral or to reduce the debt.
The drafters of the 1972 Official Text also considered the more
controversial issue of whether a subsequent purchase money inventory
financer should take priority over an earlier-filed accounts financer.
9 4 5
In essence, they addressed whether to provide a purchase money ex-
ception to the rule awarding priority t6 an earlier-fied accounts fi-
nancer who claimed a security interest in accounts also claimed as pro-
ceeds by a subsequent inventory financer. Arguably, a purchase money
inventory financer has a stronger claim to the accounts than a financer
claiming a floating lien on a debtor's inventory, since a purchase money
financer gives new value in exchange for a security interest in the col-
lateral sold to generate the account. Moreover, a purchase money in-
ventory financer typically does not claim a security interest in a
debtor's after-acquired property.9 46 Therefore, after the sale of the col-
lateral, a purchase money financer can look only to proceeds for
security.
A purchase money inventory financer also can argue that its claim
to accounts as proceeds is stronger than claims by earlier-filed accounts
financers who claim the account pursuant to an after-acquired prop-
erty clause. The primary basis for this argument is that the purchase
money financer gave new value in exchange for a security interest in
the collateral that generated the account.9 47
The response to the argument for awarding unconditional priority
to a subsequent purchase money inventory financer was that the ear-
lier-filed accounts financer might rely on the account generated by the
sale of the purchase money collateral by making an advance under a
future advance clause . 48 To accommodate these conflicting arguments,
944. See Second Look, supra note 622, at 1003.
945. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 225; see generally Gil-
more, supra note 115, at 1383-85 (discussing purchase money priority in proceeds).
946. See Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240 (11th
Cir. 1985) (exercise of after-acquired property and future advance clauses precluded in-
ventory financer from establishing a purchase money security interest).
947. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.4, at 797 ("The inventory financer's
purchase-money interest by definition reflects a new value advance: he should not be
subordinated to the competing interests of a secured party who, taking advantage of the
Code's floating lien provision, claims all the debtor's receivables under an all-embracing
after-acquired property clause.").
948. See id. (accounts financer who extends new value in reliance on after-acquired
accounts can make a persuasive case that the accounts financer should be entitled to
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commentators proposed a limited purchase money exception to the
general rule that awarded priority to the earlier-filed accounts fi-
nancer.94 9 Under this proposal, inspired by former section 9-312(3),950 a
subsequent purchase money inventory financer could prime an earlier-
filed accounts financer if the inventory financer gave the accounts fi-
nancer prior notice of its purchase money security interest.9 51 The
thought was that the notice would preclude prejudice to the accounts
financer by warning the accounts financer not to rely upon the ac-
counts generated by the sale of the purchase money collateral.
9 52
The drafters of the 1972 Official Text considered, but ultimately
rejected, a proposal under which a purchase money inventory financer
would prime an earlier-filed accounts financer with respect to proceeds
in the form of accounts if the inventory financer gave the accounts fi-
nancer prior notice.9 53 The drafters noted two reasons for their deci-
sion. First, they asserted that it would be difficult to trace the purchase
money priority into accounts as proceeds when only a portion of the
debtor's inventory was subject to the purchase money security inter-
est.15 4 The difficulty in tracing would create a problem for accounts
financers because they would be unable to determine whether they
could rely on the debtor's after-acquired accounts in making future
advances.
The second reason given for the rejection of the purchase money
exception was that "[a]ccounts financing is intricate, and not easily or
safely terminated on receipt of an inventory purchase-money no-
tice."'55 Apparently the drafters concluded that accounts financers fre-
quently furnished a debtor's working capital.9 56 Therefore, if an ac-
counts financer responded to a purchase money notice by terminating
the relationship and refusing to make additional advances, the ac-
counts financer might cause the financial collapse of the debtor. In this
priority over a purchase money inventory financer who claims the accounts as proceeds).
949. See Coogan & Gordon, supra note 537, at 1568; Gilmore, supra note 115, at
1384-85.
950. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1962) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op, 1976) (amended 1988) (conditioning a purchase money inventory financer's prior-
ity with respect to inventory upon giving prior notice to an earlier-filed inventory
financer).
951. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1384-85.
952. See id. at 1385. But see Kripke, supra note 536, at 717-18 (arguing that notice
provision not adequate to protect accounts financer); Weiss, supra note 531, at 796 (noti-
fication not a solution to problem).
953. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 225.
954. Id.; see also Kripke, supra note 536, at 718 (arguing that notice is a less than
adequate remedy).
955. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 225.
956. See Weiss, supra note 531, at 796.
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case, the debtor's prenotification accounts upon which the accounts fi-
nancer had a prior claim might well become uncollectible.9 57 Therefore,
business realities might preclude the accounts financer from terminat-
ing the financing arrangement upon receipt of the purchase money
notice.9"'
Having concluded that an accounts financer who files first should
be awarded priority over a subsequent inventory financer claiming ac-
counts as proceeds, the drafters of the 1972 Official Text adopted pro-
visions to effect this result. The critical provision for resolving priority
disputes of the type depicted in Illustration 28 is revised section 9-
312(6).959 This subsection provides that for purposes of determining
priority under the first to file or perfect rule of revised section 9-
312(5)(a), 960 a secured party's date of filing or perfection with respect
to the collateral is also that party's date of filing or perfection with
respect to proceeds. As applied to Illustration 28, section 9-312(6) op-
erates to award priority to Bank, the accounts financer. Bank filed with
respect to accounts on June 1. Finance Company filed with respect to
inventory on July 1. Under revised section 9-312(6) Finance Com-
pany's July 1 filing also constitutes its date of filing with respect to
proceeds. Therefore, Bank primes Finance Company with respect to
the August 1 account because of Bank's earlier filing.
Revised sections 9-312(5)(a) and (6) also award priority to an ear-
lier-filed accounts financer when the subsequent inventory financer re-
lies on section 9-312(3)181 to assert a purchase money priority. To illus-
trate this point, return to the variation of Illustration 28 in which
Finance Company claimed a purchase money security interest in the
inventory, which generated the August 1 account and complied with all
applicable requirements for a purchase money priority under revised
section 9-312(3).28 Arguably, section 9-312(3) applies only to conflicts
in which both secured parties claim a security interest in inventory and
thus the provision is inapplicable to the variation of Illustration 28.
Moreover, even if revised section 9-312(3) is technically applicable
957. Id.
958. Id.
959. U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section provides that "[f]or the purposes of subsection (5) a
date of filing or perfection as to collateral is also a date of filing or perfection as to
proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
960. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying notes 21-131 (analysis
of revised section 9-312(5)(a)).
961. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
962. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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to a conflict between an earlier-filed accounts financer and a subse-
quent purchase money inventory financer claiming accounts as pro-
ceeds, the provision affords no protection to Finance Company. Re-
vised section 9-312(3) limits the proceeds upon which an inventory
financer can assert a purchase money priority to "identifiable cash pro-
ceeds received on or before the delivery of thie inventory to a buyer."963
Therefore, the purchase money priority under revised section 9-312(3)
does not extend to proceeds in the form of accounts. Since revised sec-
tion 9-312(3) is inapplicable, priority is determined under revised sec-
tions 9-312(5)(a) and (6), which award priority to Bank because of its
earlier filing.
64
In summary, the 1972 Official Text dispells the uncertainty con-
cerning the priority between an earlier-filed accounts financer and a
subsequent inventory financer claiming accounts as proceeds. Under
the revised statute the accounts financer will prevail. This rule holds
true even if the subsequent inventory financer has met the require-
ments for the purchase money priority under revised section 9-312(3).
In large part, the rules promulgated by the 1972 Official Text were pre-
mised upon the assumption that accounts financing is more significant
than inventory financing and that secured parties took security inter-
ests in inventory only as secondary collateral. Under the revised stat-
ute, inventory is clearly a secondary form of collateral when the debtor
sells on unsecured credit and has granted a prior security interest in
accounts. In such cases, an inventory financer can look for security
only to inventory in the debtor's possession and to cash proceeds that
are not collections on accounts. Significantly, the inventory financer's
security vanishes upon the sale of an item of inventory. Under section
9-307(1) the sale terminates the inventory financer's security interest
in the goods sold. Moreover, revised sections 9-312(3), 9-312(5)(a) and
9-312(6) subordinate the inventory financer's security interest in ac-
counts as proceeds to the claim of the earlier-fied accounts financer.
From the analysis above, one might conclude that the primary ob-
jective of the drafters of the 1972 Official Text was to favor accounts
financers over inventory financers because of the greater commercial
significance of accounts financing. Certainly revised sections 9-312(3),
9-312(5)(a), and 9-312(6) foster accounts financing by protecting an
earlier-filed accounts financer from the claim of a subsequent inventory
financer claiming a security interest in accounts as proceeds. 965 These
963. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
964. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 8, example 8 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-9-312 comment 8, example 8 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
965. See supra text accompanying notes 959-64.
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provisions, however, do not invariably protect an accounts financer.
For example, if an inventory financer files first, its security interest in
accounts as proceeds will prime the security interest of a subsequent
accounts financer 6  Moreover, these provisions resolve disputes be-
tween inventory financers when they both claim accounts as pro-
ceeds.9"' Interestingly, in the case of a subsequent purchase money fi-
nancer, the provisions do not extend the priorities in the inventory to
the proceeds.988
b. Inventory Financer Versus Subsequent Purchaser of Accounts
The next two subsections consider two additional illustrations in-
volving priority conflicts over accounts as proceeds of inventory. An
analysis of these illustrations will complete the assessment of the rela-
tionship between inventory financing and accounts financing under re-
vised Article 9.
ILLUSTRATION 29-On June 1 Bank entered into a written security
agreement with Dealer that granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory to secure a contempora-
neous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank properly
filed a financing statement covering Dealer's inventory. During the
month of June, Dealer sold items of inventory on unsecured credit. On
July 1 Dealer entered into a written agreement under which Dealer
sold the accounts the Dealer's resulting from June sales of inventory
to Finance Company. Finance Company gave new value in exchange
for the June accounts. Also on July 1, Finance Company filed a fi-
nancing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering the as-
signed accounts. On August 1 Bank rightfully declared Dealer in de-
fault and sought to enforce its security interest against the accounts
sold to Finance Company.
The issue presented is whether Bank has priority over Finance
Company with respect to the June accounts. Bank has a security inter-
est in the June accounts as proceeds of its inventory collateral.8 9 As-
suming that Dealer does business only in South Carolina or that its
chief executive office is located in the state, Bank's June 1 filing in the
Secretary of State's office was effective to continue perfection in the
966. See infra text accompanying notes 969-73.
967. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 7 (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312 comment 7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
968. See infra text accompanying notes 987-96.
969. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) to (2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(1) to (2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra notes 444-49 and accompa-
nying text (analysis of attachment of security interest in proceeds).
1990]
197
Lacy: Conflicting Security Interests in Inventory and Proceeds under th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
accounts as proceeds.970 Moreover, pursuant to revised section 9-
312(6), Bank's June 1 filing fixes its date of filing or perfection for pur-
poses of determining priority in the accounts under revised section 9-
312(5)(a).0 7 1 Although Dealer sold the June accounts to Finance Com-
pany, the transaction is within the scope of Article 992 and Finance
Company's claim to the accounts is limited to a security interest.1
3
Therefore, Finance Company's date of filing or perfection with respect
to the accounts is July 1. As a result, under section 9-312(5)(a), Bank
primes Finance Company with respect to the June accounts.
The lesson to be drawn from Illustration 29 is clear. If a secured
party has filed with respect to a debtor's inventory, a subsequent fi-
nancer should not lend against accounts generated by the sale of inven-
tory absent a subordination agreement. The issue raised by Illustration
29 is whether the application of revised sections 9-312(5)(a) and (6) to
resolve the conflict in favor of Bank is a sound policy decision.
The policies reflected in the resolution of Illustration 29 can be
assessed with reference to revised section 9-308(b), 74 which sets forth
a special priority rule applicable when chattel paper is claimed as pro-
ceeds of inventory.9 75 Under revised section 9-308(b), a purchaser of
chattel paper who gives new value and takes possession of the paper in
the ordinary course of his business primes an earlier-filed inventory
financer who claims a security interest in the'chattel paper merely as
proceeds, even if the chattel paper purchaser has knowledge of the in-
ventory financer's security interest. 7 Revised section 9-308(b) evi-
dences a policy of preferring a new value financer to a financer claim-
ing a conflicting interest as proceeds. This policy suggests that in
Illustration 29 Finance Company should prevail over Bank, since Fi-
nance Company gave new value in exchange for the accounts which
Bank claimed merely as proceeds.977 The drafters of the 1972 Official
970. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra notes 450-63 and accompanying
text (analysis of perfection of security interest in proceeds).
971. See U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(6)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
972. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
102(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
973. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972) (amended 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
974. U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-308(b) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
975. See supra note 697.
976. See supra text accompanying notes 710-14.
977. Comments 2 and 3 to section 9-308 indicate that an inventory financer's secur-
ity interest is claimed merely as proceeds unless in a new transaction it has given value
against the chattel paper. See Weiss, supra note 531, at 805-06 (interpreting U.C.C. sec-
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Text, however, did not provide a special priority rule comparable to
revised section 9-308(b) applicable to purchasers of accounts. The ab-
sence of such a provision requires an explanation, especially in light of
drafter's apparent goal of protecting accounts financing.
Prior to the promulgation of the 1972 Official Text, commentators
considered'78 and even advocated 979 a new value priority provision for
accounts financers comparable to revised section 9-308(b). The princi-
pal reason such a rule was not adopted appears to have been that ac-
counts "were more intimately interrelated with and less able to be sep-
arated from inventory financing"980 than chattel paper.98 1 Revised
section 9-308(b) and its 1962 Official Text predecessor reflect an estab-
lished pattern of independent financing of inventory and chattel pa-
per.98 2 Lenders who finance the inventory of a debtor who sells under
conditional sales contracts frequently are willing to subordinate their
interest in chattel paper as proceeds to the claim of a purchaser of the
chattel paper.
9 8 3
The inventory financer benefits from this practice because the
debtor can use the funds received upon the sale of the chattel paper to
pay the inventory financer or purchase additional items of inventory
which will constitute collateral. The drafters apparently found that no
comparable pattern of separate financing of inventory and accounts
had evolved. 9 4 Rather, a floating lien inventory financer of a debtor
who sells on unsecured credit was viewed as lending against an aggre-
gate of current and after-acquired inventory and accounts. 9s5 In es-
sence, the collateral of the inventory financer included accounts as well
as inventory. Therefore, a floating lien inventory financer who filed
first merits protection against a subsequent accounts financer, even
when the accounts financer gave new value.
The failure to adopt a rule comparable to revised section 9-308(b),
which would allow a subsequent accounts financer who gave new value
to prime an earlier-filed inventory financer who claimed the accounts
as proceeds, provides insight into the relationship between inventory
financing and accounts financing under the 1972 Official Text. Al-
though revised sections 9-312(3), 9-312(5)(a), and 9-312(6) assure an
tion 9-308 comments 2 & 3).
978. See Coogan & Gordon, supra note 537, at 1567; Kripke, supra note 536, at 714-
16; Weiss, supra note 531, at 797-800, 805-08.
979. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 29.4, at 797.
980. Kripke, supra note 536, at 715.
981. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 714-15; Weiss, supra note 531, at 798.
982. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 715-16; Weiss, supra note 531, at 798.
983. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 715-16.
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earlier-filed accounts financer priority over a subsequently filed inven-
tory financer claiming accounts as proceeds, 986 the provisions cannot be
read as reflecting a policy of favoring financers who claim accounts as
original collateral over those who claim the accounts as proceeds of
inventory.
Rather, the uniform application of the ffrst to file or perfect rule to
resolve all disputes between accounts financers and inventory financers
claiming accounts as proceeds establishes that the 1972 Official Text
views accounts financing and inventory financing as essentially alterna-
tive forms of financing. Although an accounts financer who files first
does not have a security interest in a debtor's inventory, the accounts
financer will prime a subsequent inventory financer who claims ac-
counts as proceeds. Therefore, if a secured party has filed against a
debtor's accounts, a subsequent-secured party should not lend against
the debtor's inventory if priority with respect to proceeds in the form
of accounts is a significant factor in making a credit decision.
More significantly, under the 1972 Official Text a secured party
who files first with respect to a debtor's current and after-acquired in-
ventory is, in effect, both an inventory financer and an accounts fi-
nancer. Under revised sections 9-312(5)(a) and (6), the security interest
of the inventory financer in accounts as proceeds will prime the secur-
ity interest of a subsequent accounts financer in the accounts as origi-
nal collateral. Therefore, if a secured party has filed against a debtor's
inventory, a subsequent financer should not lend against the debtor's
accounts absent a subordination agreement. Moreover, because the
first-filed inventory financer is entitled to priority with respect to ac-
counts as proceeds, it can make future advances against those
accounts.
c. Nonpurchase Money Inventory Financer Versus Purchase
Money Inventory Financer
The conclusion that the 1972 Official Text views a secured party
with a floating lien on a debtor's inventory as both an inventory fi-
nancer and an accounts financer is further supported by the proceeds
limitations imposed on a purchase money priority under revised sec-
tion 9-312(3). To this point, conflicts between an inventory financer
claiming accounts as proceeds and an accounts financer claiming the
accounts as original collateral have been considered. Priority disputes
also can arise between two inventory financers who claim the accounts
as proceeds. Under the 1972 Official Text, revised sections 9-312(5)(a)
and (6) control these disputes and award priority to the first secured
986. See supra notes 959-64 and accompanying text.
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party to file covering the debtor's inventory.98 The application of the
residual priority rule to resolve these conflicts is unremarkable when
both inventory financers assert a nonpurchase money security interest
in the collateral. When, however, the first-filed financer claims a float-
ing lien on the debtor's current and after-acquired inventory and the
subsequent financer establishes a purchase money priority in the in-
ventory sold, the legislative decision to determine-priorities in the re-
sulting account under the residual rules requires an explanation. The
only rational explanation for this decision is that a first-filed inventory
financer claiming a floating lien upon a debtor's inventory should be
treated as a first-filed accounts financer. To illustrate this problem,
consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 30-On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a
written security agreement that granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory of building supplies to
secure a contemporaneous loan and any future advances. Also on June
1, Bank filed a financing statement covering Dealer's inventory of
building supplies. On July 1 Lumber Company and Dealer entered
into a written contract under which Lumber Company agreed to sell
lumber to Dealer on credit. The contract granted Lumber Company a
security interest in the lumber sold to secure Dealer's obligation to
pay the purchase price. Also on July 1, Lumber Company filed a fi-
nancing statement covering the lumber subject to the contract. On
July 2 Lumber Company gave Bank written notice of its purchase
money security interest in the lumber. Bank received the notice on
July 5. On July 10 Lumber Company delivered the lumber to Dealer.
On August 1 Dealer sold the lumber to Contractor on unsecured credit
with payment due in thirty days. On September 1 Dealer defaulted on
the obligations to both Bank and Lumber Company and these credi-
tors claimed the August 1 account as proceeds.
Both Bank and Lumber Company have a perfected security inter-
est in the August 1 account as proceeds. 98 Moreover, if revised sections
9-312(5)(a) and (6) control the resolution of this priority conflict, Bank
will prevail because of its earlier filing with respect to Dealer's inven-
tory. The question presented is whether Lumber Company can claim
priority under the special priority rule applicable to purchase money
inventory financers.
Although Bank was the first party to file with respect to Dealer's
inventory, Lumber Company had priority in the lumber on July 10
987. See supra notes 959-60 and accompanying text.
988. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) to (3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(1) to (3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see generally supra text accompanying notes
444-63 (analysis of attachment and perfection of security interests in proceeds).
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under revised section 9-312(3). 9s9 Lumber Company had a purchase
money security interest in the lumber and met the perfection 990 and
notice9 1 requirements for a purchase money priority in inventory.
Therefore, the issue becomes whether the purchase money priority in
inventory extends to proceeds in the form of accounts. The 1962 Offi-
cial Text did not provide a clear answer to this question.992 The 1972
Official Text addresses this question in revised section 9-312(3) and
awards priority to Bank. Section 9-312(3) provides that purchase
money priority extends to proceeds only if the proceeds are "identifi-
able cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory
to a buyer. 0 9 3 Because the purchase money priority does not extend to
proceeds in the form of accounts, the conflict between Lumber Com-
pany and Bank over the August 1 account must be resolved under the
residual priority rules. As noted, under these rules Bank is entitled to
priority.
The failure to extend the purchase money priority to accounts as
proceeds of inventory in the context depicted in Illustration 30 initially
appears illogical. 994 The sale to Contractor as a buyer in the ordinary
course terminated Lumber Company's security interest in the lum-
ber. 90 Moreover, Lumber Company did not claim a security interest in
989. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
990. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
991. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) to (d) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
312(b) to (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
992. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85. Gilmore recognized that former sec-
tion 9-312(3) could be interpreted as applying only to inventory, not to proceeds. Under
this interpretation an earlier-filed secured party with a floating lien on a debtor's inven-
tory could prime a subsequent purchase money financer of inventory with respect to
proceeds based on the residual first to file rule of former section 9-312(5)(a). Gilmore,
however, asserted that such a result "seems to be completely wrong and should be
avoided if humanly possible." Id. at 1383. The case law under the 1962 Official Text
provides some support for Gilmore's interpretation. See Appliance Buyers Credit Corp.
v. Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc. (In re Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 284 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1984). It should be noted that if the residual rules of former section 9-312(5)
applied to resolve the conflict over proceeds, a case can be made that both parties' secur-
ity interests in the proceeds were originally perfected automatically under former section
9-306(3). Therefore, pursuant to former section 9-312(6), the first to perfect rule of for-
mer section 9-312(5)(b) would control. Under this interpretation the secured parties
would have co-equal liens and share pro rata. See supra text accompanying notes 913-25.
993. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-312(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
994. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 1383-85.
995. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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after-acquired property.9 8 Therefore, following the sale of the lumber
to Contractor, Lumber Company's security was limited to its security
interest in the account as proceeds.
By granting Bank priority in the account, the 1972 Official Text
strips Lumber Company of even this security and renders purchase
money inventory financing less attractive. 99 7 The drafters' rationale for
not extending purchase money priority to accounts as proceeds of in-
ventory was that an earlier-filed secured party should be able to rely
on the accounts in making future advances.9 98 This rationale is reason-
able if the prior secured party is an accounts financer, since an ac-
counts financer typically makes future advances in reliance on after-
acquired accounts. When the prior secured party is an inventory fi-
nancer, however, the rationale is valid only if inventory financers lend
against accounts.
Ultimately the drafters' decision to subordinate a purchase money
inventory financer's security interest in accounts as proceeds to the
claim of an earlier-filed secured party with a floating lien on a debtor's
inventory must rest on the conclusion that inventory and accounts are
inseparable collateral. 99 In essence, the 1972 Official Text views an in-
ventory financer such as Bank as lending against a combined mass of
inventory and accounts, rather than against inventory alone. If dual
financing of accounts and inventory was uncommon when the 1972 Of-
ficial Text was adopted, the drafters' decision to treat a secured party
with a floating lien on inventory as an accounts financer was reasona-
ble. Moreover, if the holder of the floating lien is in essence an ac-
counts financer, the purchase money notice that establishes a priority
in the inventory is at least arguably insufficient to justify a priority in
the resulting accounts.'000
Whether the assumptions as to inventory and accounts financing
were valid when the 1972 Official Text was adopted is no longer a criti-
cal issue. The priority rules of revised sections 9-312(3), 9-312(5)(a)
and 9-312(6) now discourage dual financing of inventory and accounts
absent a subordination agreement. A secured party with a floating lien
on a debtor's inventory who files with respect to the inventory before a
conflicting secured party files as to the debtor's inventory or accounts,
996. See generally Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d
1240 (11th Cir. 1985) (exercise of after-acquired property and future advance clauses
precluded inventory financer from establishing a purchase money security interest); see
also B. CLARK, supra note 8, 3.09[2][c], at 3-97 to -99 (approving of analysis in
Southtrust).
997. See Coogan, supra note 2, at 517.
998. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, app., para. E-38, at 225-26.
999. See Kripke, supra note 536, at 716.
1000. See supra text accompanying notes 956-58.
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has an effective floating lien on both the inventory and the accounts.
Moreover, and somewhat ironically, the inventory financer's priority in
after-acquired accounts is higher than its priority in after-acquired in-
ventory. Although a subsequent purchase money financer can prime
the floating lienor as to after-acquired inventory, the floating lienor's
security interest in accounts as proceeds is prior to the claims of both
the subsequent purchase money financer and any subsequent accounts
financer.
d. Inventory Financer Versus Accounts Financer with Respect to
Returns
The potential conflicts between an inventory financer and an ac-
counts financer are not limited to disputes over accounts that the in-
ventory financer claims as proceeds. The parties also may contest pri-
ority over goods returned to the debtor by an account debtor. The
rights of an inventory financer and an accounts financer in returned
goods are controlled by section 9-306(5)(c). 110 To illustrate the conflict
between an inventory financer and an accounts financer envisioned in
section 9-306(5)(c), consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 31-On June 1 Bank entered into a written security
agreement with Dealer that granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired inventory of building materials.
Also on June 1, Bank filed a financing statement covering Dealer's
inventory. On July 1 Dealer sold a large quantity of building materials
to Contractor on unsecured credit with payment due in ninety days.
On July 1 Dealer also sold the account generated by this sale to Fac-
tor. Finally on July 1, Factor gave new value for the account, and filed
a financing statement against Dealer covering the account. On July 10
Contractor returned the building materials to Dealer alleging that the
materials were defective.
Although the ultimate issue presented in Illustration 31 is the de-
termination of priority with respect to the returned materials, it is use-
ful to begin by considering the relative priorities of Bank and Factor
with respect to the July 1 account. Factor unquestionably bought the
account, but its interest in the account was limited to a security inter-
est. 100 2 Factor perfected its security interest by filing on July 1. Bank
had a security interest in the account as proceeds of inventory, 00 3 and
1001. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(5)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). For text of section 9-306(5), see supra note 744.
1002. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
102(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1003. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1), (2) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
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Bank's June I filing with respect to inventory was effective to continue
perfection of its security interest in the account as proceeds.0 0 4 There-
fore, because Bank filed with respect to Dealer's inventory before Fac-
tor filed with respect to the account, Bank had priority in the account
under revised sections 9-312(5)(a) and 9-312(6)."0°5
When Contractor returned the building materials to Dealer, .pre-
sumably Bank would prime Factor as to the returned goods. In a sense,
the returned goods are proceeds of the account 006 and priorities in the
account should control priorities in the returned goods. 007 This as-
sumption is borne out by the provisions of section 9-306(5) as applied
to Illustration 31. Section 9-306(5)(a) grants Bank a perfected security
interest in the returned materials.0 0 Section 9-306(5)(c) grants Factor,
as "[a]n unpaid transferee of the account," a security interest in the
returned goods. 009 Section 9-306(5)(c) also resolves the priority conflict
between Bank's security interest under subsection (5)(a) and Factor's
security interest under subsection (5)(c) by awarding priority to Bank.
Under the facts of Illustration 31, Factor did not perfect directly
in the returned goods. As against Bank, such perfection would not have
enhanced Factor's position.10 0 Nevertheless, Factor should have filed
against the returns. Under section 9-306(5)(d), this filing was necessary
to protect Factor's security interest against creditors of and purchasers
from the Dealer.' 0 " In effect, section 9-306(5)(c) preserved the relative
306(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1004. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1005. See supra text accompanying notes 969-73.
1006. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 798-99 (returned goods are pro-
ceeds); Cf. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 56, § 27.5, at 737 (returns may be viewed as pro-
ceeds of chattel paper); Commentary on Section 9-306(5), supra note 745, at 3 (same).
1007. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 807.
1008. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1009. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1010. Section 9-306(5)(c) subordinates the security interest of an accounts financer
in returns and repossessions to the security interest of an inventory financer asserted
under section 9-306(5)(a), even if the accounts financer perfected in the returns and re-
possessions. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(5)(c)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1011. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984); Finance Am. Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460
(1987). Failure of an unpaid transferee to perfect its interest in returns and repossessions
will render the transferee's security interest voidable under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) in the
event of the debtor's bankruptcy. See In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
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positions of the parties in Illustration 31 when the goods were re-
turned. Bank had priority in the July 1 account and section 9-306(5)(c)
granted Bank priority in the underlying goods.
Section 9-306(5)(c) provides a more controversial result in cases in
which an accounts financer files before an inventory financer. To illus-
trate this problem, consider the following:
ILLUSTRATION 32-On June 1 Bank and Dealer entered into a
written security agreement that granted Bank a security interest in
Dealer's current and after-acquired accounts to secure a contempora-
neous loan and any future advances. Also on June 1, Bank filed a fi-
nancing statement covering Dealer's accounts. On July 1 Finance
Company and Dealer entered into a written security agreement that
granted Finance Company a security interest in Dealer's current and
after-acquired inventory of building materials to secure a contempora-
neous loan and any future advances. Also on July 1, Finance Company
filed a financing statement covering Dealer's inventory. On August 1
Dealer sold some building supplies to Contractor on unsecured credit.
On August 15 Contractor returned the building supplies to Dealer.
Under revised section 9-312(5)(a) and (6) Bank in the above illus-
tration had priority over Finance Company with respect to the August
1 account.0 12 When the goods subject to that account were returned to
Dealer, they were, in essence, proceeds of the account.10 13 Therefore,
Bank arguably would be entitled to priority in the returns. Section 9-
306(5)(c), however, awards priority to Finance Company by expressly
providing that a security interest claimed by an unpaid transferee of
an account under paragraph (c) is subordinate to a security interest of
an inventory financer under paragraph (a).
10 14
The result reached in Illustration 32 is arguably inconsistent with
the policy of the priority rules of the 1972 Official Text governing con-
flicts between accounts and inventory financers. If an accounts financer
has filed before an inventory financer, the 1972 Official Text encour-
ages the accounts financer to make future advances in reliance on af-
ter-acquired accounts by granting the accounts financer priority in the
accounts that constitute proceeds of the inventory.01 6 The effect of
section 9-306(5)(c) is to undercut the accounts financer's ability to rely
upon such accounts. If the goods subject to an account are returned,
section 9-306(5)(c) subordinates the accounts financer's security inter-
est to that of the inventory financer, even if the accounts financer
1012. See supra notes 959-60 and accompanying text.
1013. See supra note 1006.
1014. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(c) (1972) (amended 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-
306(5)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1015. See supra text accompanying note 944.
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made an advance in reliance upon the account. Therefore, section 9-
306(5)(c) arguably should have been amended by the 1972 Official Text
to afford an accounts financer priority in returns if the accounts fi-
nancer had priority in the underlying account.10 18 In response, how-
ever, one could argue that the risk that Finance Company in Illustra-
tion 32 might make an advance in reliance on the returned goods as
after-acquired collateral justifies awarding Finance Company priority.
A prior accounts financer such as Bank in Illustration 32 may be
able to avoid the effect of section 9-306(5)(c) by claiming a security
interest in returns in its security agreement and financing statement.
In Citizens & Southern Factors, Inc. v. Small Business Administra-
tion'01 7 the Alabama Supreme Court held in favor of an accounts fi-
nancer whose security agreement and prior filing covered returned
goods. The court reasoned that the priority rule in section 9-306(5)(c)
applied only when that provision created the accounts financer's secur-
ity interest in the returned goods.018 When the accounts financer ob-
tained a security interest in returns under the terms of the security
agreement, the court held that priorities were controlled by section 9-
312 rather than section 9-306(5)(c). 0 19
Moreover, since the accounts financer filed a financing statement
covering returns before the inventory financer filed, the court held that
the accounts financer was entitled to priority under the first to file rule
of former section 9-312(5)(a). 1020 Thus, Citizens & Southern Factors
establishes a second reason for an accounts financer to file with respect
to returns at the outset of the transaction. Not only does such a filing
protect the accounts financer against creditors of and purchasers from
the debtor under section 9-306(5)(d),' °21 but it also may enable the ac-
counts financer to avoid the effect of section 9-306(5)(c) in a conflict
with an inventory financer asserting a security interest in returned
goods.'
0 22
The Citizens & Southern Factors decision suggests a final priority
issue with respect to returns. The problem will arise when an accounts
financer claims a security interest in returns as well as accounts and
files a financing statement covering accounts and returns. After the ac-
counts financer has filed, an inventory financer obtains a purchase
1016. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 809-10.
1017. 375 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1979).
1018. Id. at 255; see generally Lord, supra note 745, at 188 (section 9-306(5)(c) sub-
ordinates interests that arise by operation of law and does not apply to consensual
agreements).
1019. Citizens & S. Factors, Inc., 375 So. 2d at 255.
1020. Id.
1021. See supra note 1011 and accompanying text.
1022. See Skilton & Dunham, supra note 745, at 810-15.
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money security interest in the debtor's inventory and meets the re-
quirements for a purchase money priority under revised section 9-
312(3).10 23 The debtor then sells an item of the purchase money fi-
nancer's collateral generating an account. Finally, the buyer returns
the purchased item to the debtor. As to the item of inventory prior to
its sale, the purchase money financer was entitled to priority under
revised section 9-312(3).
As to the account generated by the sale, the accounts financer was
entitled to priority under revised section 9-312(5)(a) and (6).1024 If the
accounts financer had not claimed a security interest in returns in its
security agreement, the purchase money financer would have been en-
titled to priority in the returned item under section 9-306(5)(c)., Under
the rule of Citizens & Southern Factors, however, section 9-306(5)(c)
does not control priorities in the returned item arising independently
of subsection (5)(c). Citizens & Southern Factors further holds that
section 9-312 controls the priority issue. The question presented is to
whom does revised section 9-312 award priority.
Purchase money financers can argue that since they had priority in
an item of inventory prior to its sale, they should have priority upon
the item's return. Although this argument has some appeal, it ignores
the creation of the intervening account. Under revised section 9-312(3),
a purchase money financer's priority does not continue in the account
as proceeds of the inventory. Conceptually, the return is proceeds of
the account. 10 25 Since the purchase money financer did not have prior-
ity in the account as proceeds, the purchase money financer should not
have priority in the return as proceeds of proceeds.
This argument is not mere conceptual formalism. The clear policy
of the 1972 Official Text is to encourage accounts financers who file
first to make future advances in reliance on after-acquired accounts.0 26
To effect this policy, the 1972 Official Text awards an accounts fi-
nancer priority over a purchase money inventory financer claiming ac-
counts as proceeds if the accounts financer filed first.1027 This policy
would be undercut if a purchase money financer were awarded priority
in returns. An accounts financer could not make advances against the
full value of a debtor's accounts because a purchase money financer
might be entitled to priority if the underlying goods were returned.
Moreover, unlike Finance Company in Illustration 32, the purchase
money financer is unlikely to rely upon the returned goods as after-
1023. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
1024. See supra notes 961-64 and accompanying text.
1025. See supra note 1006.
1026. See supra notes 937-58 and accompanying text.
1027. See supra notes 961-64 and accompanying text.
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Without attempting to summarize the analysis of the priority con-
flicts set forth above, several conclusions can be advanced concerning
the impact of revised Article 9 upon inventory financing. Revised Arti-
cle 9 provides for two basic forms of inventory financing. Under the
first form of financing, the secured party retains a floating lien upon
the debtor's current and after-acquired inventory to secure an initial
loan and any future advances. Under the second form of financing, the
secured party retains a purchase money security interest in inventory
to secure the extension of credit that enabled the debtor to acquire the
collateral. Part II of this article analyzed rules of revised Article 9 gov-
erning the resolution of priority conflicts in the debtor's inventory. The
most significant of these rules is the purchase money priority provision
of revised section 9-312(3), which enables a purchase money financer of
new inventory to prime an earlier-filed floating lienor asserting a secur-
ity interest upon the new inventory under an after-acquired property
clause. 029
Although the rules governing conflicting security interests in in-
ventory are significant, they do not address the most critical issues
confronting an inventory financer. The fundamental dilemma con-
fronting an inventory financer is that security interests in inventory
are extinguished when the debtor sells the inventory to a buyer in ordi-
nary course of business. 03 0 Therefore, priority in a debtor's inventory
is significant only to the extent the debtor retains unsold inventory at
the time of default. Furthermore, unless the inventory financer is re-
paid upon the sale of the collateral, the inventory financer must look to
the proceeds realized upon the sale of after-acquired property for se-
curity. Furthermore, since a purchase money financer may not claim a
security in after-acquired inventory, 0 3 1 and the floating lienor's secur-
ity interest in after-acquired inventory may be subordinate to the
claim of a subsequent purchase money financer,10 3' proceeds constitute
the primary potential source of additional security. Thus, the most sig-
nificant priority issues involve the question of whether a priority in
inventory extends to proceeds.
Part III of this article analyzed the rules governing priority con-
1028. See supra note 996.
1029. See supra text accompanying notes 114-291.
1030. See supra text accompanying note 14.
1031. See supra note 126.
1032. See supra text accompanying notes 114-291.
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flicts concerning proceeds of inventory. In addition to cash proceeds,
the most significant forms of proceeds of inventory are chattel paper
and accounts. An inventory financer's claim of a security interest in
either chattel paper or accounts as proceeds may conflict with two
types of claims. First, the inventory financer's security interest may
conflict with the security interest of another inventory financer claim-
ing the receivable (i.e., accounts or chattel paper) as proceeds. Second,
the inventory financer's proceeds claim may conflict with a security in-
terest asserted directly in the receivable. The rules for resolving these
conflicts under revised Article 9 are significant not only because they
provide certainty, but also because they largely define and limit the
role of inventory financing.
As established in Part III, the priority rules of revised Article 9
governing conflicts over the proceeds of inventory generally favor
financers who lend directly against the receivable. For example, under
revised section 9-308(b), a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper can
prime the security interest of an inventory financer claiming the chat-
tel paper as proceeds. 10 33 Therefore, when the proceeds of inventory
consist of chattel paper, section 9-308(b) precludes an inventory fi-
nancer from relying upon a proceeds claim to the chattel paper. To be
assured of protection with respect to the chattel paper, the inventory
financer must either take possession of the paper or insure that cash
paid by a chattel paper purchaser is applied to the inventory financer's
loan.
The impact of the priority rules governing proceeds upon the sale
of inventory financing, however, is most pronounced when the proceeds
are accounts. Under revised Article 9 the first secured party to file with
respect to either a debtor's inventory or accounts will be entitled to
priority in the accounts that constitute proceeds of the debtor's inven-
tory. 0 34 In contrast to the result under revised section 9-308(b), an in-
ventory financer who files first and claims accounts as proceeds is enti-
tled to priority over a subsequent purchaser of the accounts for new
value. 0 3 5 Moreover, under revised section 9-312(3) the purchase money
priority in inventory does not extend to proceeds in the form of ac-
counts.1 0 30 Therefore, a secured party claiming a floating lien upon a
debtor's current and after-acquired inventory, who files first with re-
spect to the inventory and before another secured party files with re-
spect to the debtor's accounts, is assured of priority in the accounts
generated by the sale of inventory. This priority rule, therefore, effec-
1033. See supra text accompanying notes 710-25.
1034. See supra text accompanying notes 908-1000.
1035. See supra text accompanying notes 969-86.
1036. See supra text accompanying notes 945-68, 987-1000.
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tively converts the inventory floating lienor into an accounts financer.
In contrast, if an accounts financer has filed first, the security gained
by a subsequent inventory financer is limited to the inventory in the
debtor's possession at the time of default. Thus, inventory and ac-
counts financing can rarely coexist.
In summary, the principal benefit an inventory floating lienor
gains by filing first is a prior claim to proceeds in the form of accounts.
The floating lienor's claim to the original inventory is fleeting and the
floating lienor's priority in after-acquired property is uncertain. The
floating lienor's security interest in the original inventory will be extin-
guished upon a sale to a buyer in ordinary course of business. More-
over, the purchase money priority rule of revised section 9-312(3) may
subordinate the floating lienor's claim to after-acquired ihventory.
Nevertheless, under revised Article 9 the floating lienor is assured of
priority in all accounts resulting from the sale of inventory. Therefore,
under revised Article 9 it is fair to characterize a secured party holding
a floating lien upon a debtor's inventory as an accounts financer who
has retained a security interest in inventory as additional security to
insure primarily against the event of the debtor's bankruptcy.
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